[ Western Balkans and EU ]

"There is no arguing that the Balkan countries are facing their most challenging year at precisely the moment when the EU does not seem thrilled about enlargement", writes M. Djilas in Transitions Online (1) (cf. also this blog, 1.3.2006). Indeed, 2006 will be a key year for the Western Balkans on their way towards the EU: Albania will sign its Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) in June 2006, SAA negotiations could be concluded with Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia-Montenegro at the end of the year, the status of Kosovo will be defined by the end of the year, FYROM will get a decision on when to start EU accession talks in November or December, and Croatia will soon start accession negotiations.

In 2004-2005 nevertheless, the perspective did not seem that good for the

Western Balkans. The violent riots in Kosovo in March 2004 meant a heavy draw-

back in the Standard and EU integration process. The SAA negotiations with

Bosnia-Herzegovina, due to be launched in spring 2005, were postponed because of

the failure of key-reforms such as the defence reform, the police reform (passed in

October 2005), and the law unifying the public broadcasting system (passed in

November 2005). The SAA talks with Albania were suspended in June 2005 during

the election process and SAA negotiations with Serbia-Montenegro were postponed

because of the lack of co-operation with the ICTY. Until October 2005 Croatia was

left without a decision on the start of its accession talks because of the lack of co-

operation in the capture of Ante Gotovina, and FYROM nearly failed to be

recognised candidate status at the EU summit in Brussels in December 2005,

because the French had threatened to veto the candidate status for FYROM if no

agreement was reached on the budget (cf. this blog, 13.12.2005).

Nevertheless, in October/November 2005, when the EU issued its progress

reports, all countries were "upgraded" despite (or because of?) the lack of

support in the EU population for Western Balkan integration (2). Nevertheless,

what does this really mean? According to M. Djilas (1), the EU's strategy is to

minimize the steps in order to maximize the "rewards" that the EU distributes for

each little progress achieved by the Western Balkan countries:

EU officials still underline that integrating the western Balkans is a

priority, but the context for this statement has surely changed. The failure of the

European constitution, anti-enlargement sentiments coupled with economic

difficulties in several member states, and disagreements about the very nature of the

EU all suggest that the EU will need to resolve some serious internal problems. At

the same time, if it wants to be able to affect the western Balkan countries, the EU

has to be credible with its long-term commitment to, and eventual membership for,

the region.

Aware that it will take a long time for the western Balkans to join the EU, both

because of the political and economic difficulties in the region and the internal

challenges the EU is facing, the EU seems to be thinking of breaking the benefits of

EU integration into smaller parts, so that each positive step by aspirant countries

can still be matched by a positive EU response. (1)

The "ladder" of EU integration thus consists of many little steps:

• feasibility study for SAA

• SAA
  
  negotiations

• signature and ratification of
  
  SAA

• candidate status

• start of
  
  EU accession negotiations

• signature and ratification of
  
  EU accession treaty

• accession

According to M. Djilas (1), "There is nothing wrong with this ["small-step"

approach], but regardless how small they may be, the benefits on offer have to be

real - at least as real as the challenges the western Balkan countries will have to

face over the course of 2006." However, the "small-step" approach is also reflected

in the EU's financial support for the Western Balkans, and it is questionable how


important the benefits will be for the Western Balkan countries who do not yet have

candidate status. The new financial instrument of the EU, the Instrument for Pre-

Accession (IPA), which will in 2007 replace the CARDS programme, will

distinguish between candidate countries (Croatia and FYROM) and potential

candidate countries. While candidate countries will benefit from the whole range of

assistance, potential candidate countries will benefit only of one part of it - and, of

course, resent this "2-tier" approach. It is also questionable if it would not make

more sense to invest a maximum into the potential candidate countries who need

more assistance in order to "catch up" (3) (cf. this blog, 12.12.2005).

---

Here is where the Western Balkans stand on the "ladder" of EU integration

(4):

Croatia had its SAA signed in 2001 was given the green light to start

accession negotiations in October 2005. The Croatian government will soon start

negotiations on the science and research chapters of the acquis

communautaire. Recently, the EU signed an Agreement on Decentralization of

Management with Pre-Accession Assistance with the government of Croatia, which

will now manage the EU assistance programmes (Phare, ISPA, SAPARD, and

CARDS).

FYROM signed in 2001 and got the status of candidate country in

December 2005. The Commission is to produce a report on FYROM in November

2006, and depending on the progress of the reforms in FYROM - especially in the

sectors of justice, fight against corruption, and police (5) -, a decision could be

taken at the end of 2006 on the starting date of EU accession talks.

Albania recently concluded a 3-year negotiation process with the EU

Commission, when Commission President Barroso signed Albania's SAA on 18

February 2006. The document now has to be approved by the 25 EU member

states, and the official signing ceremony is expected to take place at the next EU

summit in Vienna in June 2006. According to the EU Commission, Albania has to

make significant progress on corruption, organised crime, and in the justice sector

(6).

SAA talks with Serbia-Montenegro started in November 2005, but

could be suspended if Serbia does not fully co-operate with the ICTY. Without

setting a clear deadline, the EU Council indicated that if Mladic was not in the

Hague by the end of March/beginning of April, the next round of SAA talks

(scheduled for 4-5 April) could be postponed - or talks could be even suspended

completely. As Igor Jovanovic (7) notes, Carla del Ponte "looks certain to be

counted among the most powerful women in Serbia for some time to come."

SAA negotiations were opened with Bosnia-Herzegovina in November

2005 and talks started in January 2006. The progress of the negotiations will

depend on reforms in the sectors of public administration, public broadcasting,

police, co-operation with the ICTY, education, and electoral law reform - the

reforms will be monitored by a newly established working group of Bosnian and EU

experts. In addition to that, the EU expects amendments to the present constitution

(the Dayton agreement) in order to strengthen the central government structures.

(8)

Talks on the status of Kosovo started in Vienna on 20.2.2006 (cf. this blog, 22.2.2006). Although Kosovo is not a state, it takes part in the

Stabilisation and Association Process through a special Stabilisation Tracking

Mechanism. The EU closely monitors the standard implementation process, and is

planning an increased presence in Kosovo, especially in the policing and rule of law

sector.

---

(1) Milica Djilas: EU to Western Balkans: Communicating the Future, Transitions

Online, 24.2.2006

(2) Franz-Lothar Altmann: EU-Erweiterungsmüdigkeit und

Westlicher Balkan, SWP-Aktuell 60, December 2005.

(3) For more information about IPA, please check the EU website. On the EU Parliament website you can get the draft text and check the progress of the decision-

making process on IPA (the decision of the European Parliament is currently pending). The European Stability Initiative has published a very

interesting paper criticising the IPA draft: European Stability Initiative, Breaking Out Of The Balkan Ghetto: Why IPA Should Be Changed, 1.6.2005.

(4) Euractiv: Barroso, Rehn stress European future for Balkans, 20.2.2006.

(5) On FYROM: International Crisis Group: Macedonia: Wobbling

Toward Europe, Europe Briefing no. 41, 12.1.2006; Biljana Stavrova:

Catching the Train, Transitions Online, 14.11.2005.

(6) On corruption in Albania, cf. Artan Puto: Albania: How's Your Health?, Transitions Online, 13.2.2006; on

Albania's EU integration cf. Artan Puto:

Time to Deliver, Transitions Online, 27.2.2006.

(7) On Serbia-Montenegro: Igor Jovanovic, ICTY: Getting

Serious, Transitions Online, 6.2.2006; Cf. also the EU Council

conclusions on the Western Balkans, 27-28.2.2006 and Igor Jovanovic: This Time We’re Serious, Transitions Online, 27.2.2006.

(8) On Bosnia-Herzegovina: Mirna Skrbic: SAA Talks: Making the

Grade, Transitions Online, 1.2.2006.