1. Introduction

The whole European continent can serve as an example of a territory where various contradictory streams, opinions and interests regularly encountered in the past. Nations were divided not only by language and religion, but by rivalry, competition and political, economic and security interests, too. Multilateral consensus was, in fact, until the middle of the 20th century, a relatively unknown concept in Europe. European integration – a truly frequented notion of our times – remained on a mere theoretical level.

In essence, it is possible to distinguish three stages of European rapprochement: the first preparatory stage could be succinctly called first indications and ideas about the construction of Europe. The second phase reflected political, economic and safety circumstances after World War II and embodied common needs and interests of European states after the conflict. In comparison with the first thoughts about the building of a common Europe it represented a real qualitative move as it materialized previous ideas and dreams. This can be considered as the first steps of European integration.

Currently, we are facing the third phase of European integration that represents the next qualitative shift and signifies the searching for a common European identity.

While «external» elements, such as economic and political integration run rather well, it is generally felt that an «internal» connecting link is missing at present [...] we can perceive drawing on the European identity also as the gradual qualitative change of the behaviour of the European entity. Formerly the European states or individuals became active mostly in case of the emergent external incentives or dangers that could influence the space within the borders of their interests. Stronger European identity means also the activity that stems from the inside of the European space.¹

The main aim of this paper is the analyzing of the commencement of the second stage of the European unification. The attention is focused on post-war political, economic and safety conditions in Europe, as well as the identification of main elements and motives, that led to the idea of European integration. We examine the question whether the importance of the Treaties of Rome and Paris for European integration is appreciated in a sufficient measure. Particular steps of the process of integration (its both successful and fruitless points) within the period from the end of the conflict in 1945 to the Treaties of Rome in 1957 will be discussed as well.

When analyzing the post-war political situation, it is necessary to take into consideration that the effects of the conflict converted the idea of integration into a necessity. It is helpful to conceptualize both external and internal circumstances that stimulated this development.

From the internal perspective, Western European states found themselves in relations of mutual dependence after World War II. But this dependence was not in compliance with the centrifugal character of their sovereignty. The pressure of common needs and interests finally stimulated the recognition of Western European states, that the principle of the national sovereignty already exhausted its utility. States were forced to limit their sovereignty rights and move them to the supra-national organisations.²

From the external point of view, the world became bipolarized. The real winners of World War II – the USA and the Soviet Union – acted as the main world powers. Their mutual relations were describable as the growing tension based on ideological, political and economic contradictions. Those factors substantially influenced the creation of the European Communities.

2. Brief Historical Excursion

In a very general sense, we can find the «European spirit» emerging in the ages of Periclean Athens (480-430 B.C.) and later during the era of the Roman Empire (100 B.C.-100). The idea was renewed during the Middle Ages through the Sacrum Imperium Romanum and the consideration about the confederation of Christian rulers. Common feature of those proposals and

suggestions was the search for perpetual peace. One should bear in mind that at that time peace was in fact only a short break between various wars.

Later Henry IV of France (1553-1610), William Penn (1644-1718), the great English and later American Quaker, or Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) became reputable with their ideas about possible peace in Europe and the future of the continent. Saint Simon (1760-1825) moved from the notion of the participating state to the participating people represented by the European Parliament. Carlo Cattaneo (1801-1869) introduced the principle that was resurrected in the 1980s and became to be known as «subsidiarity». Today it is an indispensable part of the European setting in general.

But the above mentioned ideas and proposals did not abandon the theoretical dimension for a long time. Effective, real development in Europe occurred in a much more painful framework. World War I brought many changes about the map as well as in international socio-economic relations (Austria was split into several countries, a new totalitarian regime emerged in Russia etc.). And, in fact, the period of unclear international relations continued. The Treaty of Versailles, signed on the 28th of June 1919, showed, that the end of the war could not secure stability for a longer period of time. Besides, this represented an old type of Treaty, based on financial compensation after the war. It is no mistake to assume, that also the Treaty of Versailles formed proper conditions for Hitler’s later success in Germany. The League of Nations had only a little chance to succeed. The European continent suffered from a rather fragile stability at that time. It became apparent that a restructuring of international relations in Europe should take place as soon as possible, otherwise the creeping danger of a return of the conflict would pollute the air.

Richard Coudenhove Calergi, a Hungarian nobleman, founded the PanEuropean Movement in 1923. He wrote some books about PanEuropean topics. Aristide Briand, Prime Minister of France, who held a honorary presidency of the PanEuropean Movement in 1927, formed the proposal of the European integration. The idea of the project was the union or association of European states. According to it, states should be united, but their sovereignty should not be touched. However, this proposal stayed without deeper reactions, and the conception of the nation-state remained fully valid.

The 1930s witnessed a worldwide economic and trade war, closed markets, the search for self-sufficiency, the command economy in Germany and the collapse of world trade. Europe as well as the other parts of the world were compelled to cope with the economic crisis, and subsequently the sharp rise of nationalism deteriorated the atmosphere at the international scene.

Altiero Spinelli, anti-fascist and pro-European, jailed in Italy, wrote in 1941 a manifesto for a free and united Europe. As he wisely pointed out, there is an inevitable consequence of the existence of separate states: the global war.

On the 21st of October 1942, Winston Churchill, the English Prime Minister, sent the Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden the following text, which is interesting especially in view of the British traditionally reserved approach to the European integration:

I must admit that my thoughts rest primarily in Europe – the revival of the glory of Europe, the parent continent of the modern nations and the civilization. It would be a measureless disaster if Russian barbarianism overlaid the culture and independence of the ancient States of Europe. Hard as it is to say now, I trust that the European family may act unitedly as one under a Council of Europe. I look forward to a United States of Europe in which the barriers between the nations will be greatly minimized and unrestricted travel will be possible. I hope to see the economy of Europe studied as a whole [...] Of course, we shall have to work with the Americans in many ways and in the greatest ways, but Europe is our prime care.

3. Turbulent Times After The War

The structure of post-war Europe was extensively discussed already during the war and at the end of it. Europe’s liberation from war suffering seemed to be a very promising element for future development. And while the commons of Europe breathed the fresh air of the peace, the politicians and other influential groups tried to solve the questions of the structure of Europe in the close future.
One of few positive experiences of the war itself was the provoking of the awareness of the fragility of the pre-war political structures of nation-states. Practically all European states, often with a questionable democratic base, joined the conflict very quickly. In other words, the necessity of the change of pre-war political structures in many regards appeared as a very pressing issue. One might call this phase of the European unification as the seeking of balance in the polygon of interests reflecting not only war events and as the searching phase of a new Europe, too.

Churchill’s speech (he was already out of office but still a person of high influence) in Zurich 1946 on the «kind of United States of Europe» constituted certainly an important contribution to the discussion. We should appreciate his speech despite the fact that he was not offering the UK as a founding member of the union and his gentle preferences of the relation with the USA and the Commonwealth. But the growing ideological, political and economic bipolarity between the USA and the Soviet Union with an apparent incidence especially to Europe, and in a wider context to the whole world as well as the growing anxiety of France and the UK about a possible German aggression brought the tension back to Europe step by step.

The so-called Truman Doctrine, introduced during March 1947, offered to provide the American help «to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities, or by outside pressure». The background was obvious: The USA were ready to provide the support for states threatened by Soviet (or communistic) interests or direct aggression. The Truman Doctrine reflected the growing strain between the USA and the Soviet Union that intended to increase their own influence in Europe.

The same month witnessed the Treaty of Dunkirk, where Britain and France tried to secure themselves from possible German aggression. Relations especially between France and Germany, one of the biggest unresolved problems in Europe, influenced not only by war, but also historically arisen, acted as a source of tension and uncertainty in Europe for a longer time. The complex nature of Europe manifested itself also in those relations. The sensitive problem of the restoration of heavy industry in Germany connoted the question of the effective protection against the support of military production and adventures. Also the issue of the Saar province appeared to be a very delicate affair. The former German province was split from Germany and administered by France. This coincided with the situation at the end of World War I when the same scenario occurred. So, the mental strain which essentially did not entirely disappear from Europe after the war, tended to increase again, and after quite a quick pace of events, the Cold War and the Iron Curtain made im-possible the post-war development of an indiscrere Europe.

The Marshall’s Plan as one of the milestones of the post-war development came out in economic restoration of Western Europe. The US Secretary of State, G. Marshall, offered in his speech at Harvard University in Boston in June 1947, economic aid to Europe. This plan confirmed the American willingness in the rebuilding of Europe, without the distinction East-West, on condition that beneficiary countries should cooperate with each other not only when exercising the American resources, but in general, too. He proclaimed «our policy is not against any country or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, despair and chaos.» The project was originally planned for all European countries, but the negative attitude of the Soviet Union and the states under its influence obstructed already rather narrow paths of communication between East and West. As the counter-measure against the Marshall’s Plan, the Council of Mutual Economic Help was founded in 1949.

In March 1948, the UK, France and the Benelux states signed the Treaty of Collective Defence Against Soviet Union and Germany. Far from being a surprise, this protective measure against Germany was abolished due to the later development. A month later, the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation was established. Originally it comprised 16 European states. In 1960, the USA and Canada joined the organization, which caused the modification of its name to OECD. This organization can be comprehended as a more or less direct response to the Marshall’s speech. Thus, the process of economic and political splitting of Europe into East and West accelerated. The division of Germany into an Eastern and Western part constituted more than a symbolic step. The military division at the formal level became the question of time.

Indeed, in April 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington by twelve states. And when Western Germany joined European structures and the NATO, an inevitable response from the Eastern block followed: the Warsaw Pact in May 1955. The emerging Iron Curtain
broke the enthusiasm about the processes of integration in Europe. On the other hand, we may dare to say, it contributed to the quicker integration of Western Europe. Parallely, the same holds true about the pace of contemporary European unification. Usually, if there is no direct danger for European states, the unification proceeds only slowly. However, external incentives for integration manifested themselves very strongly at that time.

Many hopes were related towards the Congress of Europe in May 1948. The Congress was supposed to close symbolically the period of nervous and hazy relations, zealous quest for the European base and reserved attitudes. The most influential political personalities from France, Germany, the UK, the Benelux countries and Italy discussed possibilities of the future development of Europe. However, the final result brought disenchantment, especially for those who assumed that the way to a federal Europe would already be open. The British delegation that preferred the inter-governmental relations became the final winner of the negotiations.

A year later, in 1949, the status (which gave the organisation the inter-governmental character) of the Congress of Europe was signed by ten states. The spiritual basis of the Council of Europe was formed by ideas of parliamentary democracy and human rights. Its importance was obvious: many relevant elements of public life hitherto covered on the state level ceased to be exclusive affairs of particular states. The act of the establishing of such an organization approached Europe to the process of integration.

The European Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights from 1951 confirmed this trend. These two lines should be distinguished from economic integration, but their value orientation undoubtedly played a relevant role in the process of European integration. Europe knew its own political and economic weakness after World War II. The important task was to build a modern and united Europe, capable of an independent partnership with the United States in the long run. But this constituted a formidable and especially long-term task and objective. As it will be shown, American policies represented a crucial factor in West European political and economic developments for a long time and very strongly in the 1950s.

4. European Coal and Steel Community – Turning Point in the History of Europe

In the period, when the situation in Europe remained considerably complicated and not entirely lucid, the French Foreign Minister Robert Schumann created a sophisticated proposal concerning the founding of a European supranational organisation. This proposal was presented in May 1950. Schuman stated that «united Europe is the basis for the peace in the world.»

One of the main elements of his suggestion consisted in the elimination of traditional rivalry and competition and sometimes even mutual hostility between France and Germany. He proposed to subordinate the coal and steel industry of both greatpowers to the independent international control mechanisms.

The American pressure on the European allies to integrate the reconstructed West German economy, without which (as it was argued) a prosperous pattern of European economic growth could not be established, did much to push the French government into Schumann’s proposal, as the only way to reconcile national security with economic recovery. Obviously, the project could not conceal its pragmatic approach. From the military perspective, the plan substantially reduced the possibilities of states for the armament. This feature of Schumann’s project acted just as an euphemistic nickname for the protection against possible rearmament of Germany. «It is necessary to make war not merely unthinkable but materially impossible.»

This implied also possible disputes at the political field that were thus eliminated. One can not omit that from the economic point of view both lines of heavy industry played a key role for the recreation of an economic infrastructure.

The proposal could not stay only in the bilateral perspective. Its joining by other European states was necessary and desirable especially in the view of European integration. And, after a short waiting, the Benelux states and Italy joined the project. Founders of the European Coal and Steel Community (Treaty of Paris, signed on the 18th April of 1951) pursued the objective of contribution to the economic prosperity, increasing employment and living standards in all member states. Coal and steel industries were removed from full national competencies and placed under supranational control. A supranational authority had built a decision centre for production, investments, social conditions and to a certain extent prices as well. «Supranational» was the key word that meant the qualitative moving in the history of a European unifica-
It could even be questionable, whether both World Wars took place in Europe «by chance», especially in the view of the post-war benefits. On the other hand, too many elements and continuities determined those historical events, so that a completely true or independent description and evaluation is hardly possible.

11 One has to admit that American foreign policy throughout the history turned out to be very pragmatic. It could even be questionable, whether both World Wars took place in Europe «by chance», especially in the view of the post-war benefits. On the other hand, too many elements and continuities determined those historical events, so that a completely true or independent description and evaluation is hardly possible.


The Treaty establishing the European Defence Community was signed in Paris by the European Coal and Steel Community Six. A mere security structure without foreign policy cohesion seemed to be incomplete. Consequently, the Treaty among others called for the European Political Community.

The UK still remained out of the processes of integration and served as a target of American criticism as the USA strongly supported the European Defence Community. And in 1954 the French parliament refused the European Defence Community Treaty. France suffered from many inner difficulties as a consequence of frequent changes of governments. This meant the temporary braking of the European integration, but, on the other hand, later acceleration as well.

Apparently, primary accomplishment of sector integration in a relatively narrow sphere could not suffice for the solution of inner economic problems nor for the recreation of former pre-war influence of European states. At the end of 1954 the Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community called for its own higher efforts in extension of the economic cooperation and integration. It stimulated the creation of the so-called Beyen Plan which stipulated the formation of economic community.

J. Monnet, President of the High Authority of the Coal and Steel Community, used his contacts and influence in order to promote a resumption of the dialogue. He convinced the foreign ministers of the Six to meet at Messina in Italy in June 1955. The governments of the Six resolved that «the moment has come to go a step further towards the construction of Europe. This step must, first of all, be taken in the economic field.»12 The conference gave the impulse towards starting the work on the creation of a common market and possibly an Atomic Energy Community. The Messina Conference set up a committee of government representatives, under the chairmanship of the Belgian socialist Paul Henri Spaak.

In the discussions about atomic energy the USA played a major role again, since they had the biggest nuclear know-how. President Eisenhower announced the US Atoms for Peace programme. The USA were ready, on certain conditions, to conclude bilateral agreements concerning the atomic affairs with European states. All proposals reflected also US national security interests and their foreign policy aims, seeking the balance between them.

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The Six wanted to
proceed a customs union with no internal tariffs but with a common external tariffs. The inclusion of the agriculture within the system appeared as a next pressing question. A free trade area (without agriculture) represented an alternative to a customs union. In that case, no tariffs between the members would be imposed. But all of them would maintain their own external tariffs, and the origin of goods from the outer territories would be controlled.

The evaluation of the rules and measures proposed by the committee of government representatives took place in May 1956 at the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Venice. There remained no major hindrances for the preparation of particular proposals of treaties. And, indeed, the Treaties establishing the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community were finally signed in Rome.

So, from the legal perspective, the period of the creation of primary essences of the European Community law finished successfully. Also from the institutional point of view, the basis and the first stage of European integration were successfully accomplished. Changes in the future mirrored mainly the processes of crystallisation of European institutions. Also from the economic point of view, the period until 1957 could be perceived as the constitution of fundamental items of integration.

5. Conclusion

We can feel safe enough to claim that European integration is an idiographical process whose commencement took place in an enormously complicated framework. This holds true especially for the period from the end of World War II till the Treaties of Rome. Every major international process or the creation of international institutions is the cross-point and the product of common interests of their players and external circumstances. And one can distinguish three major dimensions of European integration: political, economic and security continuities.

From the political perspective, the bipolarity of the universal international system manifested itself in Europe. The splitting of Europe into two parts and the Iron Curtain between them embodied a large number of factors, such as contradictory political values or penetration of ideology into international relations between democratic and totalitarian states. The strengthening of disputes provoked mutual dependence and cohesion within the blocks. The communist danger functioned as a factor which drove the Western European integration. On the other hand, the international isolation increased substantially at that time. The establishing of the Council of Europe and the European Court of Human Rights as well as the signing of the European Convention on Human Rights apparently contributed to the integration, especially from the perspective of public life in general and also of the primary value system of Western Europe in contrast with Eastern European regimes.

From the economic point of view, European economy was very harmed after World War II in both infrastructure and dynamics terms. The necessity of inner restoration and the change of international economic relations as well as help from outside that would stimulate economic growth and development emerged soon. One of the major sources of the economic restoration of Europe became the Marshall’s Plan. Although the project was assigned for whole Europe, it did not find approval in the East. The Council of Mutual Economic Help was founded as a reaction and, on the other hand, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (later known as OECD) composed of 16 Western states came as another response to this development. The Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community played the cardinal role in the development of the European communities and, in a broad sense, the European integration and unification. Coal and steel industries were removed from full national competencies and placed under supranational control.

The Treaties of Rome finished the first stage of the European integration regarding the basic formation of a primary sphere of European law as well as the qualitative extension of international law.

The security continuities also influenced the building of Europe significantly. The old continent did not seem to be destined to rest and relief. World War II was replaced by the Cold War. Not surprisingly, the NATO Treaty and Warsaw Pact as a response followed. The essence of the NATO was created by the Truman Doctrine that had a stand in the necessity of the collective defence of free Western European states. There were significant contributions within the framework of the Korean conflict on working out the proposal of establishing the European Defence Community. The Treaty seemed to be on a good way, but in 1954 the French refusal
of ratification frustrated all hopes. However, the defence community in general anticipated future supranational solutions of safety questions.

As for the conception of the integration, the tension between the nation-state and international integration was and still remains prior to any discussion of the development of the European political system since the Second World War. Such a strain creates a general background of ideas and theories trying to explain the causes and the development of integration.

- Some ideas support the concept of integration as the result of the traditional objectives of the foreign policy of the states, a kind of alliance based on the reality after 1945.
- The next thought prefers the altruism of the integration, when it springs from a deeply held desire to change, for ever, the nation-state structure of Europe.
- A further stream is that the process of integration was deliberately conceived and developed to preserve (or, if you like, to make a resurrection of) the nation-state after its collapse between the 1930s and 1945.
- A fourth idea is that the loss of sovereignty of the European nation-state is inevitable because of the long-run path of economic and social development tending towards globalisation.14

However, after taking into account relevant aspects of the early stages of the transformation process, one gets an idea of integration having started within the framework of autonomous calculations of particular states. Later, especially after the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community with its supranational impact and thus the function of the real turning-point of the European integration, we can see (despite the problems such as non-ratification of the European Defence Community in France), much more indications of European rapprochement. Nevertheless, in general, it is not wrong to speak of a hard birth of a common European will as a result of particular interests and autonomous policies pursued for a certain time and later transformed into the mosaic composed often from many inhomogeneous parts.

The central aim of the federalist circle around Monnet can be characterized as setting a European order being immune against the catastrophic nationalist wars that twice had devastated the continent. But this plan could be fulfilled only partly as time did not mature to the higher stage of integration. The basic objective of the United States is describable as a creation of a strong West European bulwark against the Soviet Union, as a means to victory in the Cold War. The key French goal was to tie Germany down in a compact that would enable to preserve the strategic French position in Western Europe. The major German endeavors were directed towards a return to the rank of an established power and towards keeping the prospect of reunification as well. What held these different programmes together was the common interest of all parties in securing the economic stability and prosperity of Western Europe as a condition of achieving each of these goals.

The American presence in shaping the structure of post-war Western Europe, and in influencing the character of its politics could be perceived all the time. The USA had an obvious interest in promoting the »United States of Europe«. The conditions attached to the Marshall Plan aid forced its European recipients into close cooperation through the Organization for European Economic Cooperation and the European Payments Union. American interests also did much for a quick advance of the proposal of the European Coal and Steel Community as well as the proposal for the European Defence Community, when in both cases the mystic name of Western Germany, whose economic growth or rearmament represented a too lively threat, was exerted.

The »bad mood« of the United States as a consequence of the course of the Korean conflict and the American calling for German rearmament within NATO pushed the European states to the conversion of a mere idea of integrated European armed forces into the particular steps. Of course, Europe was aware of its economic and consequently political weakness in comparison with the USA.

The reconstruction of the »national state« notion was built on a number of contradictions and compromises between the reaffirmation of the sovereignty (practically in the same shape as before) and the acceptance of the integration. The acceptance of some degrees of dependence on the USA — direct and substantial for example for Western Germany, less distinct for France and UK — represents one of these compromises.
Thus, to summarize the idea of this article in a general way: It is useful to distinguish between two fundamental milestones during the initial phase of the construction of Europe: the Treaty of Paris and the Treaties of Rome. As first really fastening points they increased the stability in Europe. The same holds true for their cardinal role in the first stage of the spectacular way towards the European Union. Because of the embodiment of previous long-lasting theoretical constructions and dreams, both of them meant a real qualitative change in the development towards a common Europe.

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