Politics is a craft or skill, and ought precisely not to be analysed [...] as the mastery of a set of principles or theories. This does not imply that political agents do not use theories. Rather, part of their skill depends on being able to choose skilfully which models of reality to use in a certain context, and to take account of ways in which various theories are limited and ways in which they are useful or fail. The successful exercise of this skill is often called “political judgement”. (Raymond Geuss)

To say that one should replace knowledge by hope is to say much the same thing: that one should stop worrying about whether one has been imaginative enough to think up interesting alternatives to one’s present beliefs. (Richard Rorty)

1. Preliminary Considerations

It is true that the neo-conservative movement was ready and able to set the parameters of the debate concerning the war on terrorism soon after 9/11. Some realists eventually sided with the administration’s policy of invading Iraq, but many opposed the invasion on a number of ground. Even so, by the time the debate had ended, the realists proved to be unsuccessful in their attempt to prevent the invasion. Perhaps those who were dismissive of realist objections now wish they had been more constrained in their optimism. Since 2003, practically everything that could go wrong in this war has gone wrong. The deteriorating situation in Iraq, and this after seven long years of fighting, shows the neo-conservative case to have been somewhat flawed, thereby allowing for a resurgence of realism. This resurgence would not have been all that pronounced were it not for one persistent feature of realism: it constitutes “a continuing reference point against which competing positions [e.g., neoconservativism] consistently define themselves and a conceptual and rhetorical fulcrum around which both analytic and political debates revolve”. So political realism remains a powerful theoretical framework for thinking about international relations in general and the war on terrorism in particular.

Giving a definite description of this outlook is another matter, however. Even without the distortions, including caricatures, that realists often complain of as being offered up by their critics, realism still suffers from its own diversity or, as Stanley Hoffman refers to it, “its elasticity and indeterminateness”. There may be as many variations of realism as there are realists. Nonetheless, a thematic analysis of the literature suggests that there are strands that overlap one another and serve to link these variations or, better yet, that link bundles of variations that go by the names of “classical”, “neo-realist”, and “neo-classical realist”. It is these strands that continue to be used by theorists and policy-makers to justify a wide range of policy decisions. One such strand is the view that nation-state actors are involved in a struggle for power: hence, the realist tenet that foreign policy is a matter of national interest defined in terms of power.

Some realists and non-realists alike say more than that, however. They go one step further in their characterisation of realism by arguing that its stress on national interest and power weakens, if not severs, its link with morality. It is no wonder that some talk of “realism’s moral blindness”, to use a phrase from David Campbell and Michael Shapiro. George Kennan, a realist and an architect of United States cold war policy, expressed such a view when he identified the primary obligation of government with the “interests of the national society it represents”, which for him meant “those of its military security, the integrity of its political life and the well-being of its people”, interests that are neither morally good nor bad. Marshall Cohen, a critic of realism, came to the same conclusion – that realism is “amoral” – when he wrote that realists “argue that international relations must be viewed under the category of power and that the conduct of nations is, and should be, guided and judged exclusively by the amoral requirements of the national interest”. Finally, the influential political theorist Charles Beitz is blunt about this “blindness” when he insists that one of the core principles of realism is “that moral judgements have no place in discussions of international relations”. Simply put, there is no place for morality in realism, including within its central notion of the national interest.

Yet it would be wrong to simply make the case for national interest at all costs, as if moral virtues or principles played no part in the realist vision. On the contrary, there is a compelling case to be made for including the moral virtue of prudence, as well as various moral principles...
within political realism. Indeed, classical realists like Hans J. Morgenthau, E.H. Carr, and Reinhold Niebuhr, as well as neo-realists like John Mearsheimer, Kenneth Waltz, and Joel Rosenthal, can be read as having argued for the embeddedness of morality in realist thought: that a moralised realism is the presence of a substantive moral base.

It should be noted that while this debate is all about finding morality within the theory of realism expressed in the works of Morgenthau and others, there has been a trend towards finding foreign policy within morality expressed in the works of a number of theorists and policy-makers who have made reference to what has come to be known as ethical foreign policy, On this view, human rights are prioritised in the decision-making of Western foreign policy-makers. As David Chandler astutely notes, there has been a “shift from pursuing narrow interests in foreign policy to focusing on human rights questions in areas where Western states have little economic or geostrategic interest”. This shift appears in discussions of both armed humanitarian intervention and foreign aid allocation, but can be equally applied to an analysis of the war on terrorism. Although the prioritisation of human rights may suggest a turn from realism to the utopianism of idealism or the absolutism of moralism, it need not be understood as such. Broadening the war on terrorism debate to include human rights issues may simply mean that realism, as circumscribed by national interest defined in terms of power, can be moralised, and that it can be thinly moralised, as well as thickly moralised, depending on the moral psychology that is at work among the policy-makers. So the underlying mechanism of this shift does not so much involve a coherent set of realist tenets and the logical implications of those principles as it does the moral psychology of the foreign policy-makers.

Those who content themselves with scholastic substitutes for explanatory mechanisms, who immerse themselves in exegesis and thematic analysis of the works of prominent realists to the exclusion of all else, will continue to provide finer and finer discriminations within the conceptual landscape of realism while foregoing the value of moral psychology (à la moral agency) in rethinking the connection between moralised realism and the war on terrorism. Rather than contribute to more of the same, this essay ventures to discuss this connection within the context of moral agency or the exercise of the internal powers, capacities, and motivations through which an individual becomes a being who makes moral judgements and who actively intervenes in events.

The question now becomes: how might moral psychology improve our understanding of the relationship between the moralisation of realism and the war on terrorism? One way is by clarifying the conditions under which allies of the D.S. could argue for or against joining the war on terrorism while remaining within the realist camp. Of the two scenarios, the latter is by far the more interesting, for it may turn out that the political realism that justifies one country’s war on terrorism may be part of a moment of “moral temptation” experienced by the leadership of another country. In this situation the politically expedient policy clashes with the moral horror of the country’s past such that the allied leadership is unsure whether to order its country’s entry into and full participation in the war. It is not simply a matter of the leaders of one country making one moral judgement and the leaders of another country making a different judgement. Rather it has much to do with the moral psychology (or the determinants of moral judgement and behaviour) that is at work for each group of decision-makers.

Apologists for realism may be tempted to pass off talk of moral agency and moral temptation as pure drivel, for they may find it hard to believe that the moment of moral temptation would ever arise, given the tremendous suffering inflicted by a terrorist act such as 9/11, as well as the fact that terrorism in the guise of Jihadism is a global phenomenon forcing many countries to form vast alliances to protect themselves from terrorist attack. Why would there even be a question of not joining the fight, since embarking on a policy that downplays terrorism as a security threat is tantamount to “national suicide” and the demise of democracy. Of course, the apologists may react even further by saying that the mistake made by those who find explanatory power in the notion of moral temptation is that they disregard the role of prudence and expediency in politics. The classical realist and theologian Reinhold Niebuhr makes the case thus: “political tasks require a shrewd admixture of principle and expediency, of loyalty to general standards of justice and adjustment to actual power”. This would supposedly apply even to those leaders whose people have recently experienced the moral horror of genocide. The realist presumption is that allies should behave in a politically expedient way – e.g., they should come to one another’s aid in times of crisis (like a war on terrorism) because...
it will prove to be beneficial to each of them even if this is understood in terms of an interest in global peace and order. Or, in realist parlance, it is in their national interest, defined in terms of power, to do so.

Take 9/11 as a case in point. For a country to experience attacks such as those that took place on September 11, 2001 in New York City and Washington, D.C. would surely count as “times of crisis” of the worst kind. In the case of 9/11, then, we are led to believe that allies of the United States, including Bosnia, ought to join the fight against terrorism without question. However, this strong realist conclusion seems to take for granted that no interest peculiar to an ally like Bosnia could override the American imperative to engage in the fight against terrorism. Indeed, how could any ally have such an interest given that not engaging in the war on terrorism is tantamount to “national suicide and the demise of democracy”?

There are a number of questions that this presumption immediately raises. Is it, e.g., true that the presumption holds even though it is at odds with the quite reasonable injunction to respect the interests of other nations? I say reasonable because it could easily be read as a Kantian-like duty to respect the consciously conceived national interests and dignity of allied leaders who disagree with aspects of American foreign policy. Even if it were true that such duty to respect and not to manipulate is questionable from a strict Kantian perspective, is it possible for the duty to garner support from the realist tenet that American power and goodness (and wisdom) are limited, thereby allowing for at least the possibility of “consciously conceived national interests” that are contrary to American interests? If such interests are possible, can they be made actual for allied policy-makers through a process whereby the demand to join the war is overridden by some other duty that is peculiar to their country’s historical and moral contingency? These questions are obviously interrelated.

In what follows, I contend not only that the presumed obligation placed on our allies to enter the war on terrorism can be overridden by a duty unique to their own situation, but that the perception of their situation that leads to this duty can be explained through an empirically informed theory of moral psychology, like the inflationary model of morality formulated by Arne Johan Vetlesen. As I see it, policy-makers may experience moral temptation, a moment in which they as moral agents are tempted to be prudent and to decide in favour of joining the fight, yet face the morally praise-worthy choice of an alternative to fighting, at least fighting in the way that is asked of them. The prudent way is said to be in the line of least resistance, so that it is much more desirable than the praise-worthy choice. Nonetheless, that which is praise-worthy can be chosen by an “effort of the will” triggered by an empathic response toward the Other. This enables a person to act contrary to the felt balance of desire, and to achieve the higher end despite the fact that there is less desire for it. In the case of Bosnia, it is an experiential situation that provides policy-makers with the opportunity to move from a thinly moralised realism dominated by prudence and expediency to one thickened by the moral horror of genocide and ethnic cleansing and the subsequent realisation of the need for reconciliation in order to build a stable and lasting peace within its borders, and perhaps elsewhere in the world. Prudence and expediency may triumph, but there is a moment for an alternative to be contemplated and chosen.

After presenting reasonable definitions of terrorism, the terrorist qua fanatic, and the war on terrorism, I describe what a war on terrorism means for two countries, one of which is the powerful architect of the war, while the other is an ally that has the means to contribute to the war, and argue that a prima facie case can be made within a thinly moralised realism for the ally to enter the war and engage in a wide range of actions in support of it. Finally, I argue that an inflationary model of morality helps us to understand why the situation becomes blurred when the ally is a country like Bosnia, one that has recently suffered from years of moral horror like genocide and ethnic cleansing. It is in countries with such a past that the justification for certain actions in support of a war on terrorism may be overridden because moral perception allows the seeing of certain events as being morally relevant, which in turn leads to moral judgements that oppose a country’s going to war on terrorism. It is through a thickened moralised political realism that allied policy-makers may reconsider engaging in the war on terrorism in any way at all. What this entails is a serious shift in the locus of moral significance from preventing the worst from happening from without through the prosecution of a war to preventing the perpetuation of the worst from happening from within.
2. Terrorism, the Terrorist qua Fanatic, and the War on Terrorism

Before I attempt to show how thinly and thickly moralised realisms may lead to different consequences for policy-makers of powerful and not so powerful countries that are fighting a war on terrorism, I need to give some account of what I mean by the terms “terrorism”, “the terrorist qua fanatic”, and “war on terrorism”. Unfortunately, there is no consensus on these definitional questions. Moreover, no definition of terrorism can possibly cover all the types of terrorism that have appeared during the past two centuries. Yet I will answer them in ways that will facilitate a discussion of the moralization of realism.

First, what is meant by “terrorism”? Or, more to the point, what are we saying of an act when we say that it is a terrorist act? In this essay a terrorist act will be defined as an act of violence or a threat to use violence against non-combatants for the purpose of exacting revenge, intimidating, or otherwise instilling fear to advance a political or social agenda. Since terror is used by both state actors (viz., to advance perceived national interests) and non-state actors (viz., in opposition to the state), this definition covers both state terrorism and anti-state terrorism, though it is the latter that is addressed in this essay. Acts of terrorism can range from the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that result in the loss of thousands of innocent lives to the detonation of a roadside bomb (IED, Improvised Explosive Device) that kills a single person. No matter the number of causalities, the aim is to exact revenge, intimidate or instil fear in a population primarily composed of non-combatants. In short, the principle of discrimination and non-combatant immunity, which requires every reasonable effort to discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate (those not engaged in harming) targets, is in constant danger of being violated by the terrorist.

Second, who is the terrorist? The moral philosophers Jonathan E. Adler and R.M. Hare have contributed to our conceptual understanding of the terrorist qua fanatic. Adler makes it clear that when we say that a person is a fanatic, we mean that she is more than an individual who is willing to pursue actions – including terrorism – that violate most peoples’ moral sensibilities. Understood as a thinking being, fanatic describes a far richer individual, one who possesses an intellectual dimension that involves putting forth arguments intended to persuade others to share her commitments. Ordinarily the use of persuasive arguments is seen as eminently praiseworthy, if for no other reason than it signifies a persons’ willingness to communicate her position and to make it vulnerable to critical assessment. In the case of the fanatic, however, it is conceivable, if not inevitable, that she will never admit to such vulnerability even though her argument is exposed to real challenge and perhaps even refutation. The source of this inability, or unwillingness, to be open to reasoned interaction is found in an even more conspicuous aspect of this intellectual dimension: the reduction or absence of commonplace self-restraints on fanatical reasoning itself. Maneouvrering her favoured beliefs to keep them exempt from criticism takes centre stage. Being so convinced of her cause as just, the fanatic is aptly described as self-righteous, intolerant, excessively certain, and zealous. No wonder Adler is not very optimistic about the subversion of fanaticism through the use of counter-argument, as well as the fanatic’s outright rejection of terrorism.

Hare acknowledges this epistemic difficulty, yet does so in a more nuanced way that allows for a constructive defence against the spread of fanaticism and, thus, terrorism. First, Hare counterposes the fanatic with the utilitarian, thus defining the fanatic as one who possesses moral opinions that are divergent from those of the utilitarian. Far from being amoral, the fanatic in this regard can be seen as a moralizer, one who is lacking in the areas of self-awareness and the breadth of understanding of others’ situations, and is associated with a delusional sense of moral superiority. Then Hare distinguishes the more numerous impure from the pure or true fanatic insofar as the former’s moral opinions stray from the utilitarian’s because she is “unable or unwilling to engage in [...] critical thinking”, which is understood as a “refusal or inability to face facts or to think dearly, or for other reasons”. So if we imagine a continuum of how strictly people hold to commonplace self-restraints on belief construction and maintenance, and the two ends refer to the absence of such self-restraints and the maximization of said restraints, then the impure fanatic would be positioned at the former end. Clearly, this is what Adler has in mind. Whereas the impure fanatic is far removed from the critical thinker extraordinaire, Hare situates the pure fanatic in close proximity to the critical thinker. This he does by defining the pure fanatic as someone who “[is] able and willing to think critically, but somehow survived the ordeal still holding moral opinions different from those of the utilitarian”. This positioning is spurious, however. For if what Hare means by
the “critical thinking” of the pure fanatic is that she has the capacity for argumentation, but simply lacks the commonplace self-restraints on reasoning, then the pure fanatic is much closer to her impure cousin as Hare leads us to believe. Having said this, it seems only correct for Hare to view the pure fanatic with some trepidation. Hare is worried, for he writes:

If there are people so wedded to some fanatical ideal that they are able to imagine, in their full vividness, the sufferings of the persecuted, and who can still prescribe universally that this persecution should go on in the service of their ideals, even if it were they themselves who had to suffer thus, then they will remain unshaken by any argument that I have been able to discover.32

Almost three decades later, Hare solidifies the connection between the fanatic and the terrorist, while being adamant about closing off the possibility of thoughtful and reasoned decisions that are mutually persuasive. For Hare, the solution was self-evident, if a bit problematic.

The fanatical terrorist is a person who attaches so much importance to some ideal, that he is prepared to prescribe that he himself should be murdered, kidnapped, tortured, etc., if it were necessary in order to advance the cause which he has embraced […]. Of course most terrorists are not as clear-thinking as is required in order to engage in the sort of argument we have been having. They have an extremely selective view of the facts; they do not pay much attention to the facts on which we have been relying, such as the suffering that they are inflicting on others, and the rather dubious and over-optimistic nature of their own predictions. They give play to particular emotions to an extent which makes them incapable of logical thought. The philosopher cannot say anything that will help further an argument with such people; for he can only reason, and they will not. The argument will have to shift, instead, to the much more difficult moral question of what measures society can legitimately take in order to protect innocent people against them.33

Yet his earlier work sensibly gives us hope in countering the fanatic and, hence, the terrorist. So how can these passages be made compatible with each other? The key to dealing with fanatics is to “separate from the true fanatics, whose ideals really are proof against the ordeal by imagination and the facts, those who support them merely because they are thoughtless and insensitive [i.e., impure fanatics]”.34 On this view, if it were possible for the impure fanatics to be dealt with through the use of “powerful arguments”, and if pure fanatics only get their power over others (the impure fanatics) as a result of “confused thinking”, i.e., “by concealing facts and spreading falsehoods; by arousing passions which will cloud the sympathetic imagination – in short by all the familiar methods of propaganda”, then the fanatics as a whole will succumb to a divide and conquer strategy.35 And as long as we understand his later work as referring only to the impure fanatic, then moral philosophy’s ability to immunize the masses against the power of propaganda will also inoculate them against the fanatic (and, thus, reduce the ranks of the terrorist qua fanatic).

Finally, what can be said about “war on terrorism”? At some point the leaders of a country that is victimized by repeated terrorist attacks are unable or unwilling to continue playing the role of the victim and will declare “war on the terrorists”. Engaging in a full-blown offensive, complete with armoured columns, helicopter gunships, and large troop deployments may not be enough. Sometimes a country’s political leaders resort to language that gives them wide latitude in the prosecution of a war, including the supplementation of strict rules of law enforcement with war rules that condone the detention or even the killing of suspects without due process. Such a switch from one set of rules to the other surely has no political boundaries. Without a clear distinction between what is permissible during peacetime and what can be condoned during wartime, leaders worldwide could attempt to justify a wide range of actions by such a switch.

Perhaps one of the most striking examples of tampering with this distinction can be found in how the Bush administration handled the cases of Jose Padilla, a U.S. citizen, and Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, a Qatar national studying in the U.S. War rules were invoked in both cases to label the men “enemy combatants”, allowing the U.S. government to circumvent ordinary constitutional protections and subject these men to indefinite military confinement. Although those who manage the war may speak only of the supposed benefits of such tampering, Kenneth Roth, the executive director of Human Rights Watch, contends in his essay The Law of War in the War on Terror, that the Bush administration’s meddling with this distinction has had potentially devastating results.36
Errors, common enough to ordinary criminal investigations, are all the more likely when a government relies on the kind of murky intelligence that drives many terrorist investigations. If law-enforcement rules are used, a mistaken arrest can be rectified at trial. But if war rules apply, the government is never obliged to prove a suspect’s guilt. Instead, a supposed terrorist can be held for however long it takes to win the “war” against terrorism. And the consequences of error are even graver if the supposed combatant is killed [...].

Not surprisingly, the same rules have also been applied by the Bush administration in cases outside the United States, including Bosnia. In October 2001, the U.S. sought the surrender of six Algerian-born men with Bosnian citizenship, in part because the six were suspected Al Qaeda terrorists. Although the administration did secure the detention of these men through the application of law-enforcement rules, it resorted to war rules once the Supreme Court of the Federation of BiH ordered the suspects’ release for lack of evidence. The court’s decision to free the detainees did not prevent others within the Bosnian government from complying with a U.S. request to release the suspects into their custody. The suspects, known as the Algerian Group, were subsequently transferred to the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba for detention and interrogation.

Defining terrorism and the terrorist in this way, and sketching the case of the Algerian Group to show the wide latitude that can be given to a war on terrorism suggests that morality plays a key role in all of this; morality not only being routinely violated by the terrorist, but also serving as the terrorist’s ultimate nemesis. Some may contend that realism necessarily works against the terrorist in justifying countries’ entry in the war on terrorism. On this view, a thinly moralized realism does just that. However, a more thickly moralized realism may more closely reflect the historical and moral contingency of less powerful countries, thereby allowing the leadership of those countries to follow a more self-serving national interest and, thus, a foreign policy that excludes entering the war on terrorism.

3. Thinly Moralized Political Realism and the War on Terrorism

Before addressing what a war on terrorism would look like from a political realist perspective, we must first understand political realism. Although so-called neo-realism has become prevalent as the result of the works of Mearsheimer and Waltz, their work is a response to the classical form of this school of thought which assumes that statespersons and diplomats formulate and conduct policy in terms of national interest defined as power. However, if we are to place the war on terrorism into the realist framework, we need to understand how morality and realism are related to each other because war of any kind is the object of moral judgment and analysis. Of those who have dealt with morality and national interest, it is realism’s principal architect, Morgenthau, who made the most decisive statements on the topic. He took great effort to distinguish political realism from its rival political idealism and what Morgenthau took to be idealism’s principal defect – political moralizing. His work is also an especially apt beginning point because much of the debate between realism and idealism since his time has been motivated by his view and response to it.

As Greg Russell insightfully points out in Hans J. Morgenthau and the Ethics of American Statecraft, it is a widely-held assumption that Morgenthau’s realism is Hobbesian in nature: morality has no decisive role to play in how state conduct is determined. Morgenthau’s discussion of the state, interest, and power led some of his commentators and critics to this assumption when he wrote that “there is neither morality nor law outside the state”. Several years later he was much more explicit in this view when he wrote in the opening paragraph of his chapter on the Middle East in Truth and Power:

The actions of states are determined not by moral principles and legal commitments but by considerations of interest and power. Moral principles and legal commitments may be invoked to justify a policy arrived at on other grounds, as in the case of Vietnam; they may strengthen or weaken, depending upon the particular situation, the determination with which a certain policy is pursued; but they do not determine the choice among different courses of action. A rational discussion of the Middle Eastern crisis must start with this basic fact, however unpalatable to our moral sensibilities and law-abiding preferences.
Of course, if we take these passages at face value, then perhaps Robert G. Gilpin’s depiction of the realist assumption of “the primacy in all political life of power and security in human motivation” is readily applicable to Morgenthau’s realism. At best, we could say that Morgenthau’s realism subordinates morality to power and security or, at worst, that his view “epitomises the European legacy of realpolitik, with its intrinsic denial of ethical constraints upon the statesman.”

However, these words of Morgenthau’s do not capture the breadth and complexity of his thinking. In fact, those who focus on them to the exclusion of other passages mistakenly support the view that morality must be detached from power in order for power to retain the centrality that it does within politics in general and international relations in particular. But this simply is not the case; Morgenthau’s realism is much more sophisticated and nuanced than his detractors believe it to be. Anything but a confirmed “amoral realist”, Morgenthau’s realism involves a tension between, on the one hand, acknowledging that the basis of morality and its intimate connection with power, is a natural part of the human condition and, on the other hand, maintaining that the scope and efficacy of morality within international relations are subject to limits, though these limits may not be as strict as one might expect, thus making realism a close cousin to idealism. There are numerous passages within his corpus that support this alternative view, a view taken up, at least in part, by a number of writers, including Duncan Bell, Anthony F. Lang, Jr., Richard N. Lebow, Sean Molloy, and Michael C. Williams.

3.1 Morality and Power within the Human Condition

Whether we see Morgenthau as an Aristotelian (Lang), a deontologist (Lebow), a consequentialist (à la Williams wilful Realism), or as someone who proposed a “transcendent ethics” (Molloy), all these perspectives are compatible with the claim that the origin of morality is found within the human condition. In other words, morality is “natural”. Such a view is found most strikingly in Morgenthau’s short 1962 essay Love and Power. Here Morgenthau writes that man is a unique being insofar as “only man is capable of loneliness”. It is this quality of human existence, this existential void, that man must fill, and it is through the longing for love and the lust for power that man tries to escape his loneliness. So loneliness is the root of both love and power. Unfortunately, pure love, which humans can possess only within a concatenation of moments, is a rare experience because power corrupts, thus leading to the “inevitable frustration of love”. With the demise of love comes a lust for power, a substitute for love. But here again, man is damned, for “the acquisition of power only begets the desire for more”. Although Morgenthau does not refer to power in terms of evil in Love and Power, he does identify “power as the domination of man by man”, and this he connected to evil in his 1945 essay The Evil of Politics and the Ethics of Evil when he wrote that “to the degree in which the essence and aim of politics is power over man, politics is evil; for it is to this degree that it degrades man to a means for other men”. And so our everyday life is not the only arena for the “ubiquity of evil”, for there is “enduring presence of evil in all political action”. Morgenthau insists that the antinomy between the lust for power and the denial of this lust as a “universal ethical norm” cannot be resolved because each pole is part of the human nature of man. So with evil at every turn, but facing the ever-present need to decide what to do, Morgenthau seems to be of the view that man naturally accedes to his intuitions and selects a consequentialist decision-making procedure:

Political ethics is indeed the ethics of doing evil. While it condemns politics as the domain of evil par excellence, it must reconcile itself to the enduring presence of evil in all political action. Its last resort, then, is the endeavour to choose, since evil there must be, among several possible actions the one that is least evil.

For Morgenthau, then, power and morality have their origin within the human condition. Consequently, it does not make sense to think of morality as separate from politics in general and international relations in particular since power is at the heart of politics. But what about the scope and efficacy of moral principles (or norms) as they relate to international relations?
3.2 The Scope and Efficacy of Moral Principles

Of these issues, it is an examination of the scope of moral principles that is the easier of the two to conduct because it simply involves a search for de facto universal and absolute moral principles, and the existence of such principles is evidenced by there being someone who accepts them as legitimate. In this case, that someone is Hans Morgenthau. We are not seeking a Kantian deduction or demonstration of the legitimacy of the concept of universal and absolute moral principle. That would be a very different matter, and one that would require an a priori argument by Morgenthau. The goal here, on the other hand, is much simpler – to find Morgenthau having acknowledged that there are such principles. So where do we find textual evidence of universal and absolute moral principles within Morgenthau’s corpus? One place where we find Morgenthau sounding like an idealist is in In Defence of the National Interest where he writes that “[u]niversal moral principles, such as justice or equality, are capable of guiding political action only to the extent that they have been given concrete content and have been related to political situations by society”. This is a clear acknowledgement on Morgenthau’s part of the existence of such principles, though he attaches a rather important stipulation as to their application in the world, a point that will be examined below. Although Morgenthau does not define “universal”, it is reasonable to understand the term in a conventional way; that is, to say a principle is universal is to mean that the principle applies to everyone or every group, which in this case means every nation. So the principles of justice and equality as such cover every nation: they are universal.

But are these moral principles also absolute? I believe this is more difficult to determine in the absence of an explicit claim to that effect. However, I think it is reasonable to believe that he thought these principles were both universal and absolute per se. Why? It is based on the relationship between the notion of absoluteness and the stipulation of applicability. Again, Morgenthau does not define “absolute”. But if we take the conventional view once again, then to say a moral principle is absolute means that the principle “must be given precedence over all other competing” principles. Other ways of saying the same thing include that their “prohibitions hold come what may”, which amounts to a certain “moral inflexibility” and that they express “some things that ought never (i.e., under any circumstances or conditions) to be done to any human being or some things that ought always (under all conditions) to be done for every human being”. This understanding of absoluteness seems to fit nicely with his stipulation of applicability if we take the latter as a constraining force on the scope of moral principles. That is to say, regardless of their universality and absoluteness as principles in moral space, these principles bear out their scope only in their capacity (or efficacy) to guide conduct and, in this case, to guide foreign policy. As I read Morgenthau, however, the universal and absolute principles of justice and equality can only guide if they become concretised, but in the process of becoming concretised, these principles lose their qualities of universality and absoluteness. Given that his stipulation suggests a constraint on the scope of those principles, it applies to both universality and absoluteness. Assuming not only their universality but their absoluteness, then, seems to be in keeping with the function of his stipulation of applicability and how we ordinarily understand scope.

Are there other places within Morgenthau’s work that suggest universal and absolute moral principles? I believe so. Let me briefly indicate their presence in two discussions. First, Morgenthau explicitly refers to the denial of the lust for power as a “universal ethical norm”; thus, this denial norm “applies to everyone”. Is it absolute as well? Insofar as the denial is less of an operational norm wielded by persons as agents and more of a reference to the primal spark of morality itself, something that is embedded in the human condition, it appears to be not only universal, but also absolute. But given that it is more or less a fact about the human condition, a condition that both realists and idealists share, this instance of a universal and absolute moral principle is not very interesting. Second, Morgenthau’s reference of the “first principle” of political ethics – the principle of the least evil – appears to be another instance of such a moral principle, esp. if it is understood as an intuitive response to the metaphysical fact that we face evil at every turn within the human condition. This principle is different from the denial norm insofar as the former is consequentialist; however, it is a principle that is even more connected to Morgenthau’s stipulation of applicability. This is because the principle can only acquire its complete meaning and application (efficacy) within a particular context: when national interest circumscribes the weighing of consequences or perspectives (prudence) and when proportion is taken into account (moderation); in other words, when
something akin to Aristotelian practical wisdom is the handmaiden of national interest. So it is reasonable to portray the principle of the least evil as both universal and absolute.

What all this means is that Morgenthau the realist is in agreement with the idealist insofar as moral principles are: (1) standards by which international relations can be judged; and (2) these principles are sometimes recognised to be universal and absolute. But the similarity ends here. It must be remembered that Morgenthau is insistent on distinguishing political realism from political idealism. The idealist or moralist would have us believe in the antithesis of the national interest and moral principles within foreign policy. According to the idealist, the formulation and implementation of foreign policy is to be driven by a set of moral absolutes; such policy is not intended to conform with the national interest but rather with what are considered to be abstract, universal, and absolute moral principles such as justice, equality, and liberty. Their universal and absolute scope make them the sole standards by which international relations are to be judged.

But granting morality such an exalted status within international relations is what makes Morgenthau question idealism in the first place, for he thought universal and absolute principles were “appropriate only in an already perfect moral world where nobody wants what could infringe upon anybody else’s wants”. These principles would suffice in the perfect world. Why wouldn’t they, given that it is perfect? But that is not the world in which we live. To apply them “indiscriminately without regard to time and place” in our imperfect world, insists Morgenthau, would be to inflict upon ourselves a form of political myopia, blinding us to the machinations of power politics with, no doubt, devastating results. Yet it is surely not the morality within idealism that Morgenthau is reacting against and that he wishes to exorcise from the theory and practice of international affairs. Rather it is the presence of moralism within idealism, i.e., the “tendency to make one moral value supreme and to apply it indiscriminately without regard to time and place” that Morgenthau finds unacceptable.

In a revealing passage describing the idealist’s antithesis, Morgenthau, the political realist, writes:

The equation of political moralising with morality and of political realism with immorality is itself untenable. The choice is not between moral principles and the national interest, devoid of moral dignity, but between one set of moral principles divorced from political reality, and another set of moral principles derived from political reality.

It is this moralism or “moral perversion” that lies at the heart of Morgenthau’s disillusionment with idealism. It is reflected in the perverse nature of this antithesis insofar as “a foreign policy guided by universal [and absolute] moral principles, by definition relegating the national interest to the background, is [...] a policy of national suicide, actual or potential”. And to engage in such a policy, claims Morgenthau, is to act immorally, particularly when there are neither universal and absolute moral principles capable of guiding the state in their very abstractness nor supranational enforcement agencies that can look after the interests of particular nations. The crisis occurs because statespersons and diplomats attempt to guide foreign policy with such principles to the exclusion of national interest. But they need not act in this way. To prevent this disaster from occurring in an imperfect world, then, not only must statespersons and diplomats employ a morality that takes into account the complexities of political reality within moral judgements, but the making of those judgements must require a far more robust morality that is up for the task. This is exactly what Morgenthau has in mind for realism. Not only is the machinery of morality more diverse (there are a number of important moral principles like justice and liberty, but also virtues such as prudence and moderation, as well as the concept of the national interest), but context (the political, economic, and social realities of the situation) is very important. Contrary to idealism, then, moral principles are neither the sole standards by which international relations are judged nor are they standards that can be effective without some sort of concretisation or connectedness to a particular time and place.

These facets represent important strands within Morgenthau’s “dynamic realism”. Even though moral principles become more nuanced through concretisation, the configurations of variables that are at work in political situations are numerous, if not limitless. The problem for universality and absoluteness (and abstractness) is that these principles and political situations are situated within societies that have their own histories and causal networks
that constrain universality and absoluteness, and thus their applicability. The more one prudently concretises and makes a moral principle suitable for application, the less abstract (or more particular) it becomes. Once this occurs, the moral principle is no longer universal and absolute, thus making it unable to take precedence over all other principles. At some point, one starts to question whether moral principles can ever apply to all human beings and to all situations, regardless of what society they belong to. Perhaps this is what ultimately distinguishes realism from idealism; the efficacy of moral principles is furthered by increasing concretisation, making the principles cover a narrower field of situations. But this is how we need to proceed, according to Morgenthau, because anything that works against the very existence of national communities, and thus order and morality as we know it, must be resisted on moral grounds. This is the political reality that binds rather than severs national interest and morality, and that brings to the forefront the moral virtue of prudence that is at the heart of Morgenthau’s realism.

3.3 Thinly Moralised Realism and the War on Terrorism

While Morgenthau is not himself advocating political realism qua “moralism” or the view that conventional moral norms are the sole standards by which international relations are to be judged, I think it is clear that the sorts of considerations that he takes to be relevant to the scope and efficacy of moral principles represent nothing less than morality’s embeddedness in realist thought. However, the result is a realism that is thinly moralised, one in which the moral constraints are rather “timid” such that much will be allowed in achieving power and security in the name of national interest.

How can this be so? Remember that it is imperative for national interest not to be relegated to the background of a foreign policy. That amounts to national suicide and that is immoral. The importance of national interest, however, is made more pronounced by Morgenthau’s realism insofar as those interests are safeguarded in a rational foreign policy. The need for a rational foreign policy follows, for Morgenthau, because it is only a rational foreign policy that complies with the moral precepts of prudence and the political requirement of success by minimising risks and maximising benefits. And what is gauged in terms of risks and benefits is none other than the national interest, which is protected from idealism’s moralising by the virtue of prudence, which Morgenthau finds to be the standard for all virtues political and moral.

In effect, morality does not arise in politics unless prudence, as well as moderation, operates to insure that the political consequences of actions are acknowledged.

What is interesting about prudence, as well as moderation, is that it casts realism as exhibiting a particular moral theory, that is, a consequentialist approach as opposed to a non-consequentialist one (such as Kant’s deontological theory or W.D. Ross’s intuitionist theory). The former approach to moral theorising possesses a criterion of rightness that is specified in terms of what an action (or a practice) brings or is expected to bring about. So the consequentialist looks to the overall difference that a particular action will make (or is expected to make) to the world. It is the consequences and not the motive of the action or the intrinsic nature of the action that is morally relevant to the action’s rightness or wrongness. Indeed, this stress on a consequentialist ethic is viewed by Morgenthau as being at the very heart of realism, for he tells us that

[r]ealism [...] considers prudence – the weighing of consequences of alternative political actions – to be the supreme virtue of politics. Ethics in the abstract judges action by its conforming with the moral law, political ethics judges action by its political consequences.

Viewing prudence in this way places Morgenthau in opposition to those who believe that prudence is only about strict self-interest, and hence hostile to morality because morality is exclusively other-regarding. Such a view is questionable on at least two counts: (1) figures within the history of ethics, including Socrates and Kant, conceived of morality as possessing some aspects that were fundamentally self-regarding; and (2) there is also a history of taking prudence as being a part of morality (think Aristotle and practical wisdom) even in its strictest sense.
But we should not sell prudence short by simply limiting it to the “weighing of consequences” or to think of prudence as “the ability to make morally responsible decisions in international politics” as if that tells the whole story. Prudence (a focus on perspective), and moderation (a focus of proportion), are moral virtues within realism and they combine to do an enormous amount of work. Part of this work includes the concretisation of moral principles, noted in the aforementioned section. It is through this process that principles become particular, connected to a particular time and place, and thereby suitable for application. It also involves the “realistic appreciation in the exercise of practical judgement”, which covers a variety of concerns, including not downplaying the horrors of war and not overly narrowing the criterion of success when considering even the best of motivated wars, concerns that are taken into account “in order to counterbalance the concern with moral principles and high moral values”. In sum, what is important for Morgenthau is that moral principles such as justice, equality, and liberty are regulated by prudence in the name of national interest and that this regulatory feature is understood in terms of the consequences of actions and policies.

Where does this leave us with respect to countries whose leadership subscribes to a thinly moralised realist foreign policy and who face a war on terrorism? Take the case of Country A, the powerful architect of a war on terrorism, whose leadership cites winning this war to be one of its country’s national interests. Such a decision could easily reflect the realist’s rational foreign policy insofar as it minimises risks and maximises benefits as a result of prudence and political success, reducing the influence of the vast array of moral principles. Furthermore, suppose that winning the war requires a country that is an ally of Country A and that has the means to contribute to the war, Country B, to transform into one of its own national interests. It is not enough to say of n (the war on terrorism must be won) that it is “numerically identical” simply because it is apart of each country’s national interest. Instead, a transformational process is involved because for n to be a national interest of a country requires it to fit into a „web of interests” that are shaped by, and cannot be understood apart from, a set of political, economic, social, and military factors that are relational in nature and thus unique to each country. Consequently, ≠A ≠B, but rather ≠A [≠F6?] nb (where [≠F6?] designates the transformational process). In other words, n acquires an instantiated identity when it becomes a national interest of a particular country, . What does it mean to say that Country B is a loyal ally such that ?A [≠F6?] B? Assuming that countries act on that which they deem to be in their national interest, this process means that Country B will join the war on terrorism. And Country B does so not because of , but because of though without , there would be no . In this case, even a „thinly moralised” realism leads Country B to come to the aid of Country A because both countries possess leaders who find it prudent and expedient to defeat the terrorists ( and ). Defeating the terrorists is taken to be a good, which seems natural, given the evils of terrorism.

However, is joining a war on terrorism an absolute or unconditional requirement for Country B and the other allies of Country A? Is joining the war the sort of thing that ought always, under all conditions, to be done by every ally of Country A that subscribes to a thinly moralised realist foreign policy? The leadership and theorists of Country A may believe so, particularly if they evidence strong nationalist sentiments that exhibit a chauvinism toward their own values and policies. It cannot be denied that there is forcefulness behind making others’ interests one’s own in times of crisis, esp. when the sort of crisis being reacted to recognises no political or geographic boundaries. Terrorism is just such a crisis. Admittedly, for the leadership of Bosnia or any other country to choose neutrality in such matters may ultimately spell disaster for their country when terrorism itself is globalised. But from the perspective of Country B, the answer would surely be not, since national interests are “webbed” interests that are particular to countries; and these may include interests that are peculiar to their country’s historical and moral contingency. This becomes clearer once we enter into the world of real countries possessing real interests, as is the case with Bosnia.

4. The Thickening of Political Realism

In the previous section, prudence was finally described as having a regulatory function over moral principles in the name of the national interest. But there is an additional meaning of prudence that is compatible with regulation. As the ethicist W.D. Falk does not allow us to
forget, “not everything done for oneself is done for reasons of prudence”. (And I would add, not everything done for others is done for reasons other than prudence.) Moral agents can act for themselves in many ways, prudence being just one of those ways. To act prudently is to play it safe, for near-certain gains at small risks. But some good things one cannot get in this way. To get them at all one has to gamble, taking a risk of not getting them even so, or of coming to harm in the process. So too in the realm of foreign policy. Yet calling a policy reckless does not tell us what risk has been taken, nor that we should be distancing ourselves from it. Indeed, risks can take many forms: some may see a risky policy if it calls for a more extensive conception of national interest (one that includes the protection of human rights), if it is less dismissive of those moral principles (like justice and equality) that prudence attempts to regulate; or if it is limited by the extent to which a national interest that includes the reconciliation among its own peoples takes precedence over foreign engagements. A less than prudent foreign policy can occur in these ways.

It is evident, then, that our choices are not limited to either a thinly moralised realism that is governed by the tandem of national interest and prudence or political moralism that conforms policy to moral principles at the cost of national interest. So what other choice is available that provides a denser moral terrain? Given all of Morgenthau’s talk of the regulation of moral principles, we might conclude that there is no support in his corpus for such an alternative. Indeed, the allowance for moral concerns to override prudence or to act as limiting conditions for accepted national interests defined in terms of power would necessarily undermine Morgenthau’s entire politico-ethical framework, thereby creating a paradox. However, a number of passages within his corpus make such a paradox obvious. In the beginning pages of *The Twilight of International Morality*, Morgenthau sets out to temper his realism against the exaggerated influence of national interest on international politics by recognising that universal and absolute moral principles are in fact at work in the world, thereby casting his lot for a morally thicker realism. Morgenthau acknowledges that there are limits to what mid-20th century statespersons and diplomats are willing to do. As he remarks,

> [t]hey refuse to consider certain ends and to use certain means, either altogether or under certain conditions, not because of considerations of expediency in the light of which a certain policy appears to be impractical or unwise, but by virtue of certain moral rules of conduct which interpose an absolute barrier against a certain policy and which do not permit it to be considered at all from the point of view of expediency [...]. Their restraining function is most obvious and most effective in so far as the sacredness of human life in times of peace is concerned.

This is followed by a passage that can be taken as a rallying point for realists that recognise that there are even limits, albeit few, to national interest:

> A foreign policy, however, which does not admit mass extermination as a means to its end imposes upon itself this limitation, [...] by virtue of an absolute moral principle the violation of which no consideration of national advantage can justify. A foreign policy of this kind, therefore, actually sacrifices the national interest where its consistent pursuit would necessitate the violation of an ethical principle, such as the prohibition of mass killing in times of peace [...]. [T]he fact of the matter is that nations recognise a moral obligation to refrain from the infliction of death and suffering under certain conditions despite the possibility of justifying such conduct in the light of a higher purpose, such as the national interest.

Morgenthau holds to this same view almost twenty years later when he writes in *Politics among Nations* that “superior power gives no right, moral or legal, to do with that power all that it is physically capable of doing”. “Moral rules”, Morgenthau goes on to argue, do not permit certain policies to be considered at all from the point of view of expediency. Such ethical inhibitions operate in our time on different levels and with different effectiveness. Their restraining function is most obvious [...] in affirming the sacredness of human life in times of peace.

Although national interest remains a cornerstone of Morgenthau’s realism, his intent is clear: to give realism a human face; to halt the slide of politics into a wanton disregard for humanity by ridding realism of the illusion of the absoluteness of the national interest. In short, Morgenthau struggled to address the lived realities of the political life, the possibilities and limitations of ethical action by statespersons and diplomats. Perhaps the worst that we could
do to one another – mass extermination or genocide – confirmed to Morgenthau the need for the possibility of an unconstrained moral principle. Understood in this way, realism has therefore evolved into a morally thickened variety. In this sense, prudence and national interest become increasingly constrained in matters of extreme moral urgency. This might suggest that there is no other way in which realism can be thickened in a morally relevant sense. However, such a view would be misleading.

It is as common and perhaps also just as reasonable to think that there is nothing inherent within realism that precludes moral principles from being included in a country’s national interest. Indeed, beyond construing the thickening of realism solely through moral principles either overriding prudence or limiting national interest, a more transformative view of realism, one that includes elements of morality – norms, principles, and obligations – as part of a country’s national interest, develops and finds coherence in the context of an inflationary model of moral psychology and the experience of moral temptation. Actually, both the model and the experience give coherence to the other views of a thickened realism, although the transformative view is the most interesting of the three because it redefines national interest in terms that make it much more difficult for human rights, e.g., to be neglected and unprotected, since they are identified as a national interest and, thus, are prioritised within a realist foreign policy.

Some may construe this transformative view of realism strictly in terms of consequentialism, in which case engaging in humanitarian interventions in order to protect people’s human rights, e.g., becomes a part of a country’s national interest because it places the country in some sort of an advantageous position among other countries. It is plausible to suppose that, as a result of such intervention, the country’s world stature is enhanced; it finds a foothold in another country or region that has strategic value; or it provides relief that addresses some of the causes of terrorism. In emphasising consequentialism, the account given here identifies the enhancement, foothold, and combat of terrorism as what induces the thickening. In other words, what leads policy-makers to include humanitarian intervention as a national interest is that certain consequences are likely to accrue from it, and these are none other than the inducers of moral thickening – enhancement, foothold, and combat of terrorism. It is all about the goodness that is expected to be generated by the intervention.

However, these may not be what induce the thickening, though these three factors may strengthen the determination with which certain policies are pursued. Instead, that which thickens realism may simply be related to the fact that people are moral beings who sometimes perceive a situation in a moral sense as one of extreme moral horror, in which case they can make a moral judgement that reflects the overriding normative status of certain moral principles, such as anti-genocide norms. It is at the judgement phase of moral performance that the perception of extreme moral horror triggers moral intuitions that are deontological in nature, and that associate the anti-genocide norms with, e.g., human dignity and respect (Kant) or the non-reducible duty of non-maleficence (Ross), thereby giving these principles an overriding status and promoting humanitarian intervention as a national interest. Although this perception of extreme moral horror is not as commonplace among people as one might hope for, it is crucial to how elements of morality find their way into a country’s national interest in ways that have little to do with consequentialism. Thus, an appeal to an inflationary model of moral psychology is useful in explaining how this is so.

What, then, are the relevant aspects of an inflationary model (or holistic account) for demonstrating that realism can be moralised in a non-consequentialist way? These essential aspects are crystallised by Arne Johan Vetlesen in his *Perception, Empathy, and Judgement* (1994). According to Vetlesen, moral performance is a view of moral agency (or a person’s capacity for making moral judgements and engaging in conduct that agrees with morality). Such agency is often depicted as starting with a moral predicament followed by judgement and action. It is commonly thought that two well-informed, rational individuals who subscribe to the same moral theory, and who stumble into the moral predicament, would likely make somewhat similar judgements though they may or may not act on their judgements. Although this may be an overly optimistic account of like-minded actors, it does seem reasonable to suppose that actors who subscribe to radically different moral theories are more likely to disagree in their judgements, though it is difficult to imagine an act or rule utilitarian and a Kantian deontologist disagreeing on the moral impermissibility of genocide, for example.
Perhaps the most important question for how an inflationary model relates to realism may have less to do with whether there is agreement among our judgements and more to do with how we “attend” to the objects of moral judgement in the first place. How do we come into contact with the objects of moral judgements? Vetlesen acknowledges the importance that has been traditionally given moral judgement, yet he assigns moral perception with the task of providing and shaping the setting for both moral judgement and moral action. Thus, for Vetlesen, judgement is concerned with deliberations on how best to act given certain moral norms and precepts, with judgement exercised only when moral perception allows the person to “see” […] the situation at hand as a morally relevant one.91

What exactly enables us to “see” the situation as a morally relevant one? What must be satisfied for a person to be able to see whether and to what extent the well-being of others is at risk in a given situation? In a very un-Kantian move, Vetlesen turns to emotions; for it is through emotion, more specifically, the emotional faculty of empathy, that we experience the objects of moral judgements.92 He goes on to explain:

It is by virtue of this faculty that I can put myself in the place of the other by way of a feeling-into and feeling-with. Empathy allows me to develop an appreciation of how the other experiences his or her situation; empathy facilitates the first reaching out toward and gaining access to the other’s experience, but empathy does not […] mean that I myself come to feel what the other feels. I do not have to feel the other’s feeling in order to grasp, and thereupon be able to judge in light of, how the other experiences the situation he or she is in.93

However, feelings of sympathy and compassion towards another do not arise out of themselves, as it were. Rather, these feelings are directed towards others by virtue of their suffering. So, without the subject of the emotion regarding the object as being in a certain state, e.g., of suffering or pain, the phenomenon of suffering would not be constituted as an object for moral judgement.

Given that moral perception is what “initiates” moral performance, a person’s inattentiveness or indifference – lack of empathy – to the moral circumstances of a situation, will have devastating results for passing judgements.94 Perhaps this is less of a problem for those who reside together in situations of relative tranquillity, for there will be frequent personal interactions that are “felt” to be positive. At some point, the basic emotional faculty of empathy is triggered. But how easy is it for that same faculty to be triggered in situations involving peoples of different ethnicity and religion who do not reside together and who have few associations with one another? It is likely that this case would be one of “benign” inattentiveness or indifference, the Other having little, if any, moral significance, thus making it unlikely for there to be objects for moral judgement. Worse yet are those situations that are less than tranquil. Given, e.g., the hatred and anger that often overwhelm the empathic response of those who are victimised by terrorist attacks or who espouse ethnic nationalism, victims and nationalists alike may become “combative” and stricken with a “malevolent” form of inattentiveness. It is not simply a “lack” of empathy, but rather a set of contrary emotions that inhibit empathy. The case of combativeness is much more severe than that of “benign” inattentiveness, for it is likely that some harm will be intentionally done to the Other.95 The quantity and quality of “felt” interactions will be different. The possibility of respect and concern toward the Other ceases at this point; increasing the weal is not an option, but increasing the woe is, and this situation is contrary to empathy. In such a hostile situation, moral perception must be jumpstarted by the re-invigoration of attentiveness or empathy, thereby allowing one to once again recognise the Other’s moral significance and well-being.

If I were to try to layout the mechanism by which perception is jumpstarted, it would require nothing less than piecing together how risking hospitality triggers attentiveness so that intercultural education, storytelling, walking through history, and moral imagination stir up empathic responses. Fortunately, my task is a more limited one, for I am interested in how moral perception helps to explain the moralising of realism in a non-consequentialist way. I believe we have found the answer, for moral principles and thus, moral judgements, acquire a new-found importance with regard to certain sorts of events in the world only if moral perception allows policy-makers to see those events as being morally relevant, which ultimately means that those same policy-makers can empathise with the various peoples in those situations. It is at this point that the importance of those moral principles becomes enhanced to the point where they may become part of the country’s national interest. It is not a matter of
figuring out the utility of including the moral principles in the national interest, but rather a matter of the overriding normative status of certain moral principles because we are moral beings; and it is this status that has led these principles be incorporated as a prioritised part of the country’s national interest. This could account for why Morgenthau seemed to shift his position to recognise the overriding status of certain moral principle, viz., the principle prohibiting mass extermination.

One might object, saying that what has been laid out is not two competing versions of moralised political realism but a thin sort that is in competition with a doctrine that is not properly classified as political realism. As the argument goes, acting morally either coincides with national interest or it does not. If adhering to moral concerns is in the national interest, then a thinly moralised realism is sufficient to argue for following morality because behaving morally is then ultimately a matter of prudence. On the other hand, if moral concerns trump national interest, then it is not clear that the primary obligation of a government is always the pursuit of national interest. This leads moral behaviour to an abandonment of political realism.

These criticisms overlook the distinguishing characteristic of thinly and thickly moralised political realism. First, a thinly moralised realism of Morgenthau’s variety takes moral principles like justice and equality as principles regulated by prudence (in terms of consequences of actions and policies) in the name of national interest. It is a consequentialist moral theory that may not properly take into account human dignity and respect but may sacrifice them for the sake of national interest. If this is the case, then a thinly moralised realism makes morality a stepchild to prudence and national interest.

Second, thickly moralised realism does not amount to moral concerns trumping national interest in the sphere of governmental actions and policies but is a matter of certain moral principles becoming prioritised parts of a country’s national interest. Rather than overriding the national interest, the moral principles overrule other parts of the national interest. This could be what does away with the paradox that threatens Morgenthau’s politic-ethical framework. So the claim that thickly moralised political realism is actually an abandonment of realism is unwarranted.

Perhaps a better critique would focus on how a thinly moralised realism would remain thin once empathetic responses were made as precursors to moral judgements. Would the thinly moralised version simply transform into a thick version? Or would prudence and national interest be such that the making of moral judgements would be short-circuited? Laying out the mechanism by which realism can be moralised in a non-consequentialist way does not lead realism to be necessarily for or against the war on terrorism. Indeed, a thickly moralised realism does not necessarily rule out going to war. It is possible for elements of morality to become national interests that frustrate the worst from happening, and thereby support tranquillitas ordinis (i.e., civil peace). If terrorism undermines civil peace by disturbing the everyday order enjoyed by citizens as well as the state’s ability to conduct business as usual, and ultimately the country’s national interests (understood in terms of peace, security, and prosperity), then arguments against entry into a war on terrorism may be difficult to defend. Perhaps some moral theories are better equipped than others to make such a defence; even so, the fact that terrorism is antithetical to a country’s peace, security, and prosperity is a major hurdle to overcome for the sake of staying out of the war.

We must not forget that acts of terrorism may be so intermittent, of such a small scale, and have such limited success in instilling fear in the populace that terrorism may have a negligible impact on civil peace and a country’s national interest, thereby undermining an argument for war proposed by any variety of moralised realism.

5. The Constraining Force of Thickly Moralised Realism and the Same War

Yet even if a thinly and thickly moralised realism justifies the weaker ally’s entry into the war, this does not mean that the ally is required to battle the terrorists in every way that the stronger partner demands. Although allied leaders may have political and moral reasons to engage in such a war, they may also have political and moral reasons to be highly selective in how they prosecute the war. Whereas the thin form may call for greater latitude in how to conduct the war, the thick form may constrain the means by which the war ought to be prosecuted.
How could the different forms of moralised realism do this? To begin with, we must remember that the moralizations under discussion are of political realism, so national interest defined in terms of power and security is essential. However, these moralizations may lead to incongruous judgements. Part of what makes thinly moralised realism so viable is its compatibility with what Jean Bethke Elshtain calls the basic end of *government-tranquillitas ordinis*. "Without civic peace", she notes,

a basic framework of settled law and simple, everyday order–human life descends to its most primitive level. By primitive I mean rudimentary, the bare minimum – we struggle just to stay alive. Although much more is required for a functioning democratic political community, including the virtues of trust and compromise, we can at least say that civic peace is foundational and that the state has an important role in making sure that peace is achieved. Civic peace requires the state, Elshtain writes, "to create those minimal conditions that prevent the worst from happening – meaning, the worst that human beings can do to one another". In turn, without meeting these "minimal conditions", political leaders would find it difficult to implement policies that would enhance their country's peace, security, and prosperity. Whatever jeopardises the civic peace of a country also jeopardises its national interests, and this makes terrorism a prime menace; for terrorism attempts to create "the worst that human beings can do to one another". Consequently, civic peace becomes part of the thin realist project by offering further support for why countries should go to war against terrorism.

But the fact that civic peace is a condition for a country's acting on its national interests is reason enough to think that the need to maintain civic peace will lead to an even more robust realism by offering a further basis for greater latitude in the prosecution of a war on terrorism. The basic idea is that if *tranquillitas ordinis* supports a country's national interests, including a war on terrorism, by providing a suitable “habitat”, and terrorism acts to undermine that "habitat", then whatever a country could do to combat terrorism would itself serve to promote *tranquillitas ordinis* along with the country's other national interests. In other words, prudence would call for even further regulation of moral principles for the enhancement of national interest. So, in the case of the Algerian Group, Bosnian leaders could have agreed to deliver the six detainees to U.S. officials on the grounds that by doing so they were "creating those minimal conditions that prevent the worst from happening". In this case it could have been an attack on the U.S. embassy in Sarajevo. In addition, it would have sent a clear message to Washington that Bosnia was still a loyal ally to the U.S., thus creating grounds for favouritism towards Bosnia in future allocations of foreign aid. Indeed, the valuing of loyalty could turn out to be at the heart of a political bias toward needy allies. So the thin form of realism could well support both entry into the war on terrorism and greater latitude for the war's prosecution. On the other hand, the thin form could well support a judgement that does not make it prudent for Bosnia to comply with U.S. demands, given its own demographic makeup of 40% Bosniaks. Going along with U.S. demands may, in fact, result in the undermining of *tranquillitas ordinis* by making Bosnia a prime target for Islamic terrorist groups.

But there remains the question of how the thick form of realism deals with these same entry and prosecution issues. As I suggested earlier in this work, the basis of this thickening is our capacity of moral perception, an emphatic capacity that allows us to perceive situations of extreme moral horror, thereby allowing us to make moral judgements that elevate certain moral principles to the point of overriding prudence and expediency. Of course, such perceiving is crucial for an “outsider”, i.e., one who has not had the “lived experience” of one whose people have been the victim of genocide or ethnic cleansing. But for this thickening to take place for outsiders, they must move beyond simply “visualising” the feelings of those who have experienced the moral horror of genocide and ethnic cleansing, for simply visualising their feelings does not entail that they have pity for them. As Max Scheler wrote in his insightful *The Nature of Sympathy*: "Such 'visualised' feeling remains [sic] within the cognitive sphere, and is not a morally relevant act." Instead, what is needed is fellow-feeling, "of feeling the other's feeling, not just knowing of it, nor judging that the other has it; but it is not the same as going through the experience itself". It is at this point, then, that political leaders who are outsiders can no longer remain indifferent to the Other's plight, which results in the elevation of anti-genocide norms for possible inclusion in their country's national interest. The moral horror of genocide and ethnic cleansing would influence a change in
U.S. national interest. Unfortunately, the hatred and anger of many in the U.S. following 9/11 have provoked a combative inattentiveness, which has led to the war on terrorism. In this case, an instance of moral horror in the form of a horrific terrorist attack has provoked what Vetlesen calls “projective hatred”. In other words, an aggressive response, a war, is the result of the dehumanisation of the Other, of depriving the Other of status as a fellow human being, leading to the Other’s ultimate destruction. At this point in time, there is no widespread desire for reconciliation within the U.S.; healing has not yet taken place. It is the most difficult case wherein moral perception must be “jumpstarted”.

But what factors within a thickened realism bring about such constraint when it comes to a country like Bosnia? They would have to include those special circumstances peculiar to their historical and moral contingency. In the case of Bosnia, the experience of living through the moral horror of genocide and ethnic cleansing would be one thickening agent. Unfortunately, many members of Bosnia’s constituent peoples to this day face the same difficulties towards one another as do many Americans with members of societies that have been associated with 9/11. Many have difficulty empathising with others, though in the case of Bosnia, ethnic nationalism is the principal obstacle. Unlike the case of the U.S. and 9/11, however, a formal peace agreement was reached in Bosnia through the Dayton Peace Accord, and for there to be a furthering of the process of building peaceful relations between the constituent peoples, there must be a transformation (reconciliation) in the former adversaries’ attitudes towards one another. The recognition of this need for reconciliation, in turn, would promote the need for emphatic responses towards one another, which would further stimulate the need for reconciliation.

Of course, some members of each of the constituent peoples do not believe that they must continue to live peacefully within the same country, i.e., there is a desire on the part of some to divide Bosnia into mono-ethnically dominated countries. But for those who do not have such a desire, it is recognised that reconciliation is needed to build lasting peace and ultimately prevent the perpetuation of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and systematic rape, as well as the clear violation of the principle of discrimination and non-combatant immunity. Leading to the desire to make the prevention of some moral horror a national interest that constrains a country’s conduct is the desire for reconciliation in order to build a stable and lasting peace in the country. Although 9/11 is an instance of moral horror, there is no widespread desire for reconciliation within the U.S. Instead, 9/11 is what has mobilised the resources of the United States to strike back at the terrorists. War, not reconciliation, is the name of the game.

For a country like Bosnia, however, there is a realisation among many of its citizenry that peace, security, and prosperity will only come about through reconciliation among its peoples. Reconciliation is more than conflict resolution: it includes restoring relationships, which are made ever more difficult because of atrocities. The violation of the principle of discrimination and non-combatant immunity, which accompanied the wartime atrocities in Bosnia, must cease even in peacetime if reconciliation is to succeed. Unfortunately, the Bosnian government failed to do what it could to guarantee that the principle would not be violated with the Algerian Group. There was some reason to believe there would be little public accountability of what would happen to the group, given the secrecy that surrounds detentions at Guantanamo Bay. This was a moment of “moral temptation”, for the politically expedient decision to transfer the detainees into U.S. custody was not the only choice; a thickened realism gave the Bosnian leadership a basis upon which to reject the U.S. request. The “remembrance of things past” and the desire for reconciliation reflected in national interests and linked to tranquillitas ordinis, could have overridden any such request. In this case, however, the request was not overridden, perhaps because the emphatic response was not forthcoming and/or there was a weak recognition of the need for reconciliation, thereby allowing expediency to prioritise favourable consequences in terms of future foreign aid allocations.

6. Conclusion

Reconceptualisation often leads to new ways of thinking. Within the domain of politics, particularly within the dominant realist camp, there is no better way to bring about new ideas than to bring out the implications of what the political realists are thinking so they may stop
thinking them. Perhaps one thing that must no longer be thought is the way in which political realism has been described in either/or terms. While many consider realism as not being sufficiently moralised, i.e., amoral, others champion it as a defence against moralism. In this paper I have sought to challenge this description by showing that this is a false dilemma, obscuring both thinly and thickly moralised realisms that may prove useful in justifying a range of actions, albeit at times incongruous. thinly moralised realism can lead to a variety of interventions and non-interventions on behalf of a country’s national interest. I do not mean to suggest that the Bosnian government’s decision to release the Algerian Group into U.S. custody was unquestionably wrong; however, such an action is suggestive of a deeper failing, one that could lead to thinly rather than thickly moralised judgements concerning the detainees. It is here that the inflationary model is useful. If I am right, this failing does: (1) not exhibit an adequate emphatic response towards some people; (2) not sufficiently recognise the need for reconciliation in order to build a stable and lasting peace in Bosnia; and/or (3) not recognise the need to set an example to the rest of the world that it is important to learn from one’s past and not to perpetuate the sort of disregard for the innocent that can occur when national interest is narrowly defined in terms of power and security.

Finally, it needs to be made clear that even with the force of prudence and expediency, political realism need not be rejected. On the contrary, when realism becomes “thickened”, not only can it be tolerated; it can be thought of as perfectly legitimate. This points to a fundamental ambiguity of modern politics, namely the ambiguous character of the relationship between political realism and the quest for authentic policy-making. Authenticity occurs when policy is the result of its makers acknowledging the fact that they are moral beings and taking into account their “national facticity”, e.g., the case of Bosnia’s genocide and ethnic cleansing. If this quest is not simply a realisation of thin realism’s national interest defined in terms of power and security, neither is it a rejection of these goals. It follows that neither an approach of uncritical acceptance of thin realism nor one of uncompromising rejection of the need for power and security will suffice as a realist response to authenticity. On the contrary, an adequate realist response to this quest for authenticity must recognise and assimilate the thick realist vision. This form of realism can make moral principles a part of national interest. Thick realism acknowledges that policy-makers are moral beings who occasionally recognise the overriding normative status of moral principles in situations of extreme moral horror and who embark on policies that recognise the need for reconciliation and peace in their own country, as well as outside it. Thick realism takes a more serious posture towards these needs than does the thin variant, which may lead policy-makers of weaker countries to succumb to the dictates of more powerful allies. Again, the events surrounding the Algerian Group may well demonstrate this point.

Realist policy-makers, whether they operate in Sarajevo or Washington, need to begin the long, arduous task of reconceptualising not only the foundations of their national interests but also the process by which authentic foreign policy can be formulated and implemented. Although many realists seem to express little interest in such rethinking, perhaps the genocide, ethnic cleansing, and terrorism that continue to occur will cause a ripple in their moral being such that thick realism becomes dominant, promoting reconciliation and peace throughout the world. There must be a greater interest in lived human reality, in the weal and woe of others for all this to happen. If there continue to be failures on the level of moral perception, we will all epitomise the unresponsive bystander, watching tragedy upon tragedy unfold throughout the world.

**Rory J. Conces** is Ass. Prof. of Philosophy at the University of Nebraska at Omaha. He was a Fulbright Scholar in Bosnia (2001) and in Kosovo (2008). His research interests include applied philosophy, conflict resolution and democracy building in the Balkans, and the ethics of intervention.

Contact: rconces@mail.unomaha.edu
Anmerkungen


16 Coady, C.A.J.: Messy Morality: The Challenge of Politics. Oxford: Clarendon Pr. 2008, p. 15, has gone further and has raised the issue that both realists and their critics have misunderstood realism itself such that they misinterpret the realist project as being hostile to morality in international affairs rather than hostile to moralism, "a kind of vice involved in certain ways of practising morality or exercising moral judgement, or thinking that you are doing so".

17 Chandler, David/Heims, Volker (eds.): Rethinking Ethical Foreign Policy: Pitfalls, Possibilities and Paradoxes. London, New York: Routledge 2007, p. 53. Chandler notes that ethical foreign policy is not restricted to the desires and priorities of a particular citizenry, but goes beyond the wishes of the electorate. In fact, he quotes Dower, Nigel: Human Rights and International Relations. In: International Journal of Human Rights (1997), pp. 86-111, here p. 103, as noting that "once we recognize that our duty extends towards those unknown, i.e., that we have a duty of more extended caring, then the unknown can be anywhere and anyone, irrespective of place, race, creed, sex or whatever". For a brief, but excellent discussion of how realists view the problems associated with an ethical foreign policy, cf. Chandler/Heims 2007, pp. 4-8.

18 Ibid., p. 3.


22 Coady 2008, p. 45.

23 Hulsman, John/Lieven, Anatol: The Ethics of Realism. In: The National Interest 80 (Summer 2005), p. 38. p. 42. For a discussion of this apparent discounting of lesser countries’ national interests as a reflection of “national egoism”, cf. Schlesinger, Jr. Arthur: The Necessary Amorality of Foreign Affairs. In: Harpers Magazine (August 1971), pp. 72-77, who notes that it is in violation of a consistent defense of national interest, as well as being contrary to long-term national interest. I concur in Schlesinger’s claim about “egoism”, what Rosenthal 1991, p. 6, refers to as a country’s tenancy towards self-righteousness and messianism, but I find his claim having to do with a consistent defence to be questionable. In particular, there could be a problem because of the importance of prudence for realists like Morgenthau. If prudence amounts to the survival of one’s own nation and not others, it seems only consistent to reject or not take into account the interests of another nation if it meant the survival of your own nation.


25 By “moral agents” I mean those persons who can perform genuine intentional actions (and so are able to perceive relevant facts and reason about consequences) and who are thus morally responsible for what they do. The classic statement of the situation of moral temptation was by Campbell, Charles Arthur: In Defense of Free Will. Inaugural Lecture on Assuming the Glasgow University Chair of Logic and Rhetoric 1938.


29 Coady 2008, p. 17.
31 Ibid., p. 171.
34 Hare 1963, p. 184.
35 Ibid., p. 185.
39 Roth 2005, p. 306. The Algerian Group is made up of Bensayah Belkacem, Mustafa Adir, Saber Lamar, Muhamed Nehle, Lakdar Burmedien, and Boudellah Hadz. It should be noted that orders for the release of most members of the Algerian Group have been issued and that some of them have subsequently returned to Bosnia.
41 Mearsheimer 2001.
42 Waltz 1979.
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49 Lang 2007.
50 Lebow 2003.
52 Williams 2005.
54 Ibid., p. 248.
55 Ibid., p. 250
56 Ibid., p. 247.
58 I am indebted to Sean Molloy’s use and discussion of “ubiquity of evil” in Molloy 2009, p. 92f.
59 Morgenthau 1945, p. 17.
63 Churchill 2006, p. 49.
64 Coady 2008, p. 43.
66 Molloy 2009, p. 95.
69 Morgenthau 1951, p. 33. Morgenthalau responds insightfully to his critics when he writes: “People arrive at the conclusion that I am not concerned with the problem of morality. The truth is that I am too much concerned with it.” In: Russell 1990, p. 149.
70 Morgenthau 1951, p. 33.
71 Ibid., p. 35.
72 This distinction is alluded to by Nathanson 2006. Nathanson 2006, p. 3, distinguishes “amoral realism” from “moralised realism”; the former rejects the application of morality to international affairs, while the latter claims that political leaders have a moral duty to promote the national interest even though there are no such things as universal moral judgements.
73 Morgenthau 1967, p. 7.
74 Morgenthau 1958, p. 84.
76 Morgenthau 1945, p. 10. – However, Lebow 2003, p. 237, insists that Morgenthalau dismissed consequentialist ethics on the grounds that “we can never know the longer-term consequences of our actions”. This is the sort of argument that Kant used to buttress his argument for an absolute rule against lying. Unfortunately, Kant and Morgenthauboth adopted an unreasonably pessimistic view of what we know about the world, including our actions. Indeed, there are occasions in which we are quite confident about the consequences of our actions, though we would never say that we are “certain” about those outcomes.
80 Coady 2008, p. 22, p. 35, also p. 34.
81 Molloy 2009, p. 95, recognises the regulatory function of prudence and the importance of national interest when he notes that in a situation in which there is a conflict between the national interest and an abstract principle such as liberty, the prudent moral choice would be to select the survival of the nation.
82 The issue of coherency and transience of a web of national interests is noted but will not be taken up here.
84 Ibid.
86 Ibid., p. 82.
88 Ibid., p. 225.
92 Ibid., p. 4.
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93 Ibid., p. 8.
95 Granted, the harm created by indifference is potentially greater than that caused by hatred, primarily because of its indiscriminateness, cf. Vetlesen 1994, p. 252f.; but hatred has a certain directness to its harm that indifference does not possess.
96 Elshtain 2003, p. 48f.
98 Elshtain 2003, 48f.
99 Ibid., p. 48.
100 Ibid., p. 49.
101 Ibid.
102 Again, the developments on the Armenian genocide issue before the U.S. Congress should not lead us to focus on how the logic of realism determines the limits to enlarging moralism, but rather on how the political leadership of the U.S. is incapable of moral perception such that the country’s logistical dependence on Turkey for its operations in Iraq and Afghanistan overrides support for House Resolution 108.
104 Ibid.
105 But where was that “fellow-feeling”, elevation of anti-genocide norms, and, ultimately, intervention, during the massacres in Burundi (1972), Cambodia (mid-1970s), Iraq (1988), and Rwanda (1994), which all met the legal definition of genocide.