

first publication

Introduction

1 Kopecký, M./Bílek, O.: Sněmovna se postavila za dekrety. In: Lidové noviny, April 25, 2002.

2 Brügel, Johann Wolfgang: Tschechen und Deutsche 1918-1939. München: Nymphenburger 1967.

3 Kural, Václav: Konflikt místo společenství? Praha: Ústav mezinárodních vztahů 1993.

4 Brandes, Detlef: Der Weg zur Vertreibung: 1938-1945. München: Oldenbourg 2001.

5 Raška, Francis: The Czechoslovak Exile Government in London and the Sudeten German Issue. Praha: Karolinum 2002.

6 Wingfield, Nancy Merriwether: Minority Politics in a Multinational State. Boulder: Columbia UP 1989, p. 146ff.

7 Ibid., p. 149f.

8 Raška 2002, p. 19f.

9 Raška, Francis: The Emigration of Sudeten Germans to Canada (1938-1939). In: Slavic Almanac [Pretoria] 9/12 (2003), pp. 177-197.

The transfer of the Sudeten Germans after World War II continues to be one of the the most emotional and controversial political issues in the Czech Republic until today. In 2002, several German, Austrian, and Hungarian politicians called for the revocation of the *Beneš decrees* – namely the presidential directives issued between May 19 and October 27, 1945 on which the post-war treatment of Germans and Hungarians was based – in connection with the Czech Republic's application to join the European Union. The Czech political parties, involved in an election campaign, responded with a fury of nationalistic statements. On April 24, 2002, the Czech Parliament unanimously adopted a resolution tracing the origin of the decrees to the defeat of Nazism and pointed out that while no new legal measures could be based upon them the existing consequences were unchallengeable and could not be changed. The Czech legislators stressed the positive significance of the Czech-German declaration of 1997 and urged that future relations between the two countries not be complicated by political and legal issues of the past.¹

The history of the German minority in Czechoslovakia between the two world wars has been summarized in monographs by Johann Wolfgang Brügel² and Václav Kural.³ During the national elections of 1935, the Sudeten Germans supported the *Sudetendeutsche Partei*, which was escalating its demands on the Czechoslovak Government. In 1938, this Party rejected offers of significant concessions by the government and, thus, precipitated a crisis. On September 29, 1938, Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy decided at Munich that Czechoslovakia would have to surrender its frontier regions along with their German population to Germany. Despite guarantees provided by the *Munich Agreement*, remaining Czechoslovakia was occupied by Nazi Germany on 15 March 1939 and Bohemia and Moravia were incorporated into the Reich under the name *Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren*.

Edvard Beneš and his exile government in London considered a reduction of the size of the German minority the cornerstone of Czechoslovak renewal. The history of Czechoslovak plans to expel the Sudeten Germans has recently been analyzed in monographs by Detlef Brandes⁴ and Francis Raška.⁵ Early Czechoslovak plans developed from territorial cession combined with compensatory population exchanges to the creation of three German regions. The domestic resistance in the protectorate demanded German expulsion and, from 1942, German transfer became Czechoslovak policy. Beneš won the approval of the Allies for his transfer plans and in December 1943 he declared in Moscow that renewed Czechoslovakia would be a national state.

The largest organization of democratic Sudeten exiles in London, namely the *Treuegemeinschaft sudetendeutscher Sozialdemokraten* led by Wenzel Jaksch took a stand against the Czechoslovak government's position. The *Treuegemeinschaft* was the continuation of the German Social Democratic Party in Czechoslovakia. The German Social Democrats had joined the Coalition Government in 1929 and had been the most powerful German political party in the Republic until the 1935 elections when they were defeated by Konrad Henlein's *Sudetendeutsche Partei*. Wenzel Jaksch, a young Social Democratic deputy, became the leader of the Sudeten German resistance to Henlein's movement. Jaksch formulated a new political philosophy called ›*Volkssozialismus*‹, which stressed that workers shared interests with other social classes.⁶ In an attempt to radicalize the anti-Henlein focus of Sudeten German politics, Jaksch established so-called ›*Jungaktivismus*‹, which also involved younger members of other Sudeten German political parties. The *Jungaktivisten* called on the Czechoslovak government to change its attitude towards the Sudeten Germans and requested generous economic aid to the severely depressed border regions.⁷ During the crisis of 1938, the Social Democrats continued to support the Czechoslovak Republic.⁸ Their leadership worked tirelessly to help Sudeten German Social Democratic refugees who had fled the frontier regions after Munich and found themselves in rump Czechoslovakia and to relieve the plight of party members who had remained in the territories ceded to Germany.⁹ The party was disbanded under its old name on February 22, 1939 and was renamed to become the *Treuegemeinschaft sudetendeutscher Sozialdemokra-*



¹⁰ Wingfield 1989, p. 182.

¹¹ On pp. 79-132 Raška 2002 provides a detailed description and analysis of the *Treuegemeinschaft's* activities.

¹² Vondrová, Jitka: Češi a sudetoněmecká otázka. Praha: Ústav mezinárodních vztahů 1994, document no. 6, pp. 21-33.

¹³ Bachstein, Martin K.: Wenzel Jaksch und die Sudetendeutsche Sozialdemokratie. München: Oldenbourg 1974, pp. 206f.

¹⁴ Brügel, Johann Wolfgang/Goldschmidt, Leopold/Kolarz, Walter: Le problème du transfert de population – Trois million sudètes doivent-ils émigrer? Paris: s.t. 1939.

¹⁵ Public Record Office [PRO], FO371, File 24291, C7749/534/12, Jaksch to Makins, July 9, 1940; *Holmhurst Declaration*.

ten.¹⁰ More than 3,000 members of the *Treuegemeinschaft* escaped into exile, primarily to Britain, Sweden, and Canada. In Britain, they were supported by the *Czech Refugee Trust Fund*. The *Treuegemeinschaft's* political program was declared at a meeting at the Holmhurst Hotel in Loughton where the so-called *Loughton Declaration* (*Holmhurster Grundsatzklärung*) was adopted in March 1940. The *Loughton Declaration* called for a Sudeten German authority within the framework of a federal Czechoslovak state.¹¹ Despite attempts to become an integral part of the Czechoslovak exile resistance movement, the *Treuegemeinschaft* failed to reach an agreement with Czechoslovak political leaders on a solution that might have allowed both Czechs and Germans to live in a common state once again. The *Treuegemeinschaft* rejected population transfer and the activities of its members through-out the war and later unsuccessfully focused on turning public opinion in the West against the idea. This article aims to summarize the details of the *Treuegemeinschaft's* anti-transfer activities.

Rejection of Early Rumors of Transfer

In the summer of 1939, rumors of demands for the expulsion of the German minority by the domestic resistance circulated among the Czechoslovak émigré community in both Paris and London. These rumors were based on the position of the two domestic resistance organizations, namely *Politické ústředí* and *Obrana národa*.¹² Beneš himself acknowledged these rumors in a meeting with *Treuegemeinschaft* representatives in September 1939, but personally rejected them and characterized them as »foolishness«.¹³ Three members of the *Treuegemeinschaft*, Johann Wolfgang Brügel, Leopold Goldschmidt, and Walter Kolarz challenged the ideas of transfer in a pamphlet entitled *Le problème du transfert de population – Trois million sudètes doivent-ils émigrer?*¹⁴ They analyzed the historical facts surrounding German transfers in South Tyrol, which they characterized as a manifestation of pan-Germanism. They also carefully recapitulated the earlier mass transfer after the Greco-Turkish War authorized by the *Lausanne Conference* and pointed to the unfortunate results. In 1930, after the *Commission of the League of Nations* had been disbanded, tens of thousands of refugees still remained in tents. In the authors' opinion, the transfer of the Sudeten Germans could be accomplished only by force and the new Europe could not even contemplate such a measure. There was a contradiction between encouraging the fight for freedom on one hand and denying freedom to millions on the other. They also recapitulated the active role of the democratic forces in the Sudetenland and stated that those who had been forced to leave their homeland had no other option, but to return to it after the liberation. They also pointed out that history showed that extensive intermarriage had taken place between the Czechs and Sudeten Germans. The authors carefully analyzed the economic consequences of transfer. Both the transferred population in Germany and the abandoned depopulated Sudeten industries would be left in a catastrophic state. The transfer would convert the most populated and industrious region in the country into a graveyard. Ideologically, the transfer would mean both capitulation to and acceptance of Hitler's formulation of nationalist principles – *Ein Volk, ein Reich*. If Germany were forced to accept the transfer, one of the consequences would be the creation of new industries operated by the available skilled labor force, which would, in turn, damage Czechoslovakia economically. They concluded by stating that the idea of transfer was incompatible with the ideas of the late President Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk because it had no humanitarian, economic, or social foundation. The document was of outstanding quality. The authors' presentation of the historical facts as well as their economic and philosophical analysis were correct. At the time of writing, however, the authors could not have predicted the brutal nature of the war or the extent of Nazi atrocities. Their assumption that there would be a public outcry against transfer or hope that the experience of the catastrophic results of the *Lausanne Conference* might prevent it were all mistaken on account of later developments in the war. All their predictions, however, of the consequences if transfer were implemented would prove correct.

The principle of population transfer as a solution to the Sudeten German problem was rejected again in the *Treuegemeinschaft's Loughton Declaration*¹⁵ of 1940, which stated that the idea of autonomy for the Sudeten regions should serve as a basis for later negotiations with the Czechs.

16 Brandes, Detlef: Die Britische Regierung kommt zu einem Zwischenergebnis. Die Empfehlungen des Britischen *Interdepartmental Committee on the Transfer of German Population* vom Mai 1944 in Poustá, Zdeněk/Seifter, Pavel/Pešek, Jiří (eds.): *Occursus-Begegnung-Setkání*. Praha: Karolinum 1996, pp. 45f.

17 PRO, Fo371, File 30825, C6788/326/12: Transcript of War Cabinet meeting, July 6, 1942.

18 Archiv Ústavu T.G. Masaryka, [AUTGM], Fond 40, Box 62, XI, 1/8: Report on Jaksch's meeting with Kreibich and Winternitz, July 14, 1942.

19 Archiv Ministerstva zahraničních věcí [AMZV], LA, Box 156, 5900/dův/42: Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Jaksch's lecture at Federal Union, November 24, 1942.

20 AUTGM, Fond 40, Box 61, XI, 1/3: Beneš's position on *Treuegemeinschaft* conclusions of June 7, 1942, December 1, 1942.

21 Beneš, Eduard: *Memoirs of Dr. Eduard Beneš*. London: Cambridge UP 1954, pp. 320-334.

Arguments against Transfer in 1942 and 1943

In 1942, the question of transfer was not yet broadly discussed in public. The British government, however, assumed that the transfer of minorities in Central and Southeastern Europe would take place after the war. In February, the Foreign Research and Press Service assumed that a transfer of 3 to 6.8 million Germans from Poland and Czechoslovakia would take place.¹⁶ The War Cabinet approved of this idea, on principle, in July.¹⁷

In the summer of 1942, Jaksch met with the Communist functionaries, Karl Kreibich and Josef Winternitz, who assured him that the Soviet Union would never sanction the forced transfer of Germans from Czechoslovakia. They agreed to collaborate in this area and to share any news concerning the intended transfer. This interaction was in correspondence with the West European section of the Comintern's decision to initiate a campaign against the Czechoslovak government's plans to transfer the German minority. Jaksch then addressed this question to Soviet ambassador Bogomolov and was purportedly happy with the answer he received.¹⁸

The Nazi terror in the protectorate that followed Heydrich's assassination stimulated a further increase in anti-German sentiments worldwide. Any arguments Jaksch and his followers could bring forth against the transfer would effectively be neutralized by public opinion. In November 1942, Jaksch delivered a lecture at the conference of the Federal Union entitled *Can the People of Europe Unite?* He endorsed the idea of a federalization of Europe from which the Soviet Union would be excluded. Jaksch presented arguments in favor of international planning. He dismissed plans for the renewal of small, independent states as naive notions of politicians in exile. He predicted that if 26 separate states were to be renewed in post-war Europe, they would not survive for twenty years because of economic problems. He urged Britain to help Europe and America to abandon isolationist policies because such policies would give a free hand to 80 million Germans. He also argued that ideas concerning transfer and exchanges of population were impractical because of technical difficulties.¹⁹

Beneš began laying the groundwork for terminating his negotiations with Jaksch in the summer months of 1942. His position on the conclusions of the *Treuegemeinschaft* conference of June 1942 were summarized in a document he handed Jaksch on December 1, 1942, which specifically stated:

The Czechoslovak Government cannot and never will accept the principle of self-determination for 3 million Germans as it was formulated, interpreted, and asserted at the last peace conference and for a full twenty years afterwards.²⁰

Beneš unilaterally terminated contacts with the *Treuegemeinschaft* in a letter of January 10, 1943. He pointed out Jaksch's failure to associate the *Treuegemeinschaft* unconditionally with the Republic. In addition, Beneš listed the following specific issues: According to him, it had been a »cardinal political mistake« that Jaksch's willingness to join the Czechoslovak struggle during the first two years had always been conditional. The republic's recognition had thus been accomplished without German participation. Beneš inserted quotations from a number of documents written by Jaksch and other members of the *Treuegemeinschaft*. His chief objections were directed at Jaksch's unwillingness to grant unequivocal recognition to the theory of legal continuity of the Czechoslovak Republic and at his reservations about joining the Czechoslovak State Council without first receiving guarantees of national self-determination. Beneš also raised the matter of army service by Czechoslovak citizens of German nationality. Among many other negative facts, Beneš also listed Jaksch's BBC broadcasts to Germany, but in particular his protests against the renunciation of the *Munich Agreement*. Beneš ended his letter as follows:

Do you think it possible that any Czechoslovak – and not only a Czechoslovak, but any Allied politician – would understand if there were nominated to the State Council, or among the Czechoslovak civil servants someone who, until now, has never publicly declared himself a Czechoslovak citizen, who refuses to fulfill his civic duties and who still makes conditions about his belonging to the state and still leaves open a door so that he can advocate a different view later on? I do not think that this impossible situation can continue any longer.²¹

After the break with Beneš in January 1943, Jaksch and his close associate, Richard Reitzner, continued to issue regular circulars to members of the *Treuegemeinschaft*. In these circulars,



22 AUTGM, Fond 40, Box 61, XI, 1/1/2:
Treuegemeinschaft circular 3/1943,
April 6, 1943.

23 AMZV, LA, Box 157, 899/ dův 4-
1943: Interior Ministry report on
Jaksch's group, May 29, 1943.

24 AUTGM, Fond 40, Box 62, XI, 1/8:
Report on News Digest extract,
June 28, 1943.

25 Sudetendeutsches Archiv, Nach-
lass Jaksch, File E3: *Treuegemein-*
schaft circular, July 1943.

26 Ibid., Nachlass Jaksch, File G18:
Can Industrial Peoples Be Transfer-
red? The Future of the Sudeten Ger-
man Population.

27 AUTGM, Fond 40, Box 62, XI, 1/8:
Report of the Interior Ministry on
the *Treuegemeinschaft's* anti-transfer
campaign, July 27, 1943.

28 Ibid., Fond 40, Box 61, XI, 1/1/2:
Wenzel Jaksch – concepts of his poli-
tics, March 1, 1943.

29 Vondrová 1994,
document 127, pp. 258-261.

they presented the political situation from their own perspective and brought to light various facts about the situation in the Sudeten regions. The question of transfer was becoming the leading topic. They paid close attention to any public statement by both Allied and Czech political leaders and tried to counter them with both factual and political arguments. Yet, while deploring the Czechoslovak policy on transfer, they repeatedly offered their willingness to collaborate and participate in negotiations concerning arrangements for a life in a common state. However, Jaksch continued to refuse any collaboration with the other Sudeten German exile groups.

In a circular dated March 1943, Jaksch reacted to the latest speech by Churchill on the new organization of Europe, indicating the formation of a European council with a joint European court and defense system. Churchill had urged small nations towards federation and pointed out that the independence of small state entities was a thing of the past. Jaksch stated that he had already proposed a very similar arrangement in the *Loughton Declaration* and that the Czech-German problem would need to be solved on a »higher plane«. He expressed hope that the Czechoslovak leadership would abandon its antagonistic position towards its neighbors and might find a way of incorporating the Czech nation as a »Qualitätsfaktor« in the new European order.²²

After the Czechoslovak government's program for the transfer of the German minority was publicly acknowledged, the *Treuegemeinschaft* initiated a counter-offensive designed to influence public opinion. Jaksch began a correspondence with former Czechoslovak senator Siegfried Taub in the United States and asked him to start a campaign against the transfer to America. Taub pledged his support and also intended to request an interview with Beneš during the latter's trip to America.²³

In June 1943, *C60 Arbetaren* in Stockholm published an article entitled *Central European Post-War Problems*, which stated »Czech nationalists suggest radical measures for the solution of the Czech-German problem«. They wished to retain the historic frontiers and reduce the number of Germans at the same time. The article referred to Beneš's interview with an American journalist and pointed out that preparations were under way for mass expulsion. It also referred to Hubert Ripka's note *The Repudiation of Munich* stating that an attempt was being made to hold all Sudeten Germans equally responsible for the actions of Karl Hermann Frank.²⁴

A circular released in early July announced a new publication by Jaksch entitled *Can Industrial Peoples Be Transferred? – The Future of the Sudeten Population*.²⁵ In it, Jaksch pointed out that the Czech-Sudeten problem would come forward once the outlines of a new peace settlement in Europe were drawn. He recapitulated the history of his negotiations with the Czechoslovak government and referred to Beneš's various earlier statements concerning minority problems. Jaksch pointed out the industrial potential of the Sudeten regions and tried to address future solutions on the basis of historical, economic, and political arguments. He concluded by stating that short-cut improvisations, while appearing to effect a settlement, would lead to deeper conflicts in the future.²⁶

Furthermore, Robert Wiener was selected by other members of the *Treuegemeinschaft* to prepare materials needed for a campaign designed to inform the British and American public about the plan for the mass expulsion of Germans.²⁷ Indeed, Jaksch and his colleagues prepared several complex documents for the third regional conference of the *Treuegemeinschaft* planned for the autumn of 1943. The first document, *Unsere Konzeption*, contained political directives. It discussed the *Atlantic Charter* and displayed a willingness to renew the common state within the historic borders. Politically, the Party declared its right to negotiate constitutional and legal questions and asked for freedom of political action even if the Sudeten regions should be militarily occupied. The Party should have the freedom to decide on retribution and punishment with respect to Nazi terrorists and should have an adequate role in the state administration. A complex program for the revival of economic and social conditions was also offered.²⁸ In a second document, *The Application of the Atlantic Charter to the Sudeten Problem*, Jaksch and his colleagues demanded solutions to the Sudeten German problem in terms of either an internal Czechoslovak federation or through a broader federation of Central and Eastern Europe.²⁹

In the *International Socialist Forum of the Left News*, Jaksch published *The Transplantation of Millions: Problems of the Socialist International*, in which he referred to Beneš's earlier interview with the *New York Times* and pointed out that the official policy of the Czechoslovak go-



30 AUTGM, Fond 40, Box 62, XI, 1/8,
1475/4/43: Jaksch's article in *The Left
News*, August 23, 1943.

31 Ibid., Fond 40, Box 62, XI, 1/8:
Jaksch's minority report at the
Federal Union, September 6, 1943.

32 Ibid., Fond 40, Box 62, XI, 1/12:
Resolution of the third *Treuegemein-
schaft Landeskonferenz*,
November 11, 1943.

33 In: *Manchester Guardian*,
November 29, 1943.

34 Vondrová 1994,
document 132, pp. 267-270.

vernment had become the expulsion of the German population. He discussed the ramifications of transfer and correctly predicted that transfer included expropriation; he also questioned the technical feasibility of transfer implementation.³⁰

In the *1943 Annual Report of the Federal Union*, it was acknowledged that unity had not been reached on the question of mixed populations. In a minority report, Jaksch asked for the right of national minorities to elect their representatives who would be empowered to choose national committees for deciding the future form of national institutions in the European federation. He also requested the protection of minorities through a special federal law.³¹

The third conference of the *Treuegemeinschaft* took place on November 7. Jaksch's plenary address *Socialist Possibilities in Our Time* emphasized that the question of punishing Nazi criminals ought to be separated from questions concerning the peaceful arrangement of Europe. Both regional and federal organizations should consider the maturity of social development in individual nations with the goal of overcoming nationalism in political as well as economic matters. After a lively discussion, the conference called for the punishment of fascist criminals, arrangement of international relations on the basis of equality, and the solution of European problems through the formation of a European federation. The resolution warned against unilateral dictates in states containing multiple nationalities.³² It stated:

Any system of supra-national collaboration in Europe would be endangered from the outset if once again there would be established within ethnically mixed states a central predominance of one privileged nation over other underprivileged nationalities. This is why we advocate the internal federalization of Czechoslovakia based on the Swiss model [...]³³

This statement, in fact, amounted to acceptance of Beneš's *Third Plan* of 1938. In response to the *Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty* signed in Moscow in December 1943, Jaksch prepared a memorandum *Mass Expulsion of the Sudeten Germans* that emphasized his opposition to the concept of the post-war transfer of the German population on the basis of historical, economic, and political arguments.³⁴

In 1943, the battle Jaksch was waging against mass transfer was already lost. Beneš had the approval of all the Allied Powers for this concept and even had been able to gain the approval of the Czechoslovak Communists, who, in 1942, had assured Jaksch through their Sudeten German members that transfer would never be sanctioned by the Soviet Union.

Programs in 1944

Jaksch refused to accept political defeat. The transfer was the central topic of the *Treuegemeinschaft* circular of January 1944, which referred to the *British United Press Report* of January 5 on Beneš's speech to the Czech colony in Cairo. It also mentioned an address by Minister Hubert Ripka to the State Council on December 15, 1943, where future Czechoslovakia was described as a nationally homogeneous state. According to this circular, the Czechoslovak government intended to implement the expulsion as broadly as technically possible. The circular also pointed to manifestations of insecurity in the camp of the *United Anti-Fascists*, who tried to remind the Czechoslovak Government of its past promises. The circular stressed that the transfer would be the greatest such measure in Central Europe since the Thirty Years' War.³⁵

The March circular showed dissatisfaction with Churchill's speech in Parliament, in which he had stated that the principles of the *Atlantic Charter* would not be applied to Germany.³⁶ In a letter to the editor of *The Times* published on March 2, Jaksch addressed the problem of minorities and responded to a letter by Eduard Táborský on the transfer of minorities from Czechoslovakia. He raised some valid points. He asked why 3.5 million Germans in Czechoslovakia were referred to as a minority whereas 500,000 Ruthenians were seen as a state nation. The economic comparison of these two national components further showed the artificial vocabulary of the conferences of 1919 and also the error of building countries on the basis of national advantages, disregarding their socioeconomic functions: This had only led to the frictions that had provided Hitler with an excuse for his conquests. Solutions of minority problems by forced assimilation or forced transfer were thus merely a continuation of Hitler's practices.³⁷ Another *Treuegemeinschaft* circular released at the beginning of April reported on the meeting of the Party leadership in March. Following the resolution of the third regional

35 AUTGM, Fond 40, Box 61, XI, 1/2:
Treuegemeinschaft circular 1/1944,
February 8, 1944.

36 Ibid., Fond 40, Box 61, XI, 1/2:
Treuegemeinschaft circular 3/1944,
March 11, 1944.

37 Ibid., Fond 40, Box 62, XI, 1/18:
Jaksch's letter to *The Times*,
March 2, 1944.



38 Sudetendeutsches Archiv,
Nachlass Jaksch, File E5: *Treuege-*
meinschaft circular, April 1944.

39 AMZV, LA, Box 158: Report of the
Czechoslovak Information Services
on Jaksch's letter to Taub,
March 29, 1943.

40 Sudetendeutsches Archiv,
Nachlass Jaksch, File G4: Postwar Eu-
rope: Nation-States or Socialist Fe-
deration?, May 1944.

41 Bachstein 1974, p. 275f.

42 AMZV, LA, Box 158: Interior
Ministry report on W. Kolarz article,
June 26, 1944.

43 Vondrová 1994, document 136,
p. 279ff.; AMZV, LA, Box 158:
Democratic Sudeten Committee,
August 1, 1944.

44 Vondrová 1994,
document 147, p. 301ff.

45 AMZV, LA, Box 158: Gottlieb's
report to Ripka on Taub's letter to
Jaksch, November 1, 1944.

46 Jaksch, Wenzel: *Europe's Road to*
Potsdam. London: Praeger 1963,
p. 398f.

conference of 1943, the *Treuegemeinschaft* Executive rejected the idea of population transfer on the grounds that it would interfere with the punishment of Nazi criminals, would taint democratic sentiments with new hatreds, and that the economic devastation that had developed as a result of the war would be further complicated by new social and economic unrest.³⁸ In the spring months of 1944, Jaksch tried to explain his position to Siegfried Taub in a letter. Jaksch recapitulated the most salient points of his negotiations and pointed to Beneš's ill will and his distortion of the facts. He also pointed out Beneš's positive attitude towards the Sudeten German Communists despite their scandalous behavior during the early stages of the war. Jaksch stated that he harbored no illusions about Czech intentions, which were designed to heal the rift between the Czechs and Slovaks through an all-out drive against the Sudeten Germans. He described his restraint and constructive offers which had not come to fruition on account of Czech intransigence. He went on: »Every real statesman would congratulate himself for being such a constructive partner [...] yet, the present attitude on the Czech side leaves no room for hope.« The question remained what to do? Jaksch and his co-workers believed that there are times in politics when one must stick to one's principles at any cost. He concluded by acknowledging that Taub might feel differently. If he felt, Jaksch added, that anything had been neglected or any real opportunities missed, then Taub was welcome to try to reach a solution with the Czechoslovak side himself. In his letter, Jaksch also prophetically predicted that the Czech Socialists, Ripka and Stránský, »who are trying to destroy the *Treuegemeinschaft* in spite of their better conscience, are digging their own political graves.«³⁹

In a brief historical analysis entitled *Post-war Europe: Nation-states or Socialist Federation?* published in May, Jaksch expressed again his strong opposition to nationalism citing past experiences.⁴⁰

The *Treuegemeinschaft* had expected that the war would end in 1944. In its evaluation of the potential post-war situation, it preferred the occupation of the Sudeten regions immediately after the war by any forces other than Czech ones in order to create a basis for a negotiated solution during this transition period.⁴¹

In June 1944, Walter Kolarz published an article *The Czech-German Problem: Historical and Cultural Background*. He wrote that the transfer of the Germans might not have British support because it was a barbaric solution for the new world. He warned, however, that the British position was not focused on transfer from Czechoslovakia due to their poor understanding of the problem. He pointed out the roots of the breakdown of pre-war Czechoslovakia and tried to put the Czech-Sudeten German problem in historical perspective. He convincingly rejected the idea of collective guilt as a basis for expelling the Germans, but he opined honestly that the present chances of reaching agreement were nil.⁴²

In 1944, Jaksch formed the Democratic Sudeten German Committee, which consisted of representatives of the *Treuegemeinschaft* and of Catholics and was led by Jaksch, Reitzner, and Father Emanuel Reichenberger. In an appeal published in *Der Sozialdemokrat*, they stated that their aim was to purge the Sudetenland of Nazis and to restore democratic institutions. They declared that the Sudeten Germans were not a minority and they expressed opposition to any plans for mass transfer of the Sudeten German population. They suggested that an interim administration under Allied auspices be constituted to safeguard a better democratic settlement at the peace conference.⁴³ Taub was critical of the composition of the Democratic Sudeten German Committee. He questioned the appointment of some of the Catholic members who, in his opinion, represented only a minimal segment of the Sudeten German population.⁴⁴ Taub was also critical of Jaksch's methods used to form the Democratic Committee and complained that neither he nor other functionaries in the United States and Sweden had been properly consulted. Taub also questioned how careful the process used to screen the members had been and called such »people's democracy« a house of cards. He called for greater understanding of the other side (i.e., the Czechs) and warned of the dangers posed by ignorance of Czech history. »It should surprise nobody that the present sufferings of the Czech nation prevent them from paying much attention to memories of past joint anti-Fascist activities.«⁴⁵ Out of desperation, Jaksch wrote to Clement Attlee on July 31 about the plight of the Sudeten German Socialists and asked for help. In a formal, cold letter, Attlee, who himself was pro-transfer, referred Jaksch to the Government of Czechoslovakia.⁴⁶

In a September circular, Jaksch rejected Ripka's claim that the democratic and socialist politics of the *Treuegemeinschaft* represented a continuation of Henlein's activities. Jaksch stated that the Czech nation could not have had better allies than the Sudeten German democratic



47 AMZV, LA, Box 158: Interior
Ministry report on September, 1944
Treuegemeinschaft circular,
September 14, 1944.

48 Sudetendeutsches Archiv,
Nachlass Jaksch, File G5: Mass
Transfer of Minorities, October 1944.

49 Táborský, Eduard: Prezident
Beneš mezi Západem a Východem.
Praha: Mladá Fronta 1993, pp. 98-141.

workers who had fought for the Republic. Of course, they had fought for a democratic republic and not for a national state formed on the basis of fascist principles. Jaksch also rejected the *Ausschuss* circular signed by Alfred Peres, which informed readers that the *Ausschuss* has requested the Czechoslovak government to adopt a formal position on Jaksch's Sudeten Democratic Committee. Jaksch was not surprised by the fact that Sudeten German Communists welcomed the attempt by renegade socialists to destroy the Sudeten German Social Democrats. Jaksch also reminded the Communists that as the supposed representatives of German workers in Czechoslovakia they were »digging their own graves by supporting the expulsion of those very people they claimed to represent.«⁴⁷

In October, Jaksch wrote an article entitled *Mass Transfer of Minorities* in the journal *Socialist Commentary*. He presented his case against such transfers by placing them on an equal footing with »one of the most odious Nazi methods«. He raised political and economic objections to the transfer: First, the attempt to create nationally homogeneous states ran counter to the trends of European history. Second, the proposed transfer could only be effected through a disregard for human rights and by sheer force. Third, it was impossible to speak of an organized transfer in a more or less chaotic period of transition.⁴⁸

In 1944, the transfer was already decided upon. Only its scale was still open to discussion. In April, the British were assuming that of more than 3 million Germans, at most 1.25 million would remain in Czechoslovakia after the war. Their plan still considered the possibility of a small territorial cession of the westernmost portion of Bohemia. Jaksch, however, still hoped for federal arrangements in Europe. Again, he failed to recognize existing reality. While the British had been advocating earlier federal arrangements to stabilize Central Europe, Stalin was of another opinion. Czechoslovak plans for a federation with Poland had been vetoed even before Beneš went to Moscow in 1943.⁴⁹

***Treuegemeinschaft* Attempts to Block Transfer at the End of the War**

Early in 1945, Jaksch still did not believe that the transfer of the Germans could take place. He was convinced that those democratic Germans who had approved the transfer would be completely discredited in Czechoslovakia. Jaksch was also alleged to have claimed that right-wing political parties in Czechoslovakia would not endorse the transfer and would cooperate with him. He continued to express confidence in the Western Allies and predicted that the Soviet Union would be willing to make some concessions on the issue of transfer in order to secure American financial assistance.⁵⁰ When the Czechoslovak Ministry of Social Welfare issued questionnaires to Czechoslovak citizens asking whether or not they wished to return to Czechoslovakia, the *Treuegemeinschaft* leadership, after some hesitation, provided this information to its members in a February circular.⁵¹ Two weeks later, Jaksch issued a confidential memorandum to the Party membership in which he provided a surprisingly accurate and detailed account of the Czechoslovak plans concerning transfer. In the introduction, he pointed out that the plan did not as yet have the approval of the Allies, including the Soviets, and he predicted that these plans would be the subject of Beneš's negotiations in his upcoming trip to Moscow. In his final analysis, Jaksch stressed three major weaknesses of the plan: 1) The plan was at variance with international and Czechoslovak legal norms. »Sooner or later it would be acknowledged that the plan for transfer was based on force, attempts to seize property, and a national need for retribution. Anyone who participated could no longer claim to be a civilized European...« 2) He hoped that there would not exist a central administration in defeated Germany capable of absorbing millions of homeless people. 3) He doubted that Czechoslovakia could tolerate two years of economic, legal, and personal uncertainties in the most industrialized parts of the country. Jaksch also attacked the Sudeten German Communists and the *Zinnergruppe* for their participation in the planning of the proposed transfer. He emphasized the personal responsibility these groups were taking upon themselves.⁵² Jaksch's opinion and his confidence that his position on the matter would be vindicated by history have proven to have been correct. The text of the Czech-German declaration of 1997 is strikingly similar to Jaksch's words. It has to be remembered, however, that the Czech-German Declaration was the result of a fundamental change in Europe's multinational arrangements, which made it necessary to seek ways of resolving old historical divisions. Though Jaksch was not correct in his argument that a more positive treatment of the Sudeten Germans would be a requirement for any future supranational arrangements in Europe, realization of his early European federalist views most likely would have made the current good neighborly relations between Czechs and Germans even simpler.

50 AMZV, LA, Box 130, 2112/dův/45,
Jaksch's politics, February 23, 1945;
Ibid., 3173/ dův 4./45: Report on
Jaksch, February 14, 1945.

51 Ibid., 34/ dův/45: Report on repa-
triation and a copy of *Treuegemein-*
schaft February 1945 circular,
February 16, 1945.

52 Ibid., 2377/dův/45: Jaksch's posi-
tion on the transfer, March 5, 1945.



53 Sudetendeutsches Archiv, Nachlass Jaksch, File D39: Memorandum on the Indiscriminate Measures of the Czechoslovak Government against the Sudeten Population, June 10, 1945.

54 Ibid., File D50: Peace through Terror?, June 1945, An Appeal to All Friends of Justice in the Free World, June 1945.

55 Ibid., File D39: Information Regarding the Position in the Sudeten Territory June-July 1945, July 15, 1945.

56 Ibid., File F8: Cable from Jaksch, De Witte, and Katz, June 1945.

57 Ibid., File D43: The New Statesman and Nation, August 25, 1945.

58 Ibid., File D40: It Is Not the Czech People, July 25, 1945.

59 Ibid., File D41: The »Prodigious Drama« of the Sudeten People. The Position on the Eve of Winter 1945-1946, October 8, 1945.

60 Ibid., File F10: The Policy of Minority Extermination in Czechoslovakia, September 15, 1945.

61 Ibid., File D44: Re-expulsion from Austria in Mid-winter times, February 1946.

62 Grünwald, Leopold: In der Fremde für die Heimat. Sudetendeutsches Exil in Ost und West. München: Fides 1982, pp. 60-66.

63 Sudetendeutsches Archiv, Nachlass Jaksch, File D45: 500,000 Outcasts. Non-Transferred Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia. An American Responsibility, September 1947.

Jaksch's Activities after the War

Jaksch and his closest associates did not stop their attempts to block the transfer even after the war.

On May 11, 1945, the then-Deputy Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia Klement Gottwald called for the wholesale expropriation of the German and Hungarian minorities during a radio broadcast. Jaksch and his co-workers issued a protest memorandum on the *Indiscriminate Measures of the Czechoslovak Government Against the Sudeten Population*⁵³ and also issued an appeal for help to all »friends of justice in the free world« entitled *Peace through Terror?*⁵⁴

After a Presidential decree of June 21, 1945 implemented the expropriations, Jaksch presented an analysis of the situation in the Sudeten territory and offered alternative solutions.⁵⁵ In June 1945, Jaksch, De Witte and Katz sent a telegram to the leaders of all socialist parties in Europe and to the leaderships of various trade unions in the United States. The telegram read as follows:

Parliamentary delegation of Sudeten Labor calling for moral aid against declared intention of Prague Government to carry out wholesale expropriation and expulsion of 4 million former minority citizens – Solemn promise of President Beneš to protect democratic Sudeten Germans and Hungarians broken by his Government – Political and trade union and co-op branches of Sudeten Labor with a well-known fighting record still banned and in danger of final destruction – We protest in the name of 300,000 voters against further victimization of the first victims of Munich Agreement – On behalf of 20,000 martyrs of Sudeten Labor we ask for moral intervention at Czech Legation of Prague Government.⁵⁶

In August 1945, Jaksch appealed for help against the transfer in *The New Statesman and Nation*.⁵⁷ In his memoranda, Jaksch blamed the Czechoslovak Government and not the people for the plight of the Sudeten Germans.⁵⁸ In the autumn months of 1945, Jaksch, De Witte, and Katz reflected on the realities of the »wild transfer« (»divoký odsun«) and called for an end to lawlessness and chaos. They stated that »Hitler, Himmler, Heydrich and Frank together did not bring such misery to the Czech people as is now being inflicted on the Sudeten Germans«. They pointed out that responsibility is not limited to Czechoslovak authorities, but also includes Great Britain, the United States and France. The memorandum called for an inquiry into the validity of the Presidential (Beneš) decrees and pleaded that those Sudeten Germans in »U.S.-occupied western Bohemia« should be given the same guarantees enjoyed by Germans in the U.S. occupation zone of Germany.⁵⁹

In September, a protest publication entitled *The Policy of Minority Extermination in Czechoslovakia* was issued. It pointed out the excesses of the »wild transfer«, challenged the Czechoslovak government's official statements and called for the restoration of basic human rights.⁶⁰

In February 1946, a call for mercy was issued against mid-winter re-expulsion from Austria.⁶¹ The last major appeal *Is Socialist Consciousness Still Alive?* was issued by Jaksch, De Witte, and Katz to the delegates at a Socialist conference at Clacton-on-Sea on May 1, 1946. After recapitulating the history of the Sudeten German Social Democrats, they declared that

The treatment of our movement and its men and women by the present Prague Government and its socialist exponents is the worst fratricide in the history of European labor. Do not allow German anti-fascists to be further retained in labor camps in Czechoslovakia or forced to remain as slave workers in a country that no longer wants them as equal citizens.⁶²

In the summer of 1947 Jaksch, De Witte, and Katz blamed the Americans for not taking more expellees during the transfer to fulfill the original quota. He asked that help be provided to the Sudeten Germans, who remained in Czechoslovakia without civil rights.⁶³ At the end of 1947, Jaksch tried to put the new reality into historical perspective. He stressed the geographic, economic, and historical interconnection between Czechs and Germans and pointed out that when relationships between the Czechs and the West sour, the Czechs would then turn towards the East. The beneficiaries of the present state of affairs were the Communists who created a virtual »party state within the state« in the depopulated frontier regions. The sympathies of the poor were gained by the re-distribution of German property. According to Jaksch, the West tolerated »the expulsion horrors to win the masses of Czech people back to Western Democracy.« He characterized it as naivety and predicted a complete Sovietization of Czecho-



64 Ibid., File D46: The Expellee Problem. Czech and Sudeten Germans after the Expulsions, December 1947.

65 Sozialistische Nachrichten 2, November 20, 1940, p. 3.

66 Sozialistische Nachrichten 19, July 16, 1941, pp.2ff.

67 Sozialistische Nachrichten 18/19, September 15, 1942, pp. 1-4.

68 Sozialistische Nachrichten 20-21, October 15, 1942, p. 4.

69 AMZV, LA, Box 157, 978/dův 4/1943: Interior Ministry report on the *Zinnergruppe*, June 4, 1943.

70 Sozialistische Nachrichten 19/20, October 15, 1944, p. 8; AMZV, LA, Box 158, 6173/dův 4/44: Interior Ministry report on the *Zinnergruppe*, October 9, 1944.

71 Sozialistische Nachrichten 11/12, June 15, 1945, p. 5ff.

72 Neutatz, Dietmar: Československo v zahraničně politických představách německého odboje a exilu. In: Cesta do Katastrofy. Praha: Ústav mezinárodních vztahů 1992, p. 97.

73 AMZV, LA, Box 158, 828/dův 4/43: Report on the *Beuergruppe*, May 7, 1943.

74 Grünwald 1982, p. 22.

75 AMZV, LA, Box 157, 1028/ dův 4/1943: Interior Ministry on the group of Dr. A. Peres, June 17, 1943.

76 Ibid., 516/ dův/4-1943: Interior Ministry report on Dr. A. Peres, March 18, 1943.

77 AUTGM, Fond 40, XI-3: Report of the Ministry of the Interior, August 27, 1942.

78 AMZV, LA, Box 157, 830/ dův 4-1943: United Front of anti-fascists; Resolution on forced transfer, May 7, 1943.

slovakia within six months.⁶⁴ As a permanent solution and condition for peace, he resurrected his old call for either a multinational Danubian Federation or for »abrogation of the Sudeten expulsion and the creation of a multinational federation in the Bohemian lands.«

The Position of Other Sudeten German Groups

The positions of other sections of Sudeten exiles did not support *Treuegemeinschaft* efforts. Unlike the *Treuegemeinschaft*, the splinter *Zinnergruppe* believed that a dialogue concerning the fate of the Sudeten Germans after the war could only develop through a process of co-operation with the Czechoslovak Exile Government. They also recognized the Czechoslovak concept of legal continuity, which held that Czechoslovakia had never legally ceased to exist and that Beneš's resignation in October 1938 was invalid because the Czechoslovak Parliament had never formally accepted it.⁶⁵ Initially, the *Zinnergruppe* had opposed solutions of minority problems through population transfer and reacted negatively to Ripka's 1941 article.⁶⁶ In September 1942, the *Zinnergruppe* joined the Communists and Peres's Liberal Democrats in the *United Front*.⁶⁷ The *Zinnergruppe* simply ignored the nationality problems of future Czechoslovakia and characterized Jaksch's policy requiring guarantees or contractual solutions as reactionary.⁶⁸ Although the *Zinnergruppe* claimed that, in 1943, it had sought support against the transfer from the Czech Social Democrats⁶⁹, it did approve of the Czech demand for the right to determine which of those Germans who wished to remain in Czechoslovakia could do so in October 1944.⁷⁰ They also accepted the Czechoslovak plans for general transfer in 1945 as a »rational decision of Czechs and Slovaks.«⁷¹

Until 1943, the Communist Party opposed plans for German transfer.⁷² In May 1943, Josef Winternitz labeled the opinions of Czechoslovak Government officials on transfer as »stupid, short-sighted, and irresponsible.«⁷³ At a joint conference with the *Zinnergruppe* on 27-28 January 1945, a decision was made to support the course that had been decided upon by both the Czechoslovak Government and the Czechoslovak Communist leadership located in Moscow. First, it was stated that the overwhelming majority of Sudeten Germans had supported the war and, therefore, they deserved the same treatment as was accorded to Germans in the *Reich*. Second, the Sudeten German working class as well as the workers of Germany had betrayed the international proletariat and a thorough cleansing would need to take place. Third, Jaksch's *Treuegemeinschaft* had propagated the theory and practice of *Volkssozialismus* for the salvation of German imperialism. Any attempt to gain national autonomy for the Sudeten Germans would thus serve only to deepen feelings of hostility on the part of the Czechs towards the Sudeten Germans.⁷⁴ Both the Communists and the *Zinnergruppe* thus accepted the program of transfer sought by Beneš and his Government.

In 1943, the leader of Liberal Democrats, Alfred Peres expressed disappointment over the position of the Czechoslovak government and intended to protest publicly against the plans for transfer at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁷⁵ After meeting with Ministers Masaryk and Ripka, he expressed his disillusion with Czechoslovak policies because he was unable to obtain any information on the Government's plans.⁷⁶ Peres was an opportunist, however, and, in public, he strongly supported the Czechoslovak position.⁷⁷

During 1942, the Sudeten German Communists were able to form a new organization called the *Sudeten German Anti-Fascist Unity Committee (Sudetendeutscher Antifaschistischer Einheitsausschuss)*. This organization consisted of the Sudeten German Communists, the *Zinnergruppe*, and Peres's Liberal Democrats. The aim of the Committee was to enroll all Sudeten German Anti-Fascists in the Czechoslovak anti-Hitler cause in support of the war of liberation, increase the representation of democratic Sudeten German subjects in the Czechoslovak State Council and other official organizations abroad.

However, the leadership of the *Ausschuss* was initially strongly opposed to the idea of the transfer. At a meeting of May 1-2, 1943, the leaders of the group unanimously resolved that steps needed to be taken with the British, Czechoslovak, and American authorities to prevent the forced transfer of Germans from Czechoslovakia. They also prepared specific plans for further action. The Communists (Beuer and Winternitz) deferred their agreement with the plans, but both the representatives of the *Zinnergruppe* and *Peresgruppe* declared that they would follow the proposed plan even in the absence of formal approval by the Communists.⁷⁸ The meeting was declared strictly confidential. Afterward, Zinner expressed concern about losing ground and not finding support among the Sudeten population for Czechoslovak policies, par-



79 Ibid., 82/ dův 4-1943: Report on the *Zinnergruppe*, May 8, 1943.

80 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Archiv, Seliger Archiv, TG England, File 21: Do boje za společnou vlast, 16-17 října 1943.

81 Brandes, Detlef: Großbritannien und seine osteuropäischen Alliierten. München: Oldenbourg 1988, pp. 106-108.

82 Bachstein 1974, p. 111.

83 PRO, FO371, File 24291, C729/534/12: Jaksch to Makins, January 11, 1940.

ticularly regarding transfer. Jaksch's uncompromising attitude made Zinner's position even more difficult. Yet, he hoped that Britain and America solve this problem by not sanctioning the transfer because it was in conflict with the *Atlantic Charter*.⁷⁹

The national *Conference of the Sudeten German Anti-Fascists in Great Britain* took place on October 16-17, 1943 at the Beaver Hall in London. The conference identified itself with the goals of the Czechoslovak government. Nowhere, however, did it adopt or endorse the notion of mass transfer as an appropriate solution to the German minority problem.⁸⁰

Conclusion

Jaksch lost the battle against the transfer of the Sudeten Germans. It is debatable whether the outcome would have been any different had he associated with the Czechoslovak cause earlier on. His arguments, while factually correct, could not have changed the process fueled by anti-German sentiment, which had culminated during the last year of the war. Allied soldiers and also the population in the Protectorate had had the opportunity to witness the results of Nazi atrocities. The behavior of Sudeten German population as well as the other Germans in the Protectorate also had not helped matters. In the eyes of the Czechs, however, the behavior of the Sudeten Germans during the war had been worse than that of the Germans who had come from Germany. After all, the most brutal oppression after the Heydrich assassination was directed by the Sudeten German, Karl Hermann Frank. Instead of adopting more conciliatory attitudes towards the Czechs during the last months of the war, the repressive measures brutality intensified. Thus, there was no hope of even softening the effects of the transfer on the German population in Czechoslovakia.

Jaksch and his close associates in the *Treuegemeinschaft* focused their efforts on preventing British support for a large-scale German transfer, and they tried to maintain their position of »somewhat adjusted« notions of future autonomy of the Sudetenland in the renewed republic.⁸¹ They became ever more isolated, however, and the British did not react favorably to their requests. Their active attempts to organize anti-Nazi activities in the Sudetenland in 1944 also failed.

It remains a burning question why Jaksch had been so completely out of touch with the views of other Czechoslovak politicians and was unable to adapt his position to the changing conditions during the war. Before the war, the *Jungaktivisten* under Jaksch's leadership pointed out the necessity of changing the status of the Germans in Czechoslovakia, thus addressing the contradiction between the national state defined in the constitution and the *de facto* existence of a state of nationalities.⁸² They also called for proportional representation of various national groups in the state and public sectors. It should be noted that, although the *Jungaktivisten* considered the Germans to be the »second state nation«, their program did not call for autonomy because they feared that autonomy would create a Nazi enclave in democratic Czechoslovakia. In exile, however, Jaksch took a much stronger position. In his *Principles of International Policy for the Sudeten German Social Democrats* drafted in 1939, Jaksch stressed that Sudeten German autonomy based upon federalization was the only acceptable solution and that a return to a state such as pre-war Czechoslovakia was out of the question.⁸³ In the *Loughton Declaration* adopted in the spring of 1940, the renewal of a common Czechoslovak state was identified as the »best solution«, but preference was in fact implied for a broader federal arrangement.

At the beginning of the war, the British were aware of previous Sudeten German grievances against the Czechs and they were therefore eager to protect the rights of Sudeten Germans residing in Britain. Even at the time of formal British recognition of the Czechoslovak Government on July 18, 1941, the Sudeten Germans were specifically exempted from the Czechoslovak Government's jurisdiction. Jaksch was aware of the British position from the beginning and tried to use it to his advantage. With early German victories, fears of German invasion, and reports of Nazi brutality in occupied countries, anti-German sentiment in Britain continued to increase and Jaksch's position gradually weakened. Jaksch failed to recognize that his position was changing as the war progressed. His interactions with the Foreign Office revealed this fact. Though the officials at the Foreign Office did not point out the changing reality to Jaksch either, they did express their sympathies for him in statements included in confidential internal memoranda, e.g.: »The Relationship between Beneš and Jaksch had deteriorated through the fault of Dr. Beneš [...] It is not prudent to throw Herr Jaksch to the wolves as



84 Ibid., File 30834, C6447/326/12:
Vansittart to Eden, May 10, 1942,
Roberts's Minute, June 16, 1942.

85 Raška 2002, p. 115f.

86 Smutný, Jaromír: Němci v československu a jejich odsun z republiky. In: Svědectví prezidentova kancléře. Praha: Mladá fronta 1996, p. 279.

87 Jaksch, Wenzel: Was Kommt nach Hitler? Die Möglichkeiten und Voraussetzungen einer demokratischen Föderalisierung Zentraleuropas. London: s.t. 1939.

Lord Vansittart and Lockhart recommend [...]«⁸⁴ In the end, the British indeed threw Jaksch to the wolves. In fact, he was not even permitted to move to Germany until several years after the war.

Jaksch did not learn a lesson from the split of his organization initiated by the *Zinnergruppe* in the autumn of 1940. Most difficult to understand were his inexplicable protests against the British renunciation of Munich.⁸⁵ Jaksch's insistence on self-determination above and beyond autonomy provoked a negative counter-reaction on the part of Czechoslovak politicians. While nobody could doubt Jaksch's firm opposition to Nazism both before and during the war, in exile »in his attitude towards the Republic and the Czechs, he had become a typical Sudeten German.«⁸⁶

Throughout all his activities in Britain, Jaksch refused to join the *United Front* with the Communists and correctly predicted the future of the *Zinnergruppe* and of the Liberal Democrats in post-war Czechoslovakia. His predictions were also correct with respect to the Czechoslovak non-Communist Socialist politicians. He was an early European federalist. His views in *Was Kommt nach Hitler?*⁸⁷ had preceded those of the British, who viewed the creation of a federation of small European states as a measure against Soviet domination of Europe. To the Czechs, however, these views represented only pan-Germanism, which contributed to the failure to reach agreement with the *Treuegemeinschaft* about a common future in a common state.



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