Since 1995 when the Dayton Accords ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) the international community has been trying to further BiH’s transition to democracy and market economy by means of external action. However, despite all the partial successes that have been achieved less progress than was hoped for has been made: even after more than nine years, pressing problems remain unsolved, progress in core domains of the accords and the international agenda for Bosnia and Herzegovina – such as the return of displaced persons or the privatization of state-owned companies – has been much slower than expected, and/or has produced unintended results. A prominent explanation for these set-backs and delays in the state-building project is the identification of nationalist political and economic elites, their state-weakening parallel power structures as well as their shadow economy practices of economic reproduction. They are seen as principal obstacles hindering the establishment of (neo)liberal-style sustainable state and market structures. This assessment is based on the fact that the former antagonists, the Bosnian Croat Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica (HDZ), the Bosnian Serb Srpska Demokratska Stranka (SDS), and the Bosnian Muslim or Bosniak Stranka Demokratske Akcije (SDA), have remained the driving forces in political and economic developments in the former Yugoslav republic during the post-war years. Attempts by international actors to end the dominance of these elites, for example, by modifying the institutional power arrangements and electoral provisions or by having nationalist politicians removed from office by the High Representative have neither yielded the desired «civic» election results nor eliminated fundamental problems associated with the attainment of the objective. Both, politicians and academics, have so far left the complex structural grounds that lie hidden behind these developments within the post-war societies in BiH and elsewhere largely unexamined.

This article presents a number of aspects of a theory applied to study the effects of external action in post-war societies, its object being to place the analysis of the implications of international state-building into a broader concept of state and society than the majority of the present studies on contemporary developments and issues do. Assuming that the sound analysis and assessment of state-building projects demand a more profound understanding of the hybrid social formations and the ways in which they function in the states and regions concerned, the project’s underlying hypothesis is that the misinterpretation or complete ignorance of state and society structures in so-called Second and Third World countries thwarts the state-building or state-consolidating aim of international actions. Geared as they are to symptoms and actors, some of the strategies adopted by the international community have strengthened the very social formations opposing the (re-)institutionalisation and consolidation of those state structures which are meant to guarantee lasting peace. Few academic studies on post-conflict state-building are apt to reveal the interaction between local structures of rule, state institutions and the international environment because the authors feel they have to comply with normative premises or formulate instructions for political action. This behaviour confines their scope for appreciating the situation and makes them blind to inherent, possibly unsolvable dilemmas.

It is the object of this article to inquire into the specific issue of how the role of former warring factions and other players in post-war societies can be adequately examined. Literature on the post-war situation in BiH provides – often implicitly – two basic views of the roles of the three antagonistic nationalist parties – of the Bosnian Muslims, Serbs and Croats – which reflect the academic and political debates on the causes of intra-state wars (Section 2). On the one hand, there are culturalist assumptions which, in the case of BiH, find their expression in the categorisations «ethnic conflict» or «ethno-nationalism». Despite fundamental criticism of the practice of confining the causes of war to irrational factors such as hostility between ethnic groups or indeed entire civilisations (Huntington) due to allegedly irreconcilable cultural particularities, this perception also retains an influence when it comes to examining the motives behind the post-war action of elites. On the other hand, war economics research has an impact on how the role of elites in post-war societies is assessed. One feature which the
5 Actually, it is necessary to be precise and talk of those of the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs, because they are the ones who challenged the state by making separatist demands and by establishing parallel structures. They are continuing to do so in some parts.


2. Approaches Explaining the Role of Wartime Elites in Post-War Societies

The end of the East-West conflict, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the outbreak of the wars in Yugoslavia saw the paradigm of "ethnic war" enter the academic debate as a new explanation for the causes of intra-state war. As intra-state violence in the Third World had previously been assumed to have the nature of "class conflicts" or "proxy wars" between competing Eastern and Western systems, now cultural particularities were considered the primary reason for war, which had merely been "frozen" during the days of opposing systems. Cultural differences and hostility arising from them were considered to provide irrational motivation for war and violence, of which the Balkan wars were said to offer an excellent example. Critics of the "ethnic war" thesis rightfully pointed out that the end of the East-West conflict did not mark a change in the true and often unappreciated causes of war, but in how the perception of conflict changed in the eyes of both the warring factions and the observers. Although critics notice the phenomenon of warring factions forming up along ethnic or religious lines, they do not interpret this to be the reason for war, but to be the "result of social developments and transformation processes that generate conflict". Nevertheless, the idea that cultural differences are a root of conflict continues to be influential – especially under the influence of the new debate on transnational terrorism. In the literature on post-war Bosnia, this idea is notably found in its utilitarian version, that is to say, in the form of a politicisation and instrumentalisation of ethnicity by the elites for the purpose of manipulating their supporters.
When culturalistic explanations came under criticism in the mid-1990s, there was a renewed paradigm shift in research into war, due to which «economic war» became a central explanation. Rationality was pitted against the irrationality that had previously been dominant. Two concepts can be made out: Supporters of the radical economic concept declare war to be a rational economic activity practised by elites looking for profit, on the one hand, and marginalized people fighting for survival, on the other. In contrast, the defenders of the second concept see war as a rational strategy of rule pursued by elites in the context of structures of rule which are being transformed under the conditions of economic globalisation. In contrast to the radical economic theories behind the first concept, the «network war» (Duffield) or «shadow state» (Reno) theories indicate that political and economic factors interact.8 Despite all their merits, these possible explanations also have flanks: By merely focusing their analysis on social elites, they fail to take into account large sections of the population and hence the issue of the legitimacy of elites. The relationship between the elites and the general public is paradoxically established by the latter being instrumentalised along ethnic or religious lines, a thesis that was originally criticised by researchers who believe war is an economic issue. The concept of rule remains wavy and the question concerning the functionality and institutionalisation of power relations remains unanswered.

The economy-based attempts are to be found in numerous recent pieces of work on Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as on the role of Bosnian «ethnic entrepreneurs».9 In his review of a range of war-economy theories, Michael Ehrke finds that one feature of the post-war situation is the transformation of the Bosnian economy into an international rent economy in which the war elites maintain the lines of ethnic segregation and control the distribution of rents.10 Ehrke accounts for the relationship between the elites and the general public in Bosnia by resorting to the rational-economic behavioural patterns «greed» and «grievance»: While the defenders of a «mafia-type economy» are interested in maintaining a «sanctuary for illegal business relations or for the conflict economy they have succeeded in saving into a peacetime environment»,11 the majority of people are forced to «fit individual and family survival strategies into the post-conflict economy controlled by the old elites»12 due to a lack of legal economic alternatives. Therefore their electoral behaviour becomes an expression of loyalty towards clientelist networks. The author does make reference to constraints which influence nationalist elites when he states that «a polity based on ethnic community and solidarity [allows] a wider scope for semi-legal or illegal business activity than a legal and bureaucratic state with its anonymous organs», but he does not go beyond the «greed and grievance» thesis to discuss how such an ethnically defined form of rule is to be maintained by the elites or how the system of rule is organised and legitimised before their grass roots. On the subject of the contingent transformation of the former antagonists, Ehrke points out that «individuals and groups acting as brokers between the international community and the local people [get] into a key strategic position»; i.e. in contrast to the war situation, force is no longer the determining instrument of power and therefore political negotiating skills become a core resource of power. Ehrke largely attributes the continuity of nationalist party rule in BiH to the rent economy generated by the intervention and to the way this has allowed them to preserve their rule by establishing a clientelist system for the redistribution of rents. All in all, Ehrke’s analysis remains focused on elites because he reduces their relations with the general public to the redistribution of resources. He also fails to take adequate account of the contingency of the situation in which the nationalist elites transform from war parties to political post-war parties. While the economic impact of intervention on local power structures is emphasised, the author is not differentiated in his argumentation when he points to the change in instruments of power but fails to look further into the importance of such transformations for the internal system of the rule of nationalist parties.15

3. Extension of the Theory: (Former) War Parties as Social Formations

The chief issue involved in any theoretical and methodical study of the complexity of structures of rule in post-war societies is that of understanding the phenomenon’s economic, political and symbolic aspects, their interactions and interdependencies. Account must be taken both of the process character of the transformation from a form of rule of which the instrument of power in war is violence to a post-war form of rule that is based on political resources such as negotiating skills and of the way in which this process is embedded in international cohesions.
Help in doing this methodically is provided by the concept of elementary functions of society developed by Norbert Elias and advanced by Dietrich Jung. Elias states that any form of socialization has three invariant features which the simplest and most complex societies share: they must secure material reproduction; they must ensure control of the use of force; and they must guarantee a symbolic order conveyed by ideas and world views. The elementary function of the economy is quite generally the function of providing the group members with food, clothing, housing, etc. Any social group competing with the state needs to ensure material reproduction. This results in the evolution of a wide variety of economic strategies within both the formal and the shadow economy, which in times of war are termed war economies, or which Michael Pugh calls spoils of peace regarding the Bosnian post-war society. The strategies pursued by the actors, who are frequently competitors, are many and varied: They range from siphoning off of state rents to robbery, from semi-legal connections with government actors for the purpose of diverting funds to support from the Diaspora, from international smuggling in illegal goods to black-market trading at local markets. And it appears that the economic reproduction structures have to be all the more lucrative and institutionalised, the closer the parallel structure gets to becoming the model of a quasi-state which has to provide government-like services such as the maintenance of at least a rudimentary bureaucracy to generate stability.

The second elementary function, that of controlling the use of force, covers both the control of force within the group and the control of the use of force in dealing with other groups. The issue in this case is that there exist certain rules governing the use of physical force even during war time. Within the parallel structures force is embedded in the institutionalisation of structures of power and rule. Accordingly the use of force against others, i.e., competitors, the state or the general public, is governed by certain rules. The situation between former antagonists in post-war societies also calls for the preservation or establishment of internal rules for the exercise of authority which fit the new conditions. Former antagonists intending to establish themselves in post-war societies also calls for the preservation or establishment of internal rules for the exercise of authority which fit the new conditions. Former antagonists intending to establish themselves in post-war societies have to undergo considerable transformations, for the loss of open violence as a power resource requires them to substitute it with other instruments of power. Competition for power within parties, splinterings and resignations are evidence of the constant wrestle for internal order. Even so, the idea of there being a clear division between times of war and peace is obsolete, as the regulatory power of black economies also reaches into post-war societies and violence accordingly becomes visible at points where the old elites use the local state structures to discriminate against certain sections of the population.

Observance of rules is in turn bound to internalised patterns of legitimisation. Elias describes this with the third elementary function, the production and preservation of a group’s means of orientation. War research focused on quality indicates that it is not enough to merely look at what structural conditions are conducive to war and conflict and to use them in a second step to account for such developments, for this does not provide any information on the subjective reasons for individual actions. Next to the structural conditions, a concrete answer to the question of how the use of physical force is legitimised has to be found. Dominant among the shared identities may be a wide variety of constructed collective distinctions such as distinctions along socio-economic, political, ideological or religious lines, in addition to ethnic and cultural us/them distinctions. Post-war societies also have to make sense of the transforming conditions of reproduction and rule. Here internalised patterns of thought enjoy preference over imported values. Besides non-material motives for action, the economic motives stressed in war economy theories frequently play an important role in the public support given to a group. Nevertheless, a mere reduction of the range of motives down to the economic motive does not take account of the complex reality. It is the specific mix of interests and ideas which establishes the bond between the elites and the population basis and which forms the foundation for the legitimisation of their rule.

4. Parallel Structures of Rule and the State

As the election results over the last nine years have shown, the national parties in BiH have been able to develop mechanisms allowing them to display certain durability despite all the measures which the international community has taken against them. They managed to remain the central points of reference for the security and political identities of the sections of
25 While it is not possible here to go more into depth on the problems of socialisation, state-building and the decline of the state in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Yugoslavia or on the influence of the war on the state institutions, both analyses are part of the overall project.

26 The example provided by North-East India is informative: The rebel groups’ force-based orders thrust themselves into the vacuums that develop wherever the central state or regional institutions are unable to provide political solutions for the increasingly complex problems concerning the societies in North-East India. The rebels’ reproduction and orientation offers assume quasi-state functions. However, they also contribute towards consolidating the institutional inadequacies of the state structures and advance the weakening of the Indian state. Bliesemann de Guevara, Berit: Indiens vergessener Nordosten. Gewalt(akteure) in Ökonomie und Politik der Seven Sisters-Region. In: Bakonyi, Jutta/Siegelberg, Jens (Eds.): Weltordnungen – Ökonomie und Herrschaft jenseits des Staates. [forthcoming 2005]. Cf. from a more economic perspective Pugh, Michael: Rubbing Salt into War Wounds. Shadow Economies and Peace-building in Bosnia and Kosovo. In: Problems of Post-Communism 3/51 (May/June 2004), pp. 53-60.


28 Stuvøy, Kirsti: War Economy and the Social Order of Insurgencies. An Analysis of the Internal Structure of UNITA’s War Economy. Hamburg: Forschungsstelle Kriege, Rüstung und Entwicklung, Inst. für Politische Wissenschaft, Univ. Hamburg 2002 (Working paper 3 [2002]). Taking the rebel organization UNITA in Angola as an example, Stuvøy confirms her hypothesis that the organization hybridises due to the simultaneity of different logics and so falls apart. It remained relatively stable as long as the patrimonial system that operated during the East-West conflict was funded from outside. It was only when this source of funding eroded, the organization began to engage in international diamond trafficking and to adopt the rational lo-

5. The Role of International Actors and Strategies

Elias writes that social order is not constituted and its survival is not ensured until all three elementary functions are guaranteed, between which a functional interdependence but no predominance exists. The post-war persistence of former antagonists depends on their ability to fulfil the three elementary functions also in a changing external environment. In her document on war economies, Kirsti Stuvøy conceptualises rebel movements, i.e., non-governmental parties to wars, as a form of social organization whose social order has heterogeneous structures which function according to different logics: on the one hand, the internal logic, which focuses on the organization and preservation of rule within the group, and, on the other hand, the external logic, which determines the interaction between the internal system of rule and external factors. Stuvøy notes that the simultaneity of different logics leads to the hybridisation of the social order causing internal conflicts, an increased use of force within the group in order to maintain order as legitimacy dwindles, and the decline of the structures of rule. The categorisation into internal and external constraints that apply in accordance with different logics is suggestive for the situation of the former antagonists in BiH, too. Assuming that
gic of economics that the patrimonial system of rule came under pressure and the group was destabilized by the power struggle among the leaders.


31 Krastev 2002, p. 43 writes: «All new democracies are supposed to follow one and the same path. Democracy is analysed less as a matter of relations between leaders and led than as a set of institutions whose existence and effectiveness can be measured in concrete ways that are commensurate across cases», and on p. 44: «[The transition paradigm] tends to think of democracy in terms of its opposite, authoritarianism. [...] The biggest danger for democracy today is not sudden but rather slow death, meaning a gradu- 2ing for the purpose of overcoming conflicts in society, though fail to analyse them to any greater depth. And, finally, the implementation of the paradigm of democratic transition is questionable due to the deficits in democracy inherent in international intervention itself.33

the ideational level is always the slowest to transform, the variety of the patterns of interaction between the international community and the nationalist parties in Bosnia, on the one hand, and between these parties and their population base, on the other, becomes particularly virulent. The mutual dependence of the three elementary functions may pose a dilemma for the stability of a nationalist party, for instance, when the fulfillment of the function of material reproduction requires the party to deviate from former central demands in order to receive financial benefits from international organizations, when at the same time the abandonment of these central demands substantially weakens support for the party among its grass roots. The nationalist parties in BiH had to witness a weakening of their structures which they built during the war, mostly with outside money. In addition to problems concerning internal organization and political change in the countries providing the support, it was the direct intervention and new dependence on money from the international community that came to pose external constraints.29 The mutual dependence of the three elementary functions under the conditions created by the transformation of the former war parties is reflected in a large number of studies on the post-war situation in BiH, but has not yet been registered methodically.

The application of the above concept for analysing the former antagonists in the post-war society is also useful in this respect because it allows for the examination and categorisation of the factors governing the transformation of the structures of rule and power. Transformations result either from a group’s internal inability to fulfill the three elementary functions during the transition from violence-based to political rule and/or are due to external influences – in the case of external state-building, international intervention. The «quasi-protectorates» in the Balkans – Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo – are uniquely dependent on international actors because the latter have the power to intervene directly in the political process through the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) respectively. External constraints that impact local actors and the structures around them in many ways require all local elites to constantly adapt their strategies. Yet, these adaptations do not always work in the way the international actors would like them to, and the strategies put forward by the internationals themselves are at least partly to be blamed for this development. The international community proceeds to act on the basis of prevailing economic and political paradigms which can be subsumed under the catchword «liberal peace». On this matter, it is possible to make out four paradigms which determine current international policy on post-war and developing countries:

The first is the «bad legacies» paradigm, which is rooted in the historical and cultural arguments already addressed. When it comes to accounting for problems, priority is given to ethno-political ones. This is reflected in the way international actors behave towards local elites. The low degree of institutionalisation within the state is frequently attributed to «wrong», i.e. ethnic – elites who are said to be responsible for the political process. Consequently, the strategies that develop from this paradigm tend to focus on actors and ignore structures.

The second paradigm is that of the transition to democracy. Within the framework of this paradigm, tendencies of presupposing the existence of a working state can be detected. At the same time it fails to recognize that a fundamental characteristic of states in this specific situation is the fact that their structures are unfinished.31 This is often associated with the idea – particularly in view of the great degree to which the state permeated through society in socialist countries – that the decrease in state power is good for the development of a civil society. Peter Evans has criticized the neo-liberal call for a lean state, pointing towards the synergistic effects that state and society have on each other. A poorly institutionalised state is not desirable because political power is a necessity for it to fulfill its functions: «Reconstruction, not dismantling, is the order of the day.»32 The example of «global governance» shows what role is assigned to the state also in international government concepts which are more heavily focused on society. The state as a central element and mediator also figures prominently in the networks composed of international organizations, civil actors and NGOs that are geared to political fields.

Studies on the establishment of democracy in BiH frequently examine questions regarding the institutions a democratic Bosnian state should have. The outcomes of elections are considered to be an indicator for transition. These authors often propose further institutional engineering for the purpose of overcoming conflicts in society, though fail to analyse them to any greater depth. And, finally, the implementation of the paradigm of democratic transition is questionable due to the deficits in democracy inherent in international intervention itself.33
The third paradigm is the development or integration paradigm. The striking characteristic of this concept is that the resolution of political conflicts by the legislation process is not considered dependent on internal dialogue, but seen as a result of external conditionality determined by technocratic experts. Studies that come under this category are such on international state-building that seek analyses and criticism chiefly at the level of the international actors responsible for intervention and frequently centre on technical aspects of intervention. While authors of such studies do examine key problems associated with the way in which external state-building projects are organized, they can be accused of failing to observe the conditions of social processes in general and of post-war societies in particular. Measured against the afore-mentioned sociological concept of the idea of the state being embedded in the minds of the actors, it quickly becomes clear that the approach favoured by external technocratic experts cannot lead to the long-term development of such an attitude, because the local actors are stripped of all responsibility and accountability. Especially in the cases of BiH and Kosovo, the integration paradigm is linked to the idea that being integrated into EU structures and meeting the relevant criteria are ideal steps towards overcoming internal problems— even at the level of identity.34 Timothy Donais and Andreas Pickel have examined the paradoxes of this idea and come to the conclusion that the severely polarizing discourse on BiH’s European future, which requires the Bosnians to choose between reconciliation, transition to a market economy, democracy and gradual integration into the EU on the one hand and ethnic nationalism, economic backwardness and a marginal existence on the periphery of Europe on the other, has not helped to reinforce the Bosnian state, but rather generated a sense of insecurity among the people, strengthening the nationalist parties and enhancing the identification they offer.35

Finally, what can be called the fourth paradigm of the international strategies are the neoliberal assumptions regarding the positive effects of market liberalization and privatization. The basic idea is that the market forces will team up with their international champions to establish Western modernization standards all around the world and so ensure general prosperity. The concept of the state inherent in the neoliberal paradigm is that of a lean state which is reduced to performing a minimum of functions such as ensuring security and the rule of law, while leaving all the other functions to the market. The idea of restricting the influence of the state as well as the (social) benefits it provides has a bearing on the behaviour of the international actors in BiH and on some academic writers. Nevertheless, there is evidence in that country, as in other regions of the world, that the impact of the neoliberal structural adjustments have not so much led to the effective allocation of resources but to a loss of state control and to an increase in informality in political and economic spheres which is further weakening the state—or attempts, like those being made in BiH, to (re)institutionalise it.36

6. The International Community Project, the Transformation of Political Rule and the State’s Governance Ability

Schlichte and Wilke have formulated three transformations of political rule in the Third World following the global application of the (neo-)liberal development model that, judging from the initial analysis results, also apply to the situation regarding the Bosnian post-war society: the formation of parallel structures, the rule of intermediaries and the bifurcation of the physical and social security systems.37

When external pressure is applied to ensure that structures are adapted along neoliberal lines, informal patterns of material reproduction assume greater importance for political actors in contexts in which economic and political opportunities are linked and in which hybrid socialization factors figure prominently. Due to the dwindling role of the state, political actors feel forced to accumulate power outside the formal economic and state institutions. This favours the development of parallel structures. In contrast to earlier developments in the Second and Third World, which saw political elites trying to take control of state structures in order to fill their pockets and to preserve their clientelistic rule by redistributing state rents, parallel structures which profit from economic globalisation processes have an interest in keeping the state weak. The symptoms of the development of parallel structures are visible wherever members of the political elite and the administration increasingly engage in illegal economic activities. This results in the further decline of the state apparatus—e.g., due to losses in tax income, which in turn can have a negative impact on the preservation of the state’s monopoly
on force, for instance, when the payment of due wages to security personnel is at risk, or when the private and public interests of state employees combine more and more at all levels.38

Studies on Bosnia and Herzegovina reflect the problem of parallel structures when they state that it is hard to draw a line between legal and illegal or mafia-type actors in the business and political worlds in Bosnia because it is not only very thin, but also because it is crossed by the different actors in many ways. The legacy of the single-party state39 and the successive erosion of its formal structures after the war play a decisive role in the formation of parallel structures in BiH. In the system of rule that evolved while Yugoslavia was a socialist state, the party not only controlled the state institutions, but party members also held important posts in businesses. The key element of the rule was the nomenclature system, which regulated social advancement by way of party membership: The party occupied all important posts in the political and economic spheres, controlled promotion and decided on how privileges and benefits were to be allocated. During the disintegration of Yugoslavia as well as during and after the war the nationalist parties were able to adapt and preserve the fundamental patterns of the single-party rule system. This assured them direct control of each administrative machinery, the military and business stocks.

The building of post-war structures under the conditions of international intervention was initially organized through those proven networks or the ones that had evolved during the war, with recourse being taken to the socialist assets under party control. It was not until the former antagonists had to contend with the constraints resulting from the international community’s activities aimed at smashing the old structures and introducing a liberal market economy and from the High Representative’s growing scope for action that they faced up to the necessity of establishing alternative economic structures, which they then did in a great variety of ways. Examples are the so-called »ethnic privatisations«, by which the nationalist elites obtained direct or indirect ownership of previously state-owned enterprises and were additionally able to siphon off money.40 The HDZ succeeded in implementing ethnic privatisation by expediting the so-called »co-capitalization process«, in the course of which ownership of property was passed to Croat workers and managers close to the party in legally dubious ways, thus preventing non-Croats from obtaining holdings. Nepotism and corruption were involved in other privatisation cases, like the prominent case of the sale of the Holiday Inn hotel in Sarajevo. Members of the established clan structures of powerful families are not only members of the political elite, but they also control economic empires encompassing hotels, casinos, restaurants, banks, tobacco, forestry, telecommunications, energy, and water companies.41

Yet the practice of switching to parallel structures on account of state resources being on the wane is not only noted at elite level: Due to the absence or inadequacy of alternative forms of income, lower levels are recognizing the need to create new channels of material reproduction. In one report, the Bonn International Center for Conversion notes a rise in arms trafficking as a result of insufficiency in the regulation of the demobilization of former soldiers during the downsizing of the armed forces.42 The adoption of the neoliberal approach towards the adaptation of structures has not led to the creation of new jobs, but contributed to a spread in unemployment and rise in poverty in BiH – notably in the Republika Srpska – due to further cuts and dismissals, promoting both criminal activity and the expansion of the informal sector. When it comes to working in shadow economy areas, the majority of Bosnian people are not concerned with profit, but with securing their living.43 It is obvious what effects processes of this kind have on state-building: While the informal sector can contain social discontent to a certain degree because it provides alternative forms of income in a tight job market, its principal features are that it evades state taxation and fails to guarantee income security and employees’ rights. While the former helps to preserve the vacuum in state benefits due to the lack of funds and to perpetuate the shadow economy situation, the latter shares responsibility for the state being unable to develop into a general reference point for resolving social conflicts. Considering what is expected of a state that claimed the right to settle as many matters as it did in the days of socialism, the present absence of the ability to govern is all the more virulent and enhances people’s tendency to integrate into alternative structures in their search for social security. This is accompanied by a drop in the willingness to make advance concessions for (re-)institutionalising the state: »The willingness to pay taxes declines; modernization takes place informally, outside state programmes. Economic flows are moved out of state reach.«44

The second effect of international paradigms on the state’s governance ability is the power of the intermediaries that results from the very development of parallel structures: »Because,


48 The powerful Bosnian clans from which the intermediaries come are the Ćengić, Cello, Istojević, Ćivić and Hadžić. Pugh 2002, p. 470f.


50 Schlichte/Wilke 2000, p. 376f. Cf. Transparency International Bosnia and Herzegovina: Corruption Perception Study Bosnia and Herzegovina. Banja Luka, Sarajevo: Glas Srpski 2002, p. 144 seq. In BiH, the local and external personnel of the international organizations are among those who can afford privatized services and generate demand, in addition to the economic and political elites. In this respect, the presence of international actors and the so-called intervention economy contribute towards the bifurcation of the security systems.

51 Transparency International Bosnia and Herzegovina 2000, p. 145f.

52 Ibid., p. 150f.

However, resource flows no longer run through central institutions, the process of ‘political expropriation’ (Weber) reverses: Power does not get into the hands of civil servants under centralised control, but is appropriated by networks pursuing their own particular interests that definitely exceed limits.”45 The change from formal to informal structures favours the type of actor whose power lies in the ability to mediate between global markets and local economies as well as between the formal and informal spheres. The intermediaries derive their power from the command of two kinds of cultural and social capital:46 On the one hand, they are capable of communicating at a global level in a rhetoric which reflects globalised liberal values whenever they are involved, say, in negotiations with donor countries. On the other hand, they have the social capital needed to give them access to the local markets and are capable of generating functional and symbolic legitimation in their local popular basis, i.e., within the social order of their society or group.47 The previously mentioned families in Bosnia are eloquent examples of such intermediaries.48

The international community plays no mean role in the posturing of these actors, as these are supported once they have done no more than to have gained the reputation of being moderate partners, irrespective of the fact that thereby rules are contravened sometimes. On the other hand, the past has shown that not every actor who receives outside support is capable of attaining a position of power. If he does not succeed in generating local support and legitimation and therefore in establishing his position of rule, such an actor mostly remains a puppet of the international community. In BiH, the political parties in the Republika Srpska provide an example of how former and newly established elites compete in trying to secure or to establish their positions of power in the post-war situation and of how the international community is contradictory in the support it gives. The parasitistic structures which the SDS had built up during the war under the leadership of Radovan Karadžić have successfully fallen apart due to the arrest of war criminals in the aftermath of the war, due to the curtailment of the role played by former paramilitary groups and parallel secret services and due to the withdrawal of the control of the media and key economic assets by SFOR and the OHR. These developments have had a substantial effect on the internal structure of the SDS and the system of rule it established during the war. It resulted in the breaking up of the party into factions and in the new necessity for Serb elites to compete for both popular and international support. The international actors limit the elites’ scope for action in at least two ways: on the one hand, they are now important donors for the federal state institutions in the Republika Srpska, as many former sources of funds have dried up. On the other hand, the office of an elected Serb representative can also depend on the goodwill of the OHR, as the arrest of 68 Bosnian-Serb politicians in June 2004 revealed. Since Biljana Plavšić resigned from the weakened SDS in 1997, the international community in BiH has worked to boost the loose opposition in the Republika Srpska, but has often been guilty of applying double standards. In the case of the government headed by Milorad Dodik, who was considered a pro-West and moderate technocrat, the protection provided by the international actors created scope for political mismanagement, private money-making and clientelism. His election defeat in 2000 showed that Dodik failed to meet the demands of the international community on the one side and the local base on the other. His government was not capable of generating legitimation among the people, and so the efforts made by the international actors ultimately remained ineffective as well.49

The third effect of international strategies is the bifurcation of the security systems. As the state pulls back from its role as the principal driving force behind development in the course of the neoliberal adaptation process, a change also takes place in the way physical and social security are organized. At the top end of the social spectrum services are provided in the form of high-cost privatisation and at the bottom end in the form of communal self-help.50 In Bosnia and Herzegovina the fact that doctors and nurses are poorly paid has led to their leaving the public health sector for the more lucrative privatized health market and simultaneously to a rise in the level of corruption in the public health sector. Some canton and municipal health institutions have begun double-taxing those insured. In addition to their health insurance contribution, people are taxed directly under a «participation» scheme designed to provide health institutions the chance to maintain their basic services.51 The education system is suffering from the poor standard of education provided, from a teaching staff with insufficient professional qualifications, and from wages being low or not being paid at all. Higher education especially is affected by corruption, with marks and qualifications being sold.52
Surveys conducted in the Balkans show that large sections of the population consider the main threat to their physical and social security to lie in the weakness of their state. Local elites are benefiting from this and are enlarging the functional vacuum created by inadequate state structures by selling private physical and social security services instead of engaging themselves in getting them provided as state services. The people drawing profit from this are developing a vital interest in the sustainment of certain conflicts and forms of insecurity in society, for these not only guarantee them a lucrative source of income, but also a source of functional legitimacy vis-à-vis their popular base.

Further research must be done as part of the project into the situation concerning privatized physical security services. If conclusions can be drawn for BiH from other countries, a growing number of private insurance and security companies must be assumed to be selling property and personal protection services. Study must also be conducted into the extent to which government security forces from the police and army are involved in these security markets.

The aim of this article was to explain some of the theoretical considerations on the methodological study of the role of former antagonists in post-war societies in general and in BiH in particular as part of a large attempt to evaluate the effects of international state-building projects and the dilemmas associated with it. How the theory structure is further embedded, operationalised and applied could be no more than outlined. More research must be done to explicate several areas:

First, the concrete case study must be embedded more firmly in the analysis of the historical and structural processes of socialization, state formation and state disintegration in the region under study. This is imperative for the mere reason that, in order to satisfy the claim made at the beginning, it is necessary to offer an alternative approach towards evaluating the effects of external state-building on state or non-state structures of rule to those based on issues, the current situation and symptoms. In the case of BiH, valuable work has already been done in the form of a large number of studies on socialist Yugoslavia and the decline of its state structures.

Using a precise description of the specific forms of hybrid socialization that evolved in the communist bloc, especially under the modernization process going on in Yugoslavia, as a basis, it is possible to examine the situation during the war. Only both analyses allow a sound basis to be established for the assessment of subsequent transformations of structures of rule that took place after the war and under external influence.

Secondly, the considerations presented here have to be applied to BiH systematically. Three key questions can be phrased for methodological operationalisation and should be examined in the areas of the three elementary functions:

(i) How do the social orders of the Bosnian nationalist parties, which evolved under the rule of actors whose power was based on force, reproduce and develop as the actors transform into post-war actors?
(ii) What part do international actors and strategies play in this?
(iii) What effects does the transformation of the structures of rule have on the (re)institutionalisation of the state?

With regard to the function of material reproduction it has to be worked out how the groups finance their activities, what changes have taken place in the financing structures during the transition from a force-based economy to a post-war economy and what strategies they applied in the attempt to adapt to the new situation. This requires the examination of the specific part played by international actors and their strategies, that is to say, answering the question of whether a specific intervention tool (e.g., privatisation) has been instrumental in weakening, strengthening or modifying the social reproduction of the groups. In doing this, account has also to be taken of the gradual changes in the international strategies in the course of the state-building project. If the trends presented in this article prove to be accurate, the investigation concerning the effects of the forms of material reproduction on the state will result in detecting the establishment of parallel structures of the kind described above and cited

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References:

Krastev 2002, pp. 46f.: »Both individuals and businesses spend vast sums of money on security. They insure their cars with mafia-controlled agencies, pay protection money to local gangs, buy electronic alarm systems, and must bribe police officers to get them to do their job. [...] Citizens who once suffered from the arbitrary violence of the communist state feel that now their rights are no less threatened by the sheer ineffectiveness and indifferen- ce of the weak state.«

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as examples for Bosnia at all levels. This, too, will require further explication via the concrete case.

Regarding the function of the internal control of force and structures of rule, key attention has to be paid to the changes in the constellations of actors, e.g., to the rise and fall of social groups or competition between old and/or new elites. Here, too, it is a matter of working out the special part played by international intervention – e.g., dismissals from office by the OHR or the arrest of war criminals by SFOR – and of evaluating them within the general analysis. With regard to the state’s ability to govern, it ought to be possible to take into account the trends presented here and determine the point at which power passes to the so-called intermediaries.

As described above, the elementary function of the means of orientation concerns the basis of the legitimacy of rule, without which no social order – even any outside the state – is stable and durable. The task in this case is to work out the specific mix of ideas (world views, ideologies, religious ideas, etc.) and (economic, social or political) interests which constitute the bond between the elites and the general public. Focus should be on the hybrid situation created by the simultaneity of external and internal logics, which was described in Chapter 5 and, in the case of BiH, derives from the incompatibility of nationalist rhetoric with the international discourse. Referring to actors’ interests, account must be taken of trends such as the bifurcation of security systems and the role of the informal sector. Following the criticism expressed at the beginning that war economy concepts tend to neglect the social dimension, the expected outcome of the analysis would be that the electoral success of the nationalist parties is not solely due to the instrumentalisation of a marginalized population and that problems the parties have in reproducing the basis of their legitimacy have effects on the stability of the system of rule.

The particular challenge of the study as a whole lies in establishing the internal link between the three study categories – economy, rule and legitimation – in the context of the conflict between internal and external conditions and placing it in relation to the chances of (re)-institutionalising the state.58

Is external state-building in BiH a boost for the (re)institutionalisation of the state or is it a catalyst for the establishment and consolidation of parallel structures? Proceeding from the results obtained to date, I would like to answer this question with the following thesis: The stability of social formations that exist outside the state is – and this also applies to the nationalist actors in BiH – dependent on the fulfilment of the three elementary functions. External intervention leads to the transformation of rule in BiH in that it changes the foundations for the social reproduction of rule. However, instead of helping to institutionalise and consolidate state structures, the limited nature of this external effort is advancing the establishment of new, parallel structures and is so visibly weakening the state. In their article on the transformation of government in the Third World, Schlichte and Wilke pose the question of whether the »short-term decline […] might also turn out to be a mere recession in a long-term state formation process«59. Having said that, however, their sobering conclusion is that it is not possible to tell the basis upon which the state is meant to reinstitutionalise and re-appropriate its competences. This conclusion seems to be premature for Bosnia and Herzegovina at this point in the research process, but no satisfactory answers have been found so far to the fundamental questions concerning the (re)institutionalisation of the state.