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Oksa, Jukka (Eds.): *Curtain of Iron  
and Gold. Reconstructing Borders  
and Scales of Interaction*. Aldershot,  
Brookfield/USA, Singapore, Sydney:  
Ashgate 1999, pp. 25-42.

2 Ibid., p. 41.

3 Cf. Ahponen, Pirkkoliisa: The Case  
of Karelia – a remote example of bor-  
der-crossings. In: Iger, György/  
Langer, Josef (Eds.): *Border, Region  
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1996, pp. 183-202 and Langer, Josef:  
On the western side of the former  
Iron Curtain – the Austrian border  
region. In: Iger/ Langer 1996, pp. 121-  
144.

4 Cf. Paasi, Anssi: The Political  
Geography of Boundaries at the End  
of the Millennium: Challenges of the  
Deterritorializing World. In: Eskeli-  
nen/ Liikanen/ Oksa 1999, pp. 9-24.

## 1. Introduction

On the 31<sup>st</sup> of January 2000 the Portuguese Presidency of the *European Union* (EU) on behalf of fourteen out of fifteen member states issued a statement in which the president and the chancellor of Austria were informed that in the case that a government integrating the *Freedom Party* (FPÖ) will be formed the following joint reactions of the fourteen other EU member states must be faced:

Governments of 14 member states will not promote or accept any bilateral official contacts at political level with an Austrian government integrating the FPÖ.

There will be no support in favour of Austrian candidates seeking positions in international organisations.

Austrian Ambassadors in the EU capitals will only be received at a technical level.

This threat is without precedence in the history of European integration and has raised wide attention all over Europe and even beyond. It also challenges those social scientists which focus their interest on the emergence of the *European Union* and wonder about its character as a political structure. The action under discussion here has been labelled as »boycott«, »sanctions«, »merely political«, »illegal« etc. In everyday life the term »boycott« is frequently used. Generally there seems to be a lot of confusion about what it really is. In technical terms it is simply a downgrading of diplomatic relations between states. What is however obvious from the level of everyday observation are the emotions the action was able to stir up, and that it has a strong dimension of inclusion and exclusion which suggests to consider it as an ideological attempt of boundary formation in the post-Iron-Curtain era.

The existence of borders is reflected by a complex of symbolic constructions. The imagination of border as a physical or administrative reality is only one side of the phenomenon, and is connected with common experience of borders as state borders. This chapter aims to obtain understanding of how cultural interpretations of political activities influence borders and borderlands as mental constructions. Terms like »borders« and »boundaries« refer to spaces which are limited by lines and focused on certain points. The terminology related to this complex includes also territories, zones, limits and frontiers. Metaphoric expressions like bridges, doors, curtains (The Iron Curtain), gateways and ends (an ultimate end) illustrate the multiple meanings of boundaries or borders. This prism-like variety of concepts is also confusing; it signifies how difficult it is to catch the theoretical contents of the »black box« like border<sup>1</sup>. Therefore, we will emphasise that both conceptual comparisons and discussions based on as comparative case studies from different borderlands are needed to find a better theoretical basis for border impact studies.<sup>2</sup>

We see the cultural character of the political society reflected in its border constructions. From this starting point, political strategies of the societies in question (Austria and Finland) are mirrored dialogically by the authors as representatives of two European Union societies which until 1989 had in common their location at the Iron Curtain.

It was emphasised earlier by both of the authors<sup>3</sup> that borders as cultural constructions become symbolically reconstructed after some elements of artificial boundaries are redefined as resulting from certain political changes and social transformations. Another aspect to point out is that theoretical reflections on how borders become culturally constructed artefacts are not developed very far although the interest in conceptually and semantically oriented multidisciplinary studies has increased among border researchers during 1990's.<sup>4</sup> Therefore we see observations concerning comparative cases about social, cultural and political aspects in border-formations as strategically useful for developing theoretically relevant critical interpretations of the artificial character of national borders. The importance of the ideological aspect in how borders are constructed and reconstructed is lying in the operations by means of which the political security of a certain territory is justified. The cultural value system, as included in these operations, is an ideal guarantee of the legitimacy of political borders.



That is why our attention is principally focused on the ideological formation of boundaries in the context of the national policy. We use our own placements in Finland and Austria as lookout spots to understand how the ideological borders are constructed and reconstructed in the field of democracy. Our strategy is to connect certain political processes in these countries with the political situation in Europe since World War II – the current situation after the deconstruction of the Iron Curtain being, however, emphasised.

We start by discussing the complexity of the concept of ideology. Comparisons are made between some similarities and differences in the political position of Finland and Austria as unique if not even quite peculiar examples of how the processes of Europeanisation are forwarded since WW II. Our specific concern however is focused on the very recent experiences, described largely in the public media, about the declared boycott of the Austrian government by the governments of the other EU members. A strong debate, which contains an indisputable ideological charge, took place after the 14 national government of the member states of the *European Union* decided to »freeze« their official relations with this government after the representation of the *Freedom Party* in it. This analysis is based on materials both from Austrian and Finnish newspapers. The comparisons concern how the national political identity is reflected in relation to Europe. Further, an attention is paid to the role of the national governance in the context of the *European Union*.

The national boundary-formation influences the placement of a member country inside the »European family«. A mediating factor is the dimension by which the countries in question are culturally linked to larger political coalitions. That is why concepts like Nordic countries or Central Europe (*Mitteleuropa*) are discussed in this connection. There are also many other expressions like Scandinavia, states around the Baltic sea and »the Northern Dimension« in the part of Finland that are used for identifying its placement. This aspect is related here to the importance of the ideological reworking of the after-war neutrality/non-alignment policies as a national »dogma« of the fields of security and foreign policy of Austria and Finland in their current boundary situation.

## 2. Ideology – Meaning in the Service of Power

When discussing borders ideologically we travel on the cultural ground of conceptualisation; in a specific sense we go back and forth between the social use of the meaningfulness of facts and fictions and as John B. Thompson<sup>4</sup> defines meanings in serve of the »relations of domination«. In this sense, as related to the formation of symbolic borderlines, it is relevant to define the concept of ideology like Thompson, as »meaning in the service of power«. We need this perspective for understanding how borders become ideologically constructed and reconstructed in specific historical situations by the hegemonic groups to whom it is important to argue the legality of the political justification of a certain demarcation.

This aspect is emphasised here as the basis for adopting a critical view towards ideology. From that point of view we cannot see the process of symbolisation with all its meaningfulness as value-free or neutral but always taken into service of interests of certain social groups. If the political field of social action is interpreted in the light of unequal share of social resources it is more understandable why the total conception of ideology, in other words the »*Mannheimian Weltanschauung*«, is tending to turn to be reinforcing the dominating power structure.

Characteristically, ideology itself is labelled by the conceptual conspiracy. It is necessary although troublesome to make visible divisions between different meanings of ideology. In the widest sense the Mannheimian concept of ideology is seemly »neutral«, describing a system of thoughts or all symbolic systems as such. A kind of system of beliefs is pertaining to all social activities or political practices<sup>5</sup>. However, this descriptive understanding of world-view is already marked by »positivity« in its effort to see social activities as object-like »things«; therefore it is clearly connected to positivism. It is not needed here to go more toward the projects of Napoleon and Destutt de Tracy, even less toward Comtean scientific methodology to understand that this kind of ideological construction does not serve our purposes. It cannot make visible how the boundary-line between the meaningfulness of social activities and the arbitrary functioning of

4 Thompson, John B.: Ideology and Modern Culture. Critical Social Theory in the Era of Mass Communication. (1. p. 1990). Cambridge, Oxford: Polity Pr. in Ass. with Blackwell 1994, pp. 6-7.

5 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 5.



6 Cf. Williams, Raymond: *Marxism and Literature*. Oxford 1977.

7 Cf. Thompson 1994, p. 139.

8 Cf. Hall, Stuart: Introduction: Who Needs ›Identity? In: Hall Stuart/ du Gay, Paul (Eds.): *Questions of Cultural Identity*. London: Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: SAGE 1996, pp. 1-17.

9, Cf. Laclau, Ernesto/ Mouffe, Chantal: *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*. London: Verso 1988.

10 Cf. Fairclough, Norman: *Discourse and Social Change*. Cambridge: Polity Pr. 1995, p. 64f.

11 Ibid., p. 67.

12 Ibid., p. 93.

13 Ibid., p. 48.

14 Cf. Baumann, Zygmunt: *Postmodernity and its Discontents*. Cambridge: Polity Pr. 1997, p. 49.

symbolic structures is formed. Neither the structural Althusserian version of totalitarianism, in which the negative concept of ideology rules in a determinative way, is very fruitful for using ideology as a tool for understanding those border-crossings that are considered here. The critical concept of ideology has, however, inherited its kernel from the dialectical Marxian thought which turned towards the aspect of negative dialectics in the critical theory of Adorno.

The concept of ideology is also rooted in the culturalism of Williams and Hall. Here the Gramscian understanding of cultural hegemony gives a charge for seeing ideology as a social structuring of meanings<sup>6</sup> or social employment of symbolic forms<sup>7</sup>. Further, Hall advises an understanding of how meaningfulness is produced in the processes of identification, by »discursive work«, through binding and marking symbolic boundaries.<sup>8</sup> As emphasised by Hall in this connection an identity in the modern world is always strategic and positional; the same argument concerns also ideology as the counterpart of the identity construction.

The more »politics of differences« are discussed the more both identities and ideologies are seen as heterogeneous, transforming and multiple.<sup>9</sup> As Fairclough asserts, they are mediated by ways in which social relationships are set up in discourses, by negotiations, conventions and creative contributions.<sup>10</sup> It is important to see how discourses identify the participants but we like to emphasise like Fairclough<sup>11</sup> that discourses as political practices establish, sustain and change power relations which are embedded in social situations. Even more, as Fairclough continues, discourses as ideological practices constitute, naturalise, sustain and change significations of power relations. To see how ideological boundaries are constructed we take into serious consideration the Gramscian understanding of hegemonic power in Fairclough's notion that the ways in which conventions are articulated are the focus of an ideological struggle. Significantly, public media discourses influence increasingly in the »discursive facet of the contradictory and unstable equilibrium which constitutes a hegemony«<sup>12</sup>.

As understood in this way, ›ideology‹ belongs to the sphere of the culture of politics. It can be defined as a more or less coherent system of concepts and values which serves the interests of certain social groups; therefore subjectively constructed meanings are needed to serve the power. Otherwise than in the field of ›theory‹ the appeal of ideology is rather directed towards emotions than to reason. It is not defined by »rationality« although (positive) ideologies contain a strong cognitive dimension and even claim to be ›scientific‹ (e.g. Marxism).

Another important aspect of ideology is that those who take it as foundation for their action must not be aware of its character. Just in this sense, inherent possibilities for manipulation, we would see it as ›false consciousness‹. The aspect of ›false consciousness‹ has been seen important to be taken into consideration, especially from the structural perspective of »the negative ideology«. This »particular conception of ideology« or ideology as a »disguise« of interests is critically discussed in situations in which the group in which we like to have a membership is sceptical towards the ideas and views represented and advanced by our opponents. As related to our view, those opposing ideas are, according to Thompson, »misrepresentation« of the »real nature of the situation« understood by the »we-group«<sup>13</sup>.

On the other hand, we can see that those who promote ideology consciously are usually aware of its ›political‹ character. And this is another important aspect: as an interest based world view ideology is forwarded by political activities. Here we come into the realm of the most interesting sphere of politics. Intrinsic problem included in the structural understanding of ideology concerns of who are the carriers of cultural values, identities, and certain properties. How can we be certain, otherwise than by learning from the history, that some deeds, attitudes or opinions are right or even correct. We can, of course, speak in the name of humanity or morality, for instance to argue that morality is possible only in »being for the other« in the face-to-face situation.<sup>14</sup> But in a situation where there are »multiple others« unique, as Bauman continues, in their challenges to my responsibility, in their claims on my »being for«, that kind of judgements are postulated which demand criteria of objectivity and, therefore, objectivation based on principles of, for instance, democratic majority. This problem is interesting as related to questions concerning acceptability of phenomena through which the flexibility of ideological boundaries is tested. Boundaries of tolerance are then in question among the hegemonic majority, responsible of the



15 Cf. Beetham, David: *Democracy and Human Rights*. Cambridge: Polity Pr. 1999.

16 *Ibid.*, p. 13, 27f.

17 Cf. Tomlinson, John: *Globalization and Culture*. Cambridge: Polity Pr. 1999, p. 74.

18 *Ibid.*, p. 75.

democratically controlled decision-making. We agree with Beetham that a system of collectively binding decision-making is »democratic to the extent that it is subject to control by all members of the relevant association, or all those under its authority, considered as equals«.15 An access to the exercise of control over the decision-makers, presently more and more mediated means, is the measure of the representative democracy, exercised in practise by deliberative assemblies. Our purposes are also served well by Beetham's definition that democracy is a means to »reflexive agents« to determine what the public good is, as well as a capacity to realise the principles of popular control of power and political equality in practice.16

### 3. Ideological Boundaries

With respect to »ideological boundaries« we emphasise the two sides of this syndrome: one is semantic, and the other is social. The key concepts of an ideology make only sense in its own logical (theoretical, situational) context. For example the concept »race« has different connotations in the Marxist ideology than in liberalism. The social aspect is emphasised when ideology is seen as used mainly for establishing or interrupting social relations and thus having a boundary function. Its exclusiveness and inclusiveness as well as its integrating and differentiating character – depending on the group-formations between »us« and »the others« – are significant dimensions on which we have to focus ideology like a watershed.

When ideological boundaries are discussed by making comparisons between national political identities a basic difficulty has been included in the consensus – or majority – based political administration. Governments, representing the state power, are spoken like human actors. An insight into this problem may be caught by following the idea of Tomlinson's expression of »reflexive ethnocentrism«.17 Tomlinson describes this syndrome as representing »reflexively ordered nation-state system« so that »reflexive awareness« is, as he says, increasingly built into political conceptualisations of »borders«, of sovereignty or even of »incommensurability of cultures«. This awareness is forwarded, as Tomlinson18 remarks, side by side with the universal idea of the »higher unity of mankind«. Therefore, the principle of »cosmopolitan humanism« is forwarded by compromising it with nationalism and ethnicism, in other word with consciousness of existence of races. One nation or even a larger coalition identified like Scandinavia or Europe can, in principle, be unanimous; if so it is no necessity to take questions concerning democratic rights of minorities into consideration.

### 4. The Austrian Government in the EU Policies

The ideological dimension of what is now called the *causa prima* in Austria is taken here as an example of how ideological boundaries are constructed currently in the European political reality. The threat by the 14 other government of the European Union of downgrading diplomatic relations was enforced immediately after the nomination by the Austrian president Thomas Klestil of a cabinet led by Wolfgang Schüssel the head of the People's Party on the 4<sup>th</sup> of February, 2000. Officially the boycott was introduced because the new Austrian government is a coalition between the *Peoples Party* a kind of *Christian Democratic Party* and the *Freedom Party* which by ist opponents is considered right wing or even »racist«. Earlier negotiations between the *Social Democrats* and the *Peoples Party* with the purpose to renew the old coalition had failed. Also the idea of a socialist minority government was short lived due to the expected lack of parliamentary support.

This situation which prompted the Portuguese Presidency to issue the statement on behalf of 14 member states emerged after the elections of October 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1999. From nine parties which participated in the elections in Austria three parties caught almost 90% of the votes: the *Social Democrats/SPO* (33,15%), *The Freedom Party/FPÖ* (26,91%) and the *Peoples Party/ÖVP* (26,91%). Actually the *Peoples Party* which at least factually shared power with the *Social Democrats* since 1945 remained with about 400 votes behind the *Freedom Party* on third rank. Here one should know that the *Peoples Party* was the junior partner in a coalition with the *Social Democrats* since 1987. The general expectations after the October '99 elections was that this coalition will continue.



<sup>19</sup> That even that what seems most appalling with Haider can be interpreted in a more modest and tolerant way demonstrates a comment of the eminent Norwegian sociologist and peace researcher Johan Galtung in *Die Presse* v. 16.02.2000.

The statement of the 14 EU head of governments is without precedence and it does not give any reason for the threat of boycott except the participation of a party which is after all legal in Austria into government. Therefore it is not surprising that the statement created first of all a big confusion. The first reason for the confusion was the definition of the statement as of ›bilateral‹ status only though it was issued by the presidency of the EU. The boycott is supposed not to effect the multilateral relations and working of the institutions of the *European Union*. In the meantime this message has been frequently repeated by Romano Prodi and other high level speakers of the *European Commission* in Brussels.

From what representatives of the 14 government communicated with the public through media the reason for this measure was that the Austrian *Freedom Party* was unanimously considered as a ›xenophobic‹ and ›right wing radical‹ party. To let such a party participate in the governing of a EU member was considered as undesirable if not dangerous for the further development of the European Union as a democratic organisation. Gradually it was released that the evidence on which the decision was based were mainly statements of the leader of the *Freedom Party* Jörg Haider and some other representatives of this party. The incriminating part of the statements can be grouped in such about the character of Nazi Germany and others about foreigners.

Though for the neutral observer the facts on which the measures of the 14 might appear as a ›thin soup‹, because the evidence is either from what opponents of Haider have publicized or out of context.<sup>1</sup> The international media echo was enormous. Jörg Haider even made it to the cover sheet of *Newsweek* (*Thunder on the right*) and *TIME magazine* (*Should Europe fear this man?*).

With respect to the domestic and the international side of the measures announced by the 14 governments the following can be said:

- a) Though the downgrading of diplomatic relations with the Austrian government was defined as ›bilateral‹ the practice of the measures became visible to the public so far mostly at the occasions of the EU council meetings. This indicates a difficulty to keep ›bilateral‹ and ›multilateral‹ apart in the present frame of the *European Union*. At the same time the functioning of the European institution doesn't seem to be substantially effected yet by the bilateral measures. This is a kind of bizarre reality: A bilateral restrictive measure which mainly is communicated at multilateral occasions on which it should not have any effect.
- b) Officially standing together the 14 send different signals when speaking outside the EU context. On the basis of Austrian (and German) media reporting one gets the impression that France and Belgium represent the hard liners whereas Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Italy keep a more moderate position and signal an interest to terminate the boycott. It belongs to the odd side of the measures that some of those who participate criticise it publicly, whereas the institutions of the EU offer the platform for expressing the symbolism of exclusion, though they should have an interest to keep the members together.
- c) Another aspect to be considered is that officially the measures intend to isolate the Austrian government and not the Austrian society although at the beginning there were occasionally appeals to boycott Austrian tourism, student exchange and cooperation in all fields. Particularly the Belgium foreign minister Michel Marche issued such statements: Belgium schools should not send classes for skiing to Tyrol or the Austrian tourist office should be prevented to participate in a tourist fair in Brussels. One month after beginning of the boycott at a council meeting of the 15 head of states in Lisbon such wide interpretation of the measures got official disapproval. Even the Belgium foreign minister regretted his earlier statements in this direction. Now it is clear: cutting ties with the Austrian government should not be accompanied by cutting ties with the Austrian society. Some proponents of the boycott even propagate to intensify the relations with Austria to strengthen the opposition against the government. Nevertheless some cases of hostilities against Austrians abroad (mainly in France) have been reported, though the validity of such reports is not always given. The most spectacular was probably a bomb threat against the Vienna Philharmonics in Paris. In Brussels a taxi driver association has announced that it will not pick up



Austrian passengers. Later the opposite was reported that this taxi drivers were especially friendly towards Austrians. Some political analysts also expressed doubts about the possibility in a boycott to keep society and state apart.

- d) In Austria itself the measures of the 14 government is first of all visible through the media which dedicate a lot of space to all kinds of statements, events, observations, opinions etc. related to the causa prima. This reports frequently give the material for controversial statements of the political opponents – the government and the opposition. The government naturally tends to play down the boycott whereas the opposition speaks of chaos and a great danger for the country. For Austrian circumstances the verbal exchanges carry sometimes unusual aggressiveness.
- e) Right after the taking office of the new government Vienna experienced one of its largest demonstration. More than a month later anti-government demonstrations still take place though on a much smaller scale. From this and also from masses of letters to the editors of Austrian newspapers observers could conclude a deep cleavage in the society.
- f) The extent to which the boycott contributes to cleavages in the Austrian society is uncertain. For the opposition it appears to be just another field in which the government shows incompetence. On the other hand opinion surveys show that the majority of the populations (about two thirds) consider the measures of the 14 government as illegitimate, unjust and wrong. In any case it is a much larger part of Austrians than that which voted for the two parties of the ÖVP/FPÖ coalition.
- g) At the same time the support for the EU membership did not significantly decrease yet. Here one must remember that no other population in Europe has so overwhelming voted for the EU membership (two third) than the Austrian in 1994. Here it is probably important that the boycott at least officially does not prevent the Austrian government from participating in the EU institutions. If this would be the case the mood in the population would probably tilt against the *Union*.

If we begin to abstract from political emotions and partly confusing media clips and try to classify the boycott of the 14 against Austria on a cognitive level it first appears to be the effect of a boundary which is supposed to separate and isolate certain world views, values and opinions from others. One can call such a boundary ideological on a number of grounds:

- a) The boundary emerges because different clusters of ideas are not considered compatible in a semantic sense
- b) Social relations are impeded without careful proof of evidence and rational arguments
- c) The publicised intentions are most likely not the main or real intentions of the actors.

It is not difficult to argue that all three characteristics can be identified in the case under discussion here.

The 14 governments wanted to isolate a government in which a party which they consider not in accordance with the European values shares 50% of the positions. This party is the Austrian *Freedom Party* (FPÖ). The ideological border guards declare that xenophobia, playing down the cruel character of the *Third Reich*, antisemitism and general verbal abuse of opponents is not compatible with European values. And they claim that this is not only in the mind of Jörg Haider, the leader of the *Freedom Party* (in the meantime he has resigned from this position) but the essence of the whole party. Hence it does not matter whether its leader personally participates in the government or not it will be deprived of full bilateral recognition until the FPÖ withdraws from power. The other party in government, the *Peoples Party*, is almost equally refused because it has opened the door to power for an undesirable political group. It has betrayed the European consensus to keep right wing parties off this kind from power. In fact the political isolation of the *Freedom Party* began when Haider became its leader in 1986. Before the FPÖ was for a couple of years coalition partner of the *Social Democrats*. Ironically, it was a new leadership of the *Social Democrats* who started the exclusion when Haider took over. The boycott of the 14 can also be considered ideological because evidence and actual social behaviour has a low status in it. This is signalled by the kind and speed in which the measures were introduced. They did not initiate the procedure which the *Treaty of Amsterdam* (Art. 6 and 7) provides in cases of



violations against human rights but opted instead for »political and ideological« measures outside the legal frame of the EU. Thus the boycott probably was illegal and cannot meet any criteria of international or institutional law.

Consequently on the Austrian side the response is first of all also ideological. It even seems as if the political forces are getting acquainted to the boycott each trying to take its advantage from it. Besides that the country experiences an unusual engaged and wide intellectual discussion. Something which probably not even existed in the heydays of the '68 movement to this extent. Voices from all corners of society contribute their interpretations and opinions to the *causa prima*. The main outlet for this are the two major quality newspapers of the country – *Die Presse* and *Der Standard*. This newspapers also extensively quote the opinions of the foreign press in this matter. What is remarkable in the comments is the great variety of motives and interests seen as driving the boycott.

There is of course the type of comment which assume behind this measures the justified concern of Austria's partners in the EU with the supposed xenophobic and right wing character of the *Freedom Party*. Behind this kind of text are frequently authors with some kind of open or hidden relatedness to the *Social Democratic Party* or the *Green Party*. A slightly different argument is that it is not so much the *Freedom Party* than its leader Jörg Haider whose sharp tongue does not even refrain from personal attacks on EU leaders (eg. calling the French president Chirac a »pocket Napoleon« or the entire Belgium government »corrupt«) has provoked the measures against the Austrian government. This perception is frequently shared also outside those leftist circles which derive their identity partly from a fundamental opposition to the *Freedom Party*. But this type of interpretation does not represent the main thread in the discourse about the boycott. That is rather to assume hidden and latent interests of the political players behind it.

Here are a number of motives, intended and unintended consequences of the boycott as assumed by Austrian and international commentators:

- a) The boycott is a strategy of larger countries (eg. France, Germany) to weaken the position of small member states in the current institutional reform (eg. pushing the principle of majority voting in the decision procedure). Austria as a warning example if a small country does not comply with the interests of the big ones. The EU as ruled by a directory with French-German dominance.
- b) The move is a further step towards political union. It intensifies discussions on »European values«. In this respect it is not foreign intervention into the matters of a sovereign state but European domestic policy. In any case it raises the question of bilateral diplomatic representation inside the EU.
- c) France intends to push Austria back into the arms of Germany to reduce the complexity of the decision making processes in the EU. Austria as a province of Germany. What was against French interests after World War I (*Deutsch-Österreich*) is now the opposite. As the Belgium foreign minister Michel is quoted: »Europe does not need Austria«. To rephrase: A Europe without French-German strategic rivalry does not need a Austria separated from Germany.
- d) The Latin countries and among them particularly France are afraid of a German block after eastern enlargement of the EU. With the case of Austria they are warning the Germans what could happen if this country should try to follow its own course again. Some French politicians seem to see Austria, Northern Italy (*Lega Nord*), Bavaria (CSU) and German speaking Switzerland as the core of an emerging Germanic block in the EU.
- e) About half of the EU budget is subsidy for agriculture. Eastern enlargement will redistribute this money. As France and the Mediterranean members are the greatest beneficiaries of the present pattern of distribution they are the hidden enemies of taking in new members from the east-central Europe. To attack Austria is a possibility to distract from this fact and make the country responsible for delays in the negotiations with the candidate countries.
- f) One rational given for the boycott by the 14 were »European values« though unspecified. This led on the one hand to demands to make such values explicit and official in



a kind of catalogue, on the other such endeavors were criticised as serving centralistic and undemocratic purposes in the EU. It was also argued that in the present situation of mainly socialist lead governments this would lead to an implementation of ›socialist values«. Another question considered is whether such values are not already sufficiently guarded by the existing national and supranational legal system.

- g) The boycott was interpreted as a possibility of the 14 to distract from different kinds of domestic problems in each of the countries.

Austria as a lightning rod for all kinds of problems in different member states of the EU. Therefore the low level interest in exit strategy. A further indicator for the political and ideological character of the boycott.

- h) The diversion function of the boycott is sometimes also emphasised with respect to the domestic policy in Austria. The boycott consolidates the position of the new government instead as intended to weaken it. It helps to implement a mainstream neoliberal policy which the ÖVP/FPÖ government has written on its banner. In a normal situation this attack on the welfare state would release more fundamental resistance. Now the opposing energy of the population is diverted to questions of collective identity. Instead of clearly seeing the planned redistribution of about 15% of the budget from labour to capital attention is on the attack from outside. Is it a kind of »Hegels List der Vernunft«?
- i) The boycott questions the institutions of the nation state in the frame of the *European Union*. How independent are national parliaments if democratically elected parties represented in them can be kept from government by EU intervention etc.? On the administrative level the national foreign service in particular is on the test bed. Is diplomatic representation between EU governments still necessary? This question has occasionally been raised in the past but with freezing the bilateral relations as one of the main measures of the boycott the question comes closer to an answer. The Austrian case might show that a member of the EU can handle also its bilateral relations sufficiently just by participating in the European institutions without bilateral diplomatic representation. If the distinction of the 14 between boycotting society and boycotting the state will work it could well be taken as evidence for the emergence of a European society beyond the nation state.
- j) After 1989 Austria has not taken full advantage of its favourable strategic position towards the new post-communist societies. Now the boycott of the 14 has created a new situation. Having been left alone by its partners in the EU many Austrians appreciate the mostly moderate and sometimes even supportive response of its postcommunist neighbours. It is argued that after eastern enlargement Austria could play an important role in a cluster *Mittleuropa*. In the EU this could be a grouping of countries with similar functions as the French-German axis or the Scandinavian group. In this case the boycott could have been a catalyst for a new structuring.

## 5. The Boycott of the Austrian Government from the Finnish Perspective

During February, the Finnish media followed sensitively this process since *European Union* member states downsized the official relations with Austria. The negative attitudes among leading *Social Democrats* to the governmental responsibility of *Freedom Party* were clearly pronounced. The nomination of the Austrian cabinet was reacted by reporting what happened and reviewing shortly the main phases in the history of the *Freedom Party* and in Haider's life-story. As included in these news it was mentioned that a declaration for the respect to human rights and democratic values was signed by the leaders of the *People's Party* and the *Freedom Party* as demanded by president Klestil (*Karjalainen*, 04.02.2000) It was also mentioned that Klestil was not satisfied with this coalition but he could not »defy democracy«.

The second phase of the presidential election took place in Finland on 6<sup>th</sup> of February. There was a remarkable concern among *Social Democrats* of whether the boycott would affect the result of this election, their candidate, Tarja Halonen being among the defenders of the EU-resolution and the other presidential candidate, Esko Aho, leader of the *Centre Party*, criticising this agenda. Halonen, as the foreign minister in office at that time, representing also the very recent presidential seat in the *Union*, considered to be dependent on the official statement of the prime



20 Cf. Beetham 1999, p. 82.

ministers. A main argument, semantically characteristic, in Aho's critics was that the case of Austria was a »good« example of what can happen in the political conditions of the »straight flush«, in other words, letting *Social Democrats* occupy all important power positions, especially in the field of the foreign and security policy for too long a period. He blamed the *Union* also for the subjugation of the national aims under the aims of an international power bloc. The prime minister Lipponen, from his part, hurried to contest the arguments of Aho by saying that the resolution was negotiated together and the statement was prepared in the spirit of consensus, as characteristic of the concept of democracy in the EU. He remarked in this connection that even the bourgeois (*Christian-Centre*) government of Norway agreed with the statement without the membership in the *Union*. (*Karjalainen*, 04.02 and 06.02.2000).

The leading Finnish newspaper, Helsingin Sanomat, positioned as representing liberal values, published just on 6<sup>th</sup> of February a critical column *A dangerous way of the EU-leaders*. The manner of proceeding towards the boycott by the resolution of the prime ministers of member states was questioned in this column. Primarily the leaders of Germany, France and Belgium were accused – the prime ministers of other member states being »taken care by phone discussions« – of interfering »internal affairs of a member state« in the shadow of democracy. It is stated in the column that: »This corresponds with a horror scenario of the development of the EU to remind a new empire of Rome, which rules and dominates like the Almighty in Europe and excludes those who do not behave in preferable ways and who choose suspicious governments for themselves«. It was emphasised in the column that although the rise of the Haider's party into the government is »a disgusting phenomenon« it happened by following the rules of democracy while the resolution by the part of the EU was done without a public discussion. Therefore, it was presumed that the reputation of the EU might suffer from the results of this »crusade«. Popular consent, reached in conditions of free expression and association of people is seen here as an elementary condition of democracy.<sup>20</sup>

What followed was ideologically reasoned by pleading for democracy, either by emphasising liberal or social values. In practice, evasive strategies were applied to the situation in which representatives of the Austrian government were met. It was described how the ministers of social affairs looked their Austrian colleague icily down in Lisbon (*HS*, 14.02.2000) and how the foreign minister Ferrero-Waldner, as the representative of the *Freedom Party* (sic!), was listened without shaking hands with her or without answering to her speech in the meeting at Brussels (*HS*, 15.02.2000). However, the division between the democratic »camps« was clearly ideological. It was reported on 22<sup>nd</sup> of March as the opinion of the leader of France and Belgium that the EU »should not yield an inch« back in the boycott of Austria while Italy and »some smaller member states like Finland« were ready to think a new the reasonability of the situation.

In fact, the official opinion was quickly divided in Finland according to the lines of ideological values represented by the ruling parties. The representatives of the bourgeois parties criticised more or less openly the agenda while *Social Democrats*, conducted by the prime minister Lipponen, defended stubbornly the consensual agenda of the *Union*. When the discussion continued during March and April the issue was more and more whether the prime minister proceeded correctly in this affair because he had not informed the president, Martti Ahtisaari in that time, nor the parliament, before making the resolution on joining with the other 13 in the governmental boycott of Austria. Ahtisaari, then travelling, accepted the agenda later. However, after »numerous complaints« the *Chancellor of Justice* (Nikula) took the affair in his charge and asked Lipponen to clarify more the motives of the resolution and the agenda.

Both the new president Halonen and the new foreign minister Tuomioja have expressed their wish that the relations between »the fourteens« and Austria would be normalised soon. However, according to the statement of Tuomioja as it was reported on April 14<sup>th</sup> (*Karjalainen*), Finland is not aiming to make an initiative for reversing the boycott while the minister of financial affairs, Sauli Niinistö, leader of the conservative party, is among those who demand the termination of the boycott.

A well-known political »grey eminence«, Max Jakobson wrote in his column on March 13<sup>th</sup> that the European democratic consensus which has included both »conservative economical policies, the social democratic welfare state and liberal values« is now tested by the »strengthening of the populist extreme movements«. Jakobson interprets the boycott as an effort for a hindran-



ce of the increasing of racist attitudes, included in populist political variations. In the same time, as included in the politics of inclusion and exclusion, the projects of Enlightenment are continuing, integrative programs for immigrants are forward in hope of preventing unemployment and criminality inside »our« borders, and also the immigration is restricted by prohibiting asylum grants increasingly. A discussion on »useful immigrants« is revived in the name of the »active immigration programs«. As Jakobson says, all this has to be taken into consideration when we try to develop an immigration politics for a more open society instead of trying to withdraw from foreign influences into our own closed »shell«. This means that we have to discuss more and more even how to »tame« the strangers, represented by extreme movements, among us.

## 6. Ideologically identified group memberships

Between World War II and 1989 the strongest ideological border line in Europe was between communism and the pluralist democracies in the capitalist system. This boundary converged more or less with the physical construct of the Iron Curtain. In the West the ideological deviations remained inside the nation state. The extreme right political responsible for the human disaster of World War II became a marginal phenomenon with the exception countries like Spain and Portugal. Austrian and Finnish soldiers were both fighting on the side of Nazi Germany. Though Austria was clearly the first victim of German aggression it became fully integrated into the Nazi war machine later. Not as a state but as a society. This also holds as far as ideology is concerned<sup>21</sup>. The Austrian state however has resisted the »Anschluss« for many years without support from any Western country. When Austria was occupied by German troops in 1938 only Mexico protested. After 1945 the Nazi party was forbidden by law, and Austria ran one of the most ambitious denazification programmes in Europe with the probable exception of the Netherlands. Ever since the extreme right has no representation in parliament. That does not mean that the one or the other politician did not have his eye on this kind of ideology. Finland on the other hand was on the side of Germany first of all as a state and much less as a society. After 1945 the ideological influence of communism was stronger than in Austria. In the latter case it was almost insignificant.

Political integration of the member states has been a principal goal for the *European Union* through its history. In the shadow of the progress of the European economic development, the political interdependency was assumed to prevent a repeat of the horror of the Second World War. However, as Christine Agius states when considering the situation of Austria, Finland and Sweden in their relations to the *European Union*, the question of how to formulate a common agenda, especially in the fields of foreign and security policy is remained problematic.<sup>22</sup> She continues by specifying the issue to concern the supranational character of the EU. Therefore, surrendering the areas of »high policies« like security and defence policies to supranational control has been, as Agius says, »equated with a loss of sovereignty«.<sup>23</sup> It has not been quite clear how and why to strengthen the security in Europe, not even inside the *European Union*. The decision-making system in the EU is based on consensus by deliberative means. This does not mean a withdraw from any political commitment, vice versa, the *European Union* as an organisation modifies actively the contents of democracy, human issues and values concerning civil rights.

The concepts of neutrality or non-alignment-policy did not fit well in the demands of the EU-membership. These concepts were important in the after-war rhetoric of both Austria and Finland, the reason being in the political situation before and during the war as well as in the after-war sufferings. However, the methods of application as well as the contexts into which they connected were different in the countries in question. In the case of Austria neutrality went through a development from a mere category of international and constitutional law when it was introduced in 1955 to a strong element of collective identity since the late sixties. After liberation from National Socialism in 1945 Austria's sovereignty was restricted until 1955 when the so called *Staatsvertrag* was signed between Austria, France, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Visible sign of this restricted sovereignty was the presence of the armies of these four powers on Austrian soil. The next day, October 26<sup>th</sup>, 1955 after the last foreign soldier had left Austria, the parliament passed a law on »immerwährende *Neutralität* (eternal neutrality)« in the rank of a constitutional law. Since the sixties when Austrians increasingly accepted a national identity as being separate from the German nation neutrality was a central element of this consciousness<sup>24</sup>.

21 Cf. Vaaranmaa, Pasi-Heikki: Image in Transition – Ideology in Crisis. In: Kervinen, Korhonen/ Virtanen (Eds.): Identities in Transition. Turun yliopisto 1996, pp. 85-135.

22 Agius, Christine: Reinventing Neutrality – the Case of Austria, Finland and Sweden and the European Union. In: Murray, Philomena/ Holmes, Leslie (Eds.): Europe: Rethinking the Boundaries. Aldershot, Brookfield/USA, Singapore, Sydney: Ashgate 1998, pp. 155-173.

23 Ibid.

24 Cf. Langer, Josef: Last in, First out? – Austria's Place in the Transformation of National Identity. In: Kriesi, H./ Armingeon, K./ Sigrist, H./ Wimmer, A. (Eds.): Nation and National Identity. Chur, Zürich: Rüegger 1999, pp. 153-173.



25 Cf. Langer, Josef: On the Western Side of the Former Iron Curtain – the Austrian Border Region. In: Iger/Langer 1996, pp. 121-144.

26 Cf. Värynen, Raimo: Suomi avoimessa maailmassa. Globalisaatio ja sen vaikutukset. [Finland in the Open World. Globalization and its effects.] Sitra 223. Taloustieto. Helsinki 1999, p. 9f.

27 Cf. Paasi 1996, p. 115.

In a way the identification with neutrality replaced the feeling of being German. Other neutral countries like Sweden or Switzerland began compete with Germany in the mind of Austrians for the place of reference nation.<sup>25</sup> Whereas the communist neighbours who until 1918 had shared with Austria a common empire were perceived as insignificant and almost disappeared from their mind. Finally in 1994 Austrians voted for membership in the EU with the conviction that they will be able to keep neutrality. So far it is first of all the *Peoples Party* now in power which most strongly challenged Austrian's »addiction« to neutrality. Its strongest political supporters are still the *Green Party* and the *Social Democrats*.

What can replace »neutrality« in the Austrian mind? In the seventies and eighties we can find an increasing awareness of »*Mittleuropa*« as a possibility for a wider identity among intellectuals between Warsaw and Trieste, Budapest and Prag. Though the concept remained vague, ambiguous and suspicious it provided an ideology for the re-establishing of relations interrupted by the Iron Curtain. It sounds a little bit odd that in Austria which for centuries was the hegemon in Central Europe the interest in »*Mittleuropa*« came rather late and remained restricted to a marginal segment of the intellectual scene. It could be one effect of the boycott of the 14 that this will change because it forces the country to look for allies to cope with political conflicts inside the EU. And this allies could well be the old neighbours who not only shared with Austria a long history but maybe also understand the mentality of its people better than more distant countries, not to speak about the need to secure existing common economic interests. Whether this ideology of a wider regional identity has a chance to be adopted by a greater circle of population will depend on how far the contradictions and mutual dislike implanted by nationalism in this part of Europe can be overcome. In any case competing options like feeling again German, falling back to the region, keeping neutrality etc. might turn out to be less promising.

In the Finnish case, the specific border-state situation was labelled by the proximity with the former Soviet Union. After attaining its independence, Finland turned, as Värynen<sup>26</sup> describes the situation, towards aims of national coherence in the name of the politics of national reconciliation, protectionism and state-centralism. The cleavage between the winners and losers of the civil war in 1918 was, however, maintained, side by side with the image of the always threatening Russian danger, mostly fed by right-wing extremists. During the inter-war period Finland, as characterised by its historical-political uniqueness, was even distanced from her neighbouring Nordic countries. International contacts were maintained only like a curiosity in the circles of few participants of cultural radicalism. In some circles among the intellectuals cultural contacts with the Central Europe, in particular with Germany were favoured. Export business was forwarded to make possible the growth of the GNP, very necessary in the conditions of a rural periphery aiming at making modernisation and industrialisation more effective.

In the WW II Finland defended her independence against Soviet Union in two phases, first bravely alone in the months of the Winter War (1939-40), then as the »fellow-fighter« with Germany in 1941-1944. The armistice with the Allies obliged Finland to turn the guns against the armed forces of Germany in Lapland. Finland had, as Paasi reminds,<sup>27</sup> a quite extraordinary position in the after-war situation. Finland, alone with Great Britain and the USSR, was not occupied during the war and she could maintain the continuity of her constitution and the representative political institutions.

The political and cultural atmosphere was, however, changed in the after-war conditions. The Finnish society developed quickly toward the Nordic welfare state-model. Along with the increasing growth of the GNP (approximately 5%/year in 1950-74), the structural change of economy was demanded and justified as »a necessary condition for the welfare democracy«. International relations were diversified; however the bilateral political and economic exchange with Soviet Union was the basis of the formal foreign relations. *The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (TFCMA)* was a semantic basis of the definition of the political position of Finland; influential in the orientation toward the »outside world«. State-centralism and regulation defined the participation to the international affairs in the name of the national consensus. In the age of the »cold war« Finland had a special position in maintaining a power balance between superpowers by means of neutrality and joint operations with European partners. This aspect was especially emphasised in the official rhetoric in Kekkonen's period (1956-81). Geopolitical nearness with Soviet Union was a reality, the liturgy of trust was, as Värynen sta-



28 Cf. Värynen 1999, p. 27f.

29 Paasi 1996, p.132.

30 Värynen 1999, p. 27.

31 Cf. Alasuutari, Pertti/ Ruuska, Petri: Post-patria? Globalisaation kulttuuri Suomessa. [Post-patria? The Culture of Globalization in Finland]. Tampere: Vastapaino 1999, p. 79.

32 Cf. Agius 1998, pp. 128-164.

33 Paasi 1996, p.132f.

34 Cf. Värynen 1999, p. 30.

35 Cf. *ibid.* p. 31.

tes<sup>28</sup>, an instrument for interest-based commitments. National economic advantages were achieved by means of this strategy by taking a specific variant of the non-alliance policy into careful consideration. The prize was, however, that in the western assessments Finland was labelled by a specific expression called »finlandization (or, in its popular formula, »*Finlandisierung*«); in other words a situation in which, as Paasi puts it, »the Soviet Union was thought to have a major influence on Finnish internal political decisions«. <sup>29</sup> That meant, according to Värynen, »a complex of realism, opportunism and ideological faith«<sup>30</sup> – in favour of the better future for Finland. From the outside, however, this situation is seen as an anomaly in the European geopolitical landscape.

Finland is surrounded by the gulfs of the Baltic sea. To define strictly, Finland does not belong to the peninsula of Scandinavia. The specific character of the Finnish language connects people with Estonians. In spite of this, as far as Baltic states were subjugated under the Soviet system, everyday dealings with Estonian as well as Lithuanian and Latvian people were not very lively. The basic fact is that both the geopolitical existence in the nearness of the Soviet Union and a cultural membership among Nordic countries has been realities to Finland to be orientated in its internal and international relations.<sup>31</sup> During the period of the Iron Curtain Finland, although identified by its watershed position between the east and the west, was an outsider or a political bystander without being too closely connected to any bloc. Nordic co-operations, based on the sense of a common cultural heritage and the politically unifying welfare state model, were practised in favour of a common guarantee for maintaining solidarity in bigger circles and staying together as far as neutrality was concerned – in their effort to keep neutrality »intact«. <sup>32</sup>

Inside the country the consolidation of the political coalitions influenced strongly how the social system was developed. The problem was, increasingly, how to connect political neutrality with the demands for economic integration with the western Europe and the bilateral exchange with the eastern bloc, both more and more necessary for the Finnish trade and the forwarding of foreign affairs in general. By referring also to some other commentators, Paasi describes the ideological boundary between Finland and her »huge neighbour«<sup>33</sup> as an illustration constructed from unique elements like geopolitical isolation, limited defence potential, weak national identity, economic dependence and the internal influence of the communist movement. Although the significance of the »finlandization« seem to be exaggerated, at least in the most extreme arguments, the ideological impact of this borderline situation can be clearly seen, specifically afterwards.

The situation was changed step by step in the 1980's. Finland applied a full membership in the *European Free Trade Association* (EFTA) in 1985 and in 1987 the government gave a statement according to which the policy of integration is not a part of the policy of neutrality but a specific section inside the foreign policy. This statement has been interpreted as an opening towards a »new, positive and realistic alternative« by means of openness (for foreign resources), participation (with foreign organisations) and deregulation (from the political centralism towards market powers<sup>34</sup>). The period of *perestroika* was a necessary but not yet sufficient precondition for the change of the international orientation in Finland, as Värynen describes the situation. The effective changes in the international power balance during the 1990's impacted strongly in the Finnish situation. The decade began with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the period of recession and increasing unemployment rates in Finland. Political winds seemed to blow towards libertarian market values. Although this did not mean a radical change in the Finnish parliamentary representation, the orientation towards markets and inside the market-system had also political influences. After openings for the processes of globalisation and with the membership of the European Union the Finnish economic affairs have become directed more by international forces than by national political values.

The concept of neutrality has become difficult to maintain as an ideological denominator of Finland. However, this aspect has been remained as strategically emphasised in the fields of defence and security policies. According to the current »liturgy«, the independent defence of Finland is based to a policy of non-alignment in military affairs.<sup>35</sup> Finland is still trying to find a balance between blocs, to revitalise successful economic exchange with Russia, and to intermediate the process of deepening integration in the enlarged Europe.

Trustfulness is a key word to reform the contents of politics, linked also to the change in the dominating power structure. The use of power in the state-political operations has practically



36 Värynen 1999, p. 6.

37 Beetham 1999, p.61.

38 Cf. Alasuutari 1999, p. 93f.

more and more shifted, as Värynen among others notes,<sup>36</sup> from the president and the parliament to the prime minister and the holders of the strong minister positions in the government. Political democracy is still maintained by means of election but in practice democracy has become complicated and confused complex of economic values defined by ideological arguments. In this rhetoric, economic growth is necessary although not yet sufficient condition for the »sustainable democracy«<sup>37</sup>. It is a good question in the conditions of the risk society whether the »sustainable development« can be guaranteed by flexible networks of globalizing free markets, by increasing social equality, by the stability of democratically voiced political mainstream, or by the free expression of different political opinions.

At least, it was guaranteed in Finland by means of referendum that the political majority (56,9%) supported the application of the EU-membership in 1994. After becoming a member, the Finnish government has done its best to be among the »best pupils« in the school of Europeanization. Thinking pragmatically, just in the sense which characterises the current political atmosphere in Finland, it seems possible that the public discussion on the meaningfulness of the boycott of Austrian Government in official EU-meetings will continue although the discussion on whether we should operate independently in this affair has not been lively. However, any real operations towards the withdrawal by bilateral means, either alone or together with other minor partners, are not plausible. Afterwards, seen along her independent history, one can evaluate that Finland had succeeded well in this borderline situation, in operative relations both with the Soviet bloc and the Western coalitions. Now Finland is evaluated among one of the best pupils among the Euro-class. Therefore it is not worth of suspecting that this political lesson on the boundary between »us« and »them« will be utilised in the specific Finnish way. The concept of »the other« is not too familiar for the Finnish mentality; only just enough to be suspicious about how to manage with the representatives of extreme movements. One thing seems to be clear: in the globalizing world of networks, Finland as a nation does not want to stay alone any more.<sup>38</sup> Ideological borders are constructed by keeping the image of lonely hero of the winter war in the memorial gallery of the Finnish identity.

## 7. Conclusions

Like state borders ideological borders also contribute to the making of identity. Between 1945 and 1989 the nation state and the confrontation with communism provided rather stable conditions for a political collective identity in Western Europe. Since 1989 this has obviously changed. Not only that Samuel Huntington (1996) has announced a »clash of civilisation« replacing the confrontation between Communism and Western democracy, emerging transnational entities like the *European Union* are giving birth to new boundaries on all kinds of levels. On the administrative level the concept of an »external border« has been created. Dividing the poor from the rich it provokes the idea of »Fortress Europe« or a »Golden Curtain«. At the same time the »Schengen« scheme is replacing the distinct national borders of the past by a kind of security belt with flexible and unexpected control. The boycott of the Austrian centre-right government by its 14 EU partners indicates the arrival of a new kind of boundary formation. A type of boundary which is ambiguous because it can be read in different ways. Depending on the observer this kind of boundary separates a territory (Austria), an organisation (the Austrian government) or a configuration of ideas and values (ideology of the *Freedom Party*).

In any case the present conflict between the Austrian government and its counterparts in the EU is an excellent example for studying processes of boundary formation in the era of globalisation (or whatever we identify as the main characteristics of contemporary societies). Whenever boundaries disappear or become more pervious new boundaries will emerge. The *European Union* where nation states abandon their traditional border regimes and thus making the physical-administrative border between them almost disappear is not a forerunner of a borderless world. The decision of EU governments to boycott a member on ideological grounds has probably introduced a new type of boundary formation. It is the first time that the battle for hegemony as well as integration in this configuration of nation states has been moved beyond economic parameters. This raises a number of new questions in boundary studies. For example, can the government of an EU member state be isolated without considering the people it represents? Probably not if the government is still standing for a nation and not only one of many political organisations inside an European society. Whereas if the latter is already sufficiently developed the



boundary formation around the government will not effect the relations between the national sub-societies of the *Union*. Another question is how can ideological boundaries be enforced if control of state borders has already been abandoned (*Schengen*). From the Austrian case it is evident that the new ideological boundary has almost no territorial reference. It is first of all expressed by a situational semantic of exclusion. When the opponents meet they deny full social participation. How can a boundary be established if one side does not except it? So far the Austrian government has not accepted the downgrading of bilateral relations and other signs of symbolic exclusion. The new way of emphasising ideological borders intended and unintended side effects. It can for example serve domestic interests of those who draw the boundary on expense of the government encircled. On the other hand it can provoke solidarity with the excluded and thus shift boundaries on other levels. The latter we have discussed with the example of the formation of wider regional identities (Scandinavia, *Mitteleuropa* etc.).

New openings like the Nordic dimension in Europe, states around the Baltic sea, the Middle-Europe or even Euroregions are developed for crossing the earlier high borders. We can also see the idea of the »higher unity of mankind« in a symbolical use, defining political borderlines between human and inhuman values, between acceptable attitudes and those ideologies which are only worth of repulsion.

Significantly, meanings in the service of power are tended to be neutralised in deliberative practices which guarantee the social ideal of democracy. However, maintaining of consensus-based democratic values is not enough for »the end of ideology«. Also democratic procedures are demanded by emphasising the free expression of opinions as the kernel of the liberal democracy. When discussing the ideological borderline as a division between those who support the boycott of EU with the current Austrian government, we face with boundaries of socially and individually justified democracies.

#### Post scriptum

After receiving the report of the ›three wise men‹ (Ahtisaari, Frowein, and Oreja) on September 12, 2000, the current French Presedency – on behalf of the 14 EU governments originally behind the diplomatic boycott – announced the end of the sanctions because »the Austrian government has not violated European values«. However, the activities of the *Freedom Party* will be »watchfully observed«.

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