

HABSBURG'S LITTLE ORIENT

A Post/Colonial Reading of Austrian and German Cultural Narratives on Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1878-1918*

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to be published in: Ruthner, Clemens/Reynolds, Diana/Reber, Ursula/Detrez, Raymond: *Wechselwirkungen. The Political, Social and Cultural Impact of the Austro-Hungarian Occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1878-1918*. New York et al.: Peter Lang 2008 (Austrian Culture Series).

* The author would like to thank Brent Holland, Per A. Rudling and Claire Johnstone (Edmonton), Raymond Detrez and Stijn Vervaeet (Gent), Diana Reynolds (San Diego), and Anna Müller-Funk (Vienna) for their assistance in linguistic and historical matters.

1 In: Eliot, T.S.: *The Waste Land and Other Poems*. Ed. by Helen Vendler. New York: Penguin/Signet Classics 1998, pp. 32-59, here p. 33.

2 Musil, Robert: *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften*. Roman. Ed. by Adolf Frisé. Reinbek: Rowohlt 1978, p. 33.

3 Cf. Malcolm, Noel: *Bosnia. A Short History*. New York: Pan Macmillan 2002.

4 Cf. Todorova, Maria: *Imagining the Balkans*. New York: Oxford UP 1997; cf. also Wolff, Larry: *Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment*. Stanford: Stanford UP 1994.

5 For a survey of the ongoing discussion among historians, cf. Kolm, Evelyn: *Die Ambitionen Österreich-Ungarns im Zeitalter des Hochimperialismus*. Frankfurt/M. et al.: Peter Lang 2001, pp. 235ff.

6 I have already addressed these topics and will detail them further in the course of the text. Cf. Ruthner, Clemens: »K.u.k. Kolonialismus« als Befund, Befindlichkeit und Metapher. Versuch einer weiteren Klärung. In: Prutsch, Ursula/Feichtinger, Johannes/Csáky, Moritz (Eds.): *Habsburg postcolonial. Machtstrukturen und kollektives Gedächtnis*. Innsbruck et al.: Studienverlag 2003, pp. 111-128. Reprint: www.kakanien.ac.at/beitr/theorie/CRuthner3.pdf [29.01.2003].

7 Even as late as the 1990's one German-Croatian religious historian maintained that the mandate given Austria-Hungary by the Congress of

[...] *Son of man,
You cannot say, or guess, for you know only
A heap of broken images, [...]*
(T.S. Eliot: *The Waste Land*)¹

[...] *die Worte Kolonie und Übersee hörte man an wie
etwas noch gänzlich Unerprobtes und Fernes.*
(Robert Musil: *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften*)²

Bosnia-Herzegovina has been the epitome of a European periphery for a long time. This is a condition that arose from Bosnia's time as a rebellious borderland of the Ottoman Empire (to which it belonged de facto until 1878 and formally until 1908) through to its subsequent incorporation into the territorial holdings of Austria-Hungary (1878-1918) and then into Yugoslavia.³ During this period the region not only served as the economic and cultural fringe for different political centres (Istanbul, Vienna/Budapest, Belgrade/Zagreb), but it also came to occupy a specific symbolic position within the hegemonic discourses of the ›West‹: to this day, Bosnia's affiliation with the ›Balkans‹ has led to its stigmatization as a form of ›the Other within Europe‹,⁴ a status that has been further entrenched since the devastating Yugoslav wars of the 1990s.

After all, Bosnia-Herzegovina is the only territory of the Habsburg monarchy that can be approached through the paradigm of colonialism not only in a figurative sense;⁵ the reasons for this inhere primarily in the peculiar arrangement of the region's cultural, social, economic and legal structures.⁶ My article shall elucidate some of these factors through a critical discussion of prevailing histori(ographi)cal narratives on Bosnia-Herzegovina; subsequently, it will expand on the cultural repercussions of that colonization by analyzing the collective imagery of the region in the hegemonic Austrian and German cultures at the time of Habsburg occupation and annexation (with a final side glance at the Bosnian author Ivo Andrić).

I. *VorGeschichte(n)*: Bosnia-Herzegovina in the International Historiography of the 20th Century

Why Austria-Hungary precisely wanted to occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1878, and what agenda its ›Balkan peace mission‹ actually concealed, are questions not easily answered even 125 years later;⁷ one would do well to accept the age of Imperialism in Europe as a significant frame of reference.⁸ Indeed, in the accepted narrative of historiography the sequence of events does not deviate substantially from the formulations advocated by the well-known American⁹ Balkan-historian Barbara Jelavich and other researchers who contributed standard works on this subject matter:¹⁰

In 1875 a revolt broke out in the European territory of the Ottoman Empire. Pitting dissatisfied Herzegovinian farmers against their Muslim landholders, it was »one of the major guerrilla wars in modern European history«, as Milorad Ekmečić¹¹ writes in the *History of Yugoslavia* (1974). It produced a large number of casualties and refugees, for Serbia and Montenegro soon supported the uprising against Turkish rule, which by 1876 had also spread to encompass Bulgaria. While Ottoman government troops remained victorious in the ensuing battles, the war was nevertheless accompanied by a political crisis in the power centre of Istanbul, which led to a manifold change in leadership and even to *coups d'état*.¹²

Faced with the instability of the »sick man of the Bosphorus« and with ambitious Russian plans, Austria-Hungary clearly no longer saw itself in the position of sticking to the double maxim of its Balkan policy, in place since Kaunitz and Metternich: »(1) to keep Russian presence and influence to a minimum and (2) to maintain the status quo with the Ottoman administration.«¹³ Likewise, there is evidence for the view that a new expansionist reorientation of Austria-Hungary's *Orientpolitik* was not only the ambition of the Austrian court and military but also essentially bound up with Count Gyula (Julius) Andrassy, Joint Minister of the Exterior.¹⁴

Berlin was »Besetzen und verwalten, um diese beide Provinzen befrieden zu können«. In: Vrankić, Petar: Religion und Politik in Bosnien und der Herzegowina (1878-1918). Paderborn et al.: Schöningh 1998 [also Habil. Univ. Augsburg 1995], p. 24.

8 Cf. Holm 2001. Even critics of a colonialist interpretation of the occupation and annexation of Bosnia accept imperialist motivations. Cf. Kann, Robert A.: Trends Towards Colonialism in the Habsburg Empire, 1878-1918. The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1878-1914. In: Rowney, D.K./Orchard, G.E. (Eds.): Russian and Slavonic History. Columbus/Ohio: Slavica Publ. 1977, pp. 164-80, here p. 166f. Cf. also Suppan, Arnold: Zur Frage eines österreichisch-ungarischen Imperialismus in Südosteuropa. Regierungspolitik und öffentliche Meinung um die Annexion Bosniens und der Herzegowina. In: Wandruszka, Adam et al. (Eds.): Die Donaumonarchie und die südslawische Frage von 1848 bis 1918. Texte des ersten österreichisch-jugoslawischen Historikertreffens Gössing 1976. Wien: ÖAW 1978, pp. 103-131, here p. 128ff.

9 In the framework of my account I do not consider it irrelevant to draw the national and/or political background of the consulted historians into consideration.

10 Jelavich, Barbara: The Habsburg Empire in European Affairs, 1814-1918. Chicago: McNally 1969 (European History Series), p. 115ff. Cf. also Dedjier, Vladimir/Božić, Ivan/Čirković, Sima/Ekmečić, Milorad: History of Yugoslavia. Ed. by Marie Longyear, trans. by Kordija Kveder. New York et al.: McGraw-Hill 1974, pp. 393ff.; Bridge, Francis Roy: Österreich(-Ungarn) unter den Großmächten. In: Wandruszka, Adam/Urbanitsch, Peter (Eds.): Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918. 6 vols. Vienna: ÖAW 1973-89. Vol. VI/1 (1989): Die Habsburgermonarchie im System der internationalen Beziehungen, pp. 196-373, here p. 249ff. Bérenger, Jean: L'Autriche-Hongrie 1815-1918. Paris: A. Colin 1994 (Collection Cursus), p. 115ff.; Hösch, Edgar: Geschichte der Balkanländer von der Frühzeit bis zur Gegenwart. Munich: C.H. Beck, 2002, p. 129ff.

11 Dedjier et al. 1974, p. 393.

12 Cf. e.g. Jelavich 1969, pp. 115-20.

13 Pinson, Mark: The Muslims of

In 1877, during the Russo-Turkish War, which followed on the heels of the clashes of 1875/76, the Habsburg monarchy declared its readiness to adopt benevolent neutrality towards the Tsarist Empire. The Russians countered the move by offering up Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Austrians as an inducement.¹⁵ However, on March 3, 1878, this arrangement went by the board with the Treaty of San Stefano, but the resultant territorial reorganization of the Balkans (e.g. the emergence of a large new Bulgarian state) dissatisfied the other great European powers. In response, the Congress of Berlin was convened on June 13th of the same year, at which the drawing up of the borders was supposed to be discussed anew. One important outcome of this conference was the ceding of the administration of the Ottoman provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria-Hungary at the request of the British representative Lord Salisbury. The two provinces were occupied by imperial troops, »Germanically hyphenated«¹⁶ and thirty years later, in 1908, annexed to the Habsburg Empire.

In the characteristic style of the left-leaning British historian A.J.P. Taylor, the aporetic stance of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister to the two Ottoman provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina reads as follows:

Russia had constantly pressed them on Austria-Hungary, to tempt her into setting the example of partition. For this reason Andrassy had tried to avoid the offer; on the other hand, he could still less afford their union with the Slav state of Serbia. At the Congress of Berlin he squared the circle.¹⁷

Barbara Jelavich, on the other hand, elects to focus on Andrassy's return home from Berlin:

Despite these great gains Andrassy did not receive a triumphant welcome home. Francis Joseph among others did not like the terms of the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He would have preferred a direct annexation. In contrast, the Magyar leaders were displeased with the acquisition of more Slavic peoples in the Empire.¹⁸

The French historian Jean Bérenger also emphasizes the consequences of Andrassy's success, which he declares a pyrrhic political victory:

[The occupation] provoked demonstrations in Hungary. Public opinion followed with suspicion the Russophile politics of Andrassy which was justified only by the maintenance of the status quo in the Balkans; the strengthening of the smaller Balkan states and the occupation of Bosnia broke this balance. It hurt the Turkophile feelings of the Hungarians, and above all, the occupation of Bosnia increased the number of Slavs living in the Habsburg monarchy. While the political left expressed its hostility towards a war of conquest, it cost numerous human lives. Equally the Austrian liberals expressed their disagreement with respect to a military operation regarded as potentially disastrous and unnecessary. This contributed to collapse of the liberal government of Alfred Auersperg, since the emperor Francis-Joseph did not like the idea that someone violated his stamping ground.¹⁹

This is the way the historiographical account of Bosnia vacillates between personification (Andrassy as *global player*) and metonymy (the ›nations‹ and ›political forces‹); but in its essential points, it is either identical amongst most of the consulted historians or at the very least compatible.²⁰ Conjecture about the particular motivations for this last – and fatal – territorial expansion of the Habsburg monarchy before the First World War is far more diverse and falls into three categories of historiographical argument, which are capable of being asserted or, at the very least, discussed:

1. *Strategic grounds.* The assumption here is that Austria-Hungary needed to safeguard its own area of rule and/or sphere of influence against Russia and suspected Serbian expansion plans through the military and infrastructural occupation of the Dalmatian hinterland, as Radetzky had already proposed.²¹ Admittedly, this explanation is weakened by a fact already foreseeable at the time, namely that the addition of more than a million South Slavs would in the process also potentially exacerbate all the ethnic tensions that were already extant in the Habsburg monarchy – a situation that could just as easily have prevented the empire from intervening, as had been the case earlier

Bosnia-Herzegovina under Austro-Hungarian Rule, 1878-1918. In: Pinson, Mark (Ed.): *The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Their Historic Development from the Middle Ages to the Dissolution of Yugoslavia*. Cambridge/Mass.: Harvard UP 1994, pp. 84-128, here p. 86.

14 Cf. Haselsteiner, Horst: *Bosnien-Herzegowina. Orientkrise und die südslawische Frage*. Vienna, Cologne, Weimar: Böhlau 1996 (Book series of the IDM 3), pp. 9-30. Cf. also Wertheimer, Eduard v.: *Graf Julius Andrássy. Sein Leben und seine Zeit*. 3 vols. Stuttgart: DVA 1910-1913, vol. 3; Kolm 2001, p. 105f.

15 Efforts in this direction certainly may have been evident even earlier on the part of Austria-Hungary; advance talks at least since 1875/76 (with Russia) and 1878 respectively (also with Serbia). Cf. Dedijer/Božić/Čirković/Ekmečić 1974, p. 396; Donia, Robert J.: *Islam under the Double Eagle. The Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1878-1918*. New York: Columbia UP 1981 (Boulder East European Monographs 78), p. 8ff.; Jelavich, Barbara: *History of the Balkans*. 2 Vols. Cambridge et al.: Cambridge UP 1983, p. 59; Hösch, Edgar: *Geschichte der Balkanländer von der Frühzeit bis zur Gegenwart*. Munich: C.H. Beck 2002, p. 132ff.; Haselsteiner 1996, p. 15ff.

16 Pavlowitch, Stevan K.: *A History of the Balkans, 1904-1945*. London, New York: Longman 1999, p. 116.

17 Taylor, A.J.P.: *The Habsburg Monarchy 1809-1918. A History of the Austrian Empire and Austria-Hungary* [1948]. Reprint Harmondsworth: Penguin 1990, p. 166. Cf. the depiction of Sugar, Peter F.: *Industrialization of Bosnia-Herzegovina: 1878-1918*. Seattle: Washington UP 1963, p. 20ff.

18 Jelavich 1969, p. 122.

19 Bérenger 1994, p. 117: »Elle [= l'occupation, CR] provoqua des manifestations en Hongrie. L'opinion suivait avec méfiance la politique russophile d'Andrássy, qui n'était justifiée que par le maintien du statu quo dans les Balkans; le renforcement des petits États balkaniques et l'occupation de la Bosnie rompaient cet équilibre. Elles heurtaient les sentiments turcophiles des Hongrois et surtout l'occupation de la Bosnie accroissait le nombre de Slaves à l'intérieur de la monarchie, tandis que

in the 19th century.²²

2. *Economic grounds*. Bosnia-Herzegovina harboured large deposits of coal and various ores, so that the region could easily have been transformed into a ›Balkan Ruhrgebiet‹, a potential that was only realized (albeit incipiently) under Tito. This potential wealth leads some historians, like Jean Bérenger, to impute certain economic interests to Austria-Hungary.²³ Given the available historical evidence, however, it is difficult to say to what extent such natural resources – along with the prospect of a new market for Austrian goods – actually played a motivational role in the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Instead, it might well be the case that the Austro-Hungarian administration either did not recognize the full economic worth of its booty or, conversely, that it was simply not in a position to adequately exploit the area due to the limitations of its self-imposed administrative structure.²⁴
3. *Territorial expansion*. This line of argument maintains that, after the founding of the German Empire in 1871, the only remaining possibility for imperial(ist) expansion still open to Austria-Hungary lay in the South,²⁵ i.e. in the fallback regions of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans. This prospect was all the more appealing because of the desire of the Habsburg Monarchy to preclude the founding of a large South Slavic state on its southern flank and thereby also the resulting ›domino effect‹ on the Croat, Serb and Slovenian populations already living under Austro-Hungarian rule.²⁶

However, massive administrative, if not also financial, disadvantages were arrayed against the geopolitical advantages of occupation. Robert A. Kann writes:

In financial sense the acquisition was considered not only no gain but a definite loss [...]. Occupation was considered the lesser of two evils. It would mean bad business economically but it might offer some relief against the threat of Balkan nationalism and Russian-inspired Panslavism.²⁷

Apart from increasing the South Slavic population within the monarchy, out of which plans for Croatian hegemony and for Trialism²⁸ both arose side by side with Serbian nationalism, and increased expenditure, it should not be underestimated that with the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, for the first time in the history of the empire, a significant Muslim population became part of Christian Austro-Hungarian society and culture.²⁹ This new population was by no means merely a matter of scattered converts, but also of regional elites consisting of property owners, Ottoman functionaries, clergymen and merchants.³⁰ The later increasingly ethnicized religious differences in Bosnia-Herzegovina were interwoven with social hierarchy, especially since the majority of free peasants and dependent tenant farmers (*kmetovi*) were of the Christian faith, both Orthodox and Roman Catholic.³¹ Thus, all Austro-Hungarian administrative measures that led to an interference with the existing (and frankly not unproblematic) late-feudal system of cultural, religious and social difference were particularly delicate politically, even when they may have been adopted, in part, with well-meaning intent.³²

At the beginning, however, Austria-Hungary's possession of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1878 was anything but a peaceful *Einmarsch* as is sometimes suggested, but rather the gory military intervention of a major power.³³ By the end of the campaign, the Austro-Hungarian occupying forces under the command of the Croatian general Joseph Philippovich (Josip Filipović) von Philippsberg were roughly a quarter million men³⁴. Still, this army required almost three months (from the beginning of August until the end of October 1878) to subdue the territory. Almost everywhere the invaders met with bitter resistance from native forces which contained the remnants of Turkish troops and hastily recruited regional militias, who felt abandoned by the Ottomans.³⁵ Thus the military peace mission of Austria-Hungary ended up claiming thousands of victims³⁶ on both sides and leading to a mass exodus of civilians.³⁷ The operation itself can be considered the first and only large military victory of the Austro-Hungarian army between the German-Danish conflict of 1864 and the First World War;³⁸ accordingly, a significant percentage of surviving Austrian texts on Bosnia are narrative depictions of those ›heroic deeds‹, military memoirs, etc.

It is here that a propagandistic colonial tone first becomes perceptible, when, for example, a Czech soldier describes the heads of Austrian soldiers skewered by »insurgents« (the official term already in use at the time)³⁹ after the capture of Vranduk on August 18, 1878. Now, the old Balkan cliché about barbaric bandits and cutthroats rises again and positively

la gauche manifestait son hostilité à une guerre de conquête, qui coûta de nombreuses vies humaines. Les libéraux autrichiens manifestèrent également leur désaccord à l'égard d'une opération jugée ruineuse et inutile. Elle contribua à la chute du cabinet libéral Alfred Auersperg car François-Joseph n'aimait pas que l'on empiêtât sur son domaine réservé.»

20 This would be the ideal juncture to raise several points concerning the modes of representation applied to Bosnia-Herzegovina (i.e., focus, motivation, personalization, agency etc.) as they are to be observed in international historiography, where right up to the Yugoslav wars of the 1990's the area has remained more an exotic marginalia. Unfortunately, as worthwhile as this task might be, the restrictions of space do not permit it. 21 Cf. Sugar 1963, p. 20ff.; Jelavich 1983, p. 59; Haselsteiner 1996, p. 16ff.; Malcolm 2002, p. 136.

22 Cf. e.g. Sugar 1963, p. 26; Pinson 1994, p. 119; Malcolm 1996/2002, p. 136; Kraljačić, Tomislav: Kalajev režim 1882–1903. Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša 1987.

23 Bérenger, Jean: A History of the Habsburg Empire 1700–1918. Trans. by C. A. Simpson. London, New York: Longman 1997, p. 255: »The Near East presented the Viennese bankers and Bohemian industrialists with a considerable market and at the time when the great powers were endeavouring to acquire a colonial empire, Austria rediscovered its traditional sphere of economic interest.« Cf. also Malcolm 2002, p. 136, as well as Kolm 2001, p. 18f., p. 105f., p. 244ff.

24 The emperor and the two parliaments decreed that the new province had to finance itself with its own income; in this way there were no substantial subsidies from Vienna except for railway building (and even then only circuitously). Moreover, both the newly established Imperial and Royal mines authority as well as the *Bosna* mining corporation proved inefficient at developing new mineral resources; the flow of information to private investors either failed or was omitted completely, and further planning errors occurred. Cf. Sugar 1963, p. 105ff., p. 159ff. Cf. also Wessely, Kurt: Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung von Bosnien-Herzegovina. In: Wandruszka & Urbanitsch 1973–1989, vol. 1, pp. 528–566; Lampe, John/Jackson, Marvin: Balkan

cries out for new administration:

We stood in full battle dress against the ignoble cannibal enemy and it is no exaggeration to say that the Zulus, Bagurus, Niam-Niams, Bechuans, Hottentots and similar South African bands behaved more chivalrously towards European travellers than the Bosnian Turks did towards us. I always recollect with dismay the peoples of the Balkans, where the foot of the civilised European has not trod for decades, how the Turks, ›native lords‹, probably rule down there!⁴⁰

In 1881/82, new uprisings subjected the Austro-Hungarian occupational forces to a further test of their military strength.⁴¹ Afterwards the phase of Habsburg civil administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina began, the evaluation of which still seems to remain a problematic case for international historiography.

II. *NachBereitungen*: Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Light of Critical Discourses on Colonialism

The thesis put before us, namely that the administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina represented trends of colonialism, is highly problematical. We must first ask whether the concept of colonialism, commonly understood as the rule of European powers over native colored people on other continents, can be transferred to a master-subject relation within Europe, pointing to a system of colonial administration and exploitation of whites by whites.⁴²

It was in the capacity of an apologist that in 1976 the prominent Austrian-American historian Robert A. Kann⁴³ weighed in on the running debate concerning *internal European colonization*. At the time, Austria-Hungary was also viewed, next to Great Britain and the Soviet Union, as a potential field of inquiry.⁴⁴ For Kann, however, colonialism constitutes »the unholy trinity of imperialism, capitalist exploitation, and oppression on racial grounds, all of them imposed by force«;⁴⁵ on this basis, he rejects the application of the term to Bosnia-Herzegovina, albeit with arguments that are scarcely convincing. In the more recent formulation of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, which proceeds from the protean nature of the phenomenon, the accusation of colonialism levelled at Austria-Hungary would, on the other hand, seem plausible:

›Colonizer‹ and ›colonized‹ can be fairly elastic if you define scrupulously. When an alien nation-state establishes itself as a ruler, impressing its own laws and system of education, and re-arranging the mode of production for its own economic benefit, one can use these terms, I think.⁴⁶

An examination of contemporary interpretations of the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, however, reveals that Austro-Hungarian sources liked to speak of the dual province in terms of a »cultural« or »civilizing mission« that must inevitably follow the decline of the Ottoman regime and the bloody chaos of war in the period between 1876 and 1878.⁴⁷ It is this rhetoric that places the Austro-Hungarian endeavours within the general framework of European colonial and imperialist discourse. A statement made by the Austro-Hungarian Joint Finance Minister Benjamin von Kállay, who from 1882–1903 was responsible for the administration⁴⁸ of the »occupied zone«, is one of many textual instances that are symptomatic of this attitude. In an interview with London's *Daily Chronicle* he commented: »Austria is a great Occidental Empire [...] charged with the mission of carrying civilization to Oriental peoples«; »rational bureaucracy« would be »the key to Bosnia's future [...] to retain the ancient traditions of the land vilified and purified by modern ideas.«⁴⁹

It appears as if before and after the conquest, Austro-Hungarian sources ›rewrote‹ the history of Bosnia-Herzegovina which one can surely view as the decline of a regime (i.e. the Ottoman Empire), but also just as positively as a gradual process of modernization.⁵⁰ (And as Mark Pinson maliciously points out, there were e.g. complaints about the fact that the Austro-Hungarian judiciary in the region would work more slowly than its Turkish counterpart⁵¹ – despite the fact that, compared with the Ottoman era, the total number of civil servants engaged in the administration had risen from 120 to around 9,500 by 1908.⁵²) However, talk of Austria-Hungary's »civilizing mission« has led not only Yugoslav⁵³ but also English and American⁵⁴ historians to extend the critical paradigm of colonialism to the Habsburg monarchy. Such is the case with A.J.P Taylor, who writes on the subject of

Economic History, 1550-1950. From Imperial Borderlands to Developing Nations. Bloomington: Indiana UP 1982, esp. pp. 264-322; Malcolm 2002, p. 141.

25 Cf. e.g. Pinson 1994, p. 87.

26 Cf. *ibid.*; Sugar 1963, p. 20.

27 Kann 1977, p. 168.

28 Cf. Jelavich 1983, p. 60.

29 Cf. Pinson 1994, p. 91.

30 Cf. the standard works of Donia 1981; Pinson 1994; as well as Neweklowsky, Gerhard: Die bosnisch-herzegowinischen Muslime. Geschichte, Bräuche, Alltagskultur. Unter Mitarb. v. Besim Ibišević und Žarko Bebić. Klagenfurt, Salzburg: Wieser 1996 (Austrian-Bosnian Relations 1).

31 Cf. Donia 1981; Pinson 1994, p. 117f.

32 Of course, this begs the question as to what criteria adjudge an occupation to be an act of colonialism. Is it perhaps the externally applied – and failed – attempt at the standardization and centralization of Bosnia-Herzegovina, or rather the accommodating stance of Austria-Hungary concerning cultural difference as an instrument of foreign rule? It was likely the clumsy mix of both approaches that brought about the specific situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

33 Pavlowitch 1999, p. 116 writes laconically: »the occupation almost turned into a conquest«.

34 Malcolm 2002, p. 135 counts only 82,000 troops in service on the side of the Austro-Hungarian army and 40,000 fighters on the Bosnian side. However, in the middle of October 1878 official Austrian sources speak of something like 200,000 or 280,000 deployed soldiers respectively and estimate the strength of the opponent at 93,000 men; cf. Militaria Austriaca 12 (1993), p. 34.

35 Malcolm (*ibid.*), however, contradicts this widely held portrayal: »given the appalling state of most of the roads, it is barely an exaggeration to say that the Austrian army conquered Bosnia in the time it took to walk through«.

36 Vrankić 1995/98, p. 24f. counts 178 dead Imperial and Royal offi-

Bosnia-Herzegovina:

The two provinces were the ›white man's burden‹ [!] of Austria-Hungary. While other European Powers sought colonies in Africa for the purpose, the Habsburg Monarchy exported to Bosnia and Hercegovina its surplus intellectual production – administrators, road builders, archeologists, ethnographers, and even remittance-men. The two provinces received all benefits of Imperial rule: ponderous public buildings; model barracks for the army of occupation; banks, hotels, and cafés; a good water supply for the centres of administration and for the country resorts where the administrators and army officers recovered from the burden of Empire. The real achievement of Austria-Hungary was not on show: when the Empire fell in 1918, 88 per cent of the population was still illiterate.⁵⁵

Taylor's ironic tone here takes on polemical dimensions when discussion turns to the high rate of illiteracy and social/economic ›underdevelopment‹ even after the Austro-Hungarian period (in researching these potential side effects of colonization, economic historians were more sober than their British colleague, without falsifying his findings, though⁵⁶). It thus seems reasonable to suspect that the »civilizing mission« of the Habsburg monarchy was in fact only a half-hearted pretext for a geopolitical gambit in the Dalmatian hinterland that was not even remotely capable of achieving the »cultural« goals it had set for itself.

While later Yugoslav historians may admittedly be suspected themselves of having propagandistically rewritten the imperial prehistory of Bosnia-Herzegovina from the perspective of their own multi-ethnic state, the socio-economic and cultural implications, which Taylor, albeit exaggeratedly, cites, cannot be so easily invalidated. In 2004 the American historian Ian Sethre subsumes:

Many analysts have come to regard the relatively short period of Austro-Hungarian administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina [...] as one of considerable progress and prosperity. Indeed communications, industry and the transportation network were all noticeably upgraded in the region, but results of Austria-Hungary's ›modernization‹ campaign in Bosnia and Herzegovina were uneven at best. Their administrative strategies failed to facilitate any real or lasting semblance of ethnic cohesion and the most significant development [...] was the political awakening of the three largest ethnic groups [...].⁵⁷

In 1976 the Viennese economic historian Kurt Wessely has already established that, in his discipline, the assessment of Austro-Hungarian rule over Bosnia-Herzegovina is conflicting (»zwiespältig«); big achievements on a infrastructural level contrast with economic shortcomings and political failures:

[G]roßen Leistungen auf wirtschaftlich-kulturellem Gebiet [...] stehen eine ungleichmäßige Entfaltung der Produktivkräfte, eine zögernde und ungenügende finanzielle Unterstützung der Landeserfordernisse und ein Verkennen der wirtschaftlichen und politischen Wechselwirkung der Kmetenfrage gegenüber, welche den Erfolg des wirtschaftlichen Aufbauwerkes in Frage stellen mußte [...].⁵⁸

Of course, the Austro-Hungarian administration may credit itself with the will to construct social institutions and infrastructures such as a judicial system, transport routes and also, in part, educational facilities. On the other hand, the construction of structures of political and religious representation took place only after the Muslim, Orthodox (Serbian) and Croatian (Catholic) sections of the population mounted a fierce defence of their rights.⁵⁹ Fateful mistakes are likewise to be noted, such as the fact that the foreign administrators never decisively relinquished the late feudal principles relinquished the late feudal principles of land propriety and dependent tenant farming (the *kmetovi* issue);⁶⁰ instead, they merely modified and instrumentalized this manorial system for their own political ends.

Within the framework of the Colonialism debate, the aforementioned dispatch of officials becomes a point of some significance as well. The Yugoslav-British Balkan historian Stevan Pavlowitch, for instance, writes of the end of the military administration: »a much improved civil service was put in place, [...] ›colonial‹ [in the sense] that it was generally staffed by officials from all over the Monarchy.«⁶¹ We might further qualify this point with the following statement by the Yugoslav historiographer Ekmečić: »employment in the administration was also subject to discrimination.«⁶² (In 1904 only 26.5% of all officials with placements in Bosnia-Herzegovina were natives, the majority of them being Catholics with a further 3% being Serbs and 5% Moslems.⁶³)

cers (commissioned and non-commissioned) and 5,000 soldiers; Bérenger 1994, p. 116 speaks of 4,000 casualties, Malcolm 2002, p. 135 merely of 946. The casualty numbers for Austria-Hungary reported in *Militaria Austriaca* 12 (1993), which speaks of 983 dead and 3,984 wounded (pp. 27, 36f.), are likely the most precise. No numbers are available for the Bosnian-Herzegovinian losses (cf. p.41).

37 The refugee count from Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time of Austro-Hungarian rule lies between 50,000 and 300,000 depending on the source. Cf. Pinson 1994, p. 92ff.; Malcolm 2002, p. 139.

38 Cf. Bérenger 1994, p. 116f.

39 Cf. Pinson 1994, p. 98; Malcolm 2002, p. 134f.

40 Chaura, E.: *Obrazky z okupace bosenske*. Prague 1893, p. 38. Outd., transl. and commented by Jezernik, Božidar: *Wild Europe. The Balkans in the Gaze of Western Travellers*. London: Saqi/Bosnian Institute 2004, p. 139.

41 Cf. Malcolm 2002, p. 138f.

42 Kann 1977, p. 164.

43 Robert Adolf Kann, b. 1906 in Vienna, emigrated in 1938 to the US.

44 Cf. e.g. Hechter, Michael: *Internal Colonialism. The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1975; about the debate cf. also Nolte, Hans-Heinrich/Bähre, Klaas (Eds.): *Innere Peripherien in Ost und West*. Stuttgart: Steiner 2001.

45 Kann 1976, p. 164.

46 Quoted in: Ulbandus 7 (2003): *Empire, Union, Center, Satellite. The Place of Post-Colonial Theory in Slavic/Central and Eastern European/(Post-)Soviet Studies*, p. 15. However, this definition is partially problematic, since only few colonizing empires (such as Great Britain, Belgium, etc.) are nation-states; Spivak obviously refers here to states in a more general sense.

47 This discourse has been uncritically taken up by historians in part right up to the present, as for e.g. when the Viennese Arnold Suppan laconically notes in 1978: »Im wesentlichen bestand eine Kultur- und Missionsaufgabe« (p. 128).

Similar to British rule over India, the Austro-Hungarian occupiers also established their rule over a majority of the population with the participation and gradual ›reformation‹ of already existing elites, in this case the Bosnian Muslims. But there are further pertinent points, which support the argument for colonialism. In the first place, Bosnia-Herzegovina was kept in a questionable *no man's land* status between national and international law for thirty years; even in 1908, with its annexation, it was not afforded the status of a ›crownland‹ (*Kronland*), but of a *Reichsland* instead (in essence belonging to neither of the two halves of the empire). Accordingly, Bosnia-Herzegovina had no state assembly until 1910 (being governed in the interim by the Joint Finance Ministry), and even after annexation it could not send any elected representatives either to the Viennese *Reichstag* or to the parliament in Budapest; it is precisely in this context that the American historian William McCagg, borrowing from the example of the Soviet Union, speaks of a »satrapy«. ⁶⁴ Besides, the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire in the late 19th century also saw the usurpation of other Turkish territories, as for example that of Egypt by England (1882) and Tunis by France (1881) – events which historians do indeed view within the context of a European colonialism. ⁶⁵ Thus, though no ocean separated Austria-Hungary in 1878 from its territorial acquisition, the Habsburg monarchy can absolutely be regarded as colonial trendsetter in this respect.

In Austro-Hungarian texts of the time, however, the term colonialism is strictly avoided, and to the present day this still applies to a majority of Austrian historiography. Ironically, it is frequently the imperial German observers of the Austrian presence in the Balkans, who, in the phase of Wilhelminian expansion to Africa, also employ the term when referring to the Austro-Hungarian occupation. Ferdinand Schmid, head of the Office of Statistics in Bosnia and later a university professor in Leipzig, furnishes an interesting example of this when he discusses colonialism (in a broader sense) in his principally affirmative 1914 monograph and applies the term to the dual provinces:

Man hat in der deutschen und westländischen Literatur viel über den Begriff der Kolonien gestritten und darunter häufig nur überseeische, vom Mutterlande wirtschaftlich oder auch staatsrechtlich beherrschte Gebiete verstanden. In diesem Sinne besitzt Österreich-Ungarn keine Kolonien und in diesem Sinne hat es – wenigstens in der neueren Zeit – niemals Kolonialpolitik getrieben. Faßt man dagegen den Begriff der Kolonien etwas weiter, so kann kaum ein Zweifel darüber bestehen, daß Bosnien und die Herzegovina von Österreich-Ungarn als Kolonialgebiete erworben wurden und solche in der Hauptsache bis heute geblieben sind. ⁶⁶

Though essentially more florid, the fairytale description formulated some twenty years earlier by the Berlin journalist Heinrich Renner is similar in tenor and likewise expresses the hope that the Austro-Hungarian administration can serve as a model for other colonial regimes:

Dem grossen Publikum blieben [...] diese Gefilde gänzlich unbekannt; das bosnische Dornröschen schlief noch den jahrhundertlangen Zauberschlaf und fand seine Auferstehung erst, als die kaiserlichen Truppen die Grenzen überschritten und die neue Aera einleiteten. Jetzt wurde das Dickicht, das um Dornröschens Schloss wucherte, gelichtet und nach rastloser und schwerer Arbeit von nicht zwei Jahrzehnten steht Bosnien bekannt und geachtet vor der Welt. Was in diesem Lande geleistet wurde, ist fast beispiellos in der Kolonialgeschichte aller Völker und Zeiten [...]. ⁶⁷

[...] auch den in Europa jetzt so zahlreichen Kolonialpolitikern ist ein Besuch zu empfehlen; in Bosnien wird praktische Kolonialpolitik [...] getrieben und was geleistet wurde, stellt den leitenden Personen und Oesterreich-Ungarn im Allgemeinen das höchste Ehrenzeugniss aus. Einst gänzlich zurückgeblieben, reiht sich heute die bosnische Schwester europäischen Ländern als würdige Genossin an. ⁶⁸

For their part, however, the Germans do not only employ the term colonialism affirmatively and, at times, even panegyrically, but also as a critical tool. The travel writer Hermann Wendel, for example, writes in 1922: »[D]as österreichisch-ungarische Bosnien war eine Kolonie, ein Stück Orient, künstlich von den Wiener Machthabern gehütet.« ⁶⁹ With this statement the social democrat Wendel, who hails from another occupied territory, namely German Lorraine, accuses the Austro-Hungarian administration of engaging in a ›disneyfication‹

48 Immediate local authority for the occupied zone belonged to the military commander of the 15th Army Corps in Sarajevo, at whose side a civilian »assistant« was placed. Cf. Pinson 1994, p. 92; Vrankić 1995/98, p. 27ff.; Sugar 1963, p. 25ff.

49 Quoted in: Donia 1981, p. 14.

50 Cf. Pinson 1994, p. 123.

51 Alongside the existing Islamic law courts, the Austro-Hungarian administration created a parallel secular system after its own model, consisting of municipal and district courts as well as a regional court (*Bezirks-, Kreis- and Landesgericht*). On this topic cf. for example Sugar 1963, p. 31f.

52 Cf. Pinson 1994, p. 119f.

53 Cf. Dedijer/Božić/Ćirković/Ekmečić 1974, p. 448, where the discussion centres on »semicolonialism«. Cf. also Detrez, Raymond: Colonialism in the Balkans. Historic Realities and Contemporary Perceptions. In: Kakanien revisited, www.kakanien.ac.at/beitr/theorie/RDetrez1.pdf [15.05.2002]; further the research report on the Yugoslav historiography on Bosnia in Vervaeet, Stijn: Some Historians from Former Yugoslavia on the Austro-Hungarian Period in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1878-1918). A Reality of Imperialism versus the Golden Years of the Double Eagle? In: Kakanien revisited, www.kakanien.ac.at/beitr/fallstudie/SVervaeet1.pdf [18.04.2004].

54 Aside from the quoted Taylor there are Donia 1981, p. 12ff. and Pinson 1994, p. 113, amongst others.

55 Taylor 1948/90, p. 166.

56 In 1908, there were only 350 primary schools for 15% of the children, 12 high schools and no university (Sugar 1963, p. 202). Assessing the numbers is, however, a matter of conception; thus Malcolm 2002 defends the Austro-Hungarian educational policy with the words: »[...] no government which builds nearly 200 primary schools, three high schools, a technical school and a teacher-training college can be described as utterly negligent in its education policy« (p. 144). Nevertheless, the fact remains that the high rate of illiteracy continued even after the end of the Habsburg monarchy.

(*avant la lettre*) and of perpetuating the »Sklavinnenrolle der muselmanischen Frau«. ⁷⁰ The Russian count Leo Tolstoy is even sharper in his criticism when, after the annexation of 1908, which caused a severe international crisis, he referred to the Habsburg monarchy simply as a »nest of thieves«. ⁷¹ Reports submitted by British diplomats in 1890 and quoted by the American-Hungarian economic historian Peter Sugar in 1963 take a similar line:

[...] the trade of the native merchants had been ruined by the immense influx of Austrian speculators, mostly men without capital or substance [...] who become bankrupt a few months after their arrival. But this does not seem to deter others from coming. ⁷²

Everything is provisional here [in B-H, CR], and consequently few good employees will accept posts in the civil administration. With very few exceptions [...] we have nothing here but the scum of the Austrian official world, and bribery is as important a factor as ever in the arrangement of any matter with the Government. ⁷³

Eventually, in the 1990s, the Croatian-German historian Petar Vrankić summarized matter-of-factly that one has to diagnose »dass Österreich-Ungarn, obwohl es viel für die Modernisierung, Sicherstellung und Durchführung der neuen Staatsideen getan hat, Bosnien und die Herzegowina auch weiterhin als Kolonialland behandelt hat.« ⁷⁴ Contained in this statement is a claim that holds exemplary validity for our present historical view of Bosnia-Herzegovina, for it reveals a portrait of the Francisco-Josephinian epoch that is, particularly in its most southerly periphery, Janus-headed – fluctuating between the discursive poles of colonialism and modernization. One need not even go as far as Robert Kann did in 1977 with his apology:

[...] we have to come to the conclusion that colonial trends had no significant place in history of the administration from 1878 to 1914 unless one considers the Habsburg Empire as a whole a residuum of the age of colonial administration. To do so would clearly transcend the mandate which the topic of this report intends to comply with. ⁷⁵

A decade and a half later, the Viennese historian Peter Stachel wrote: »Definiert man »Kolonisierung« vorläufig sehr allgemein als ein hegemoniales Konzept der zwangsweisen Vereinheitlichung kultureller Differenzen, so erscheint es durchaus zweckentsprechend, sich mit dieser Konzeption auch der Geschichte der Habsburgermonarchie zu nähern.« ⁷⁶ Stachel, however, thinks that the Austro-Hungarian self-image of a »unity in diversity« or, respectively, a »family of peoples« counteracted a compulsory centralist standardization of the periphery – which does not exclude the heuristic benefits of a »postcolonial« take, but rather refines this approach to a »microlevel«:

Damit ist jedoch keineswegs behauptet, dass die Habsburgermonarchie von jenen Strategien der kulturellen Zwangsassimilation, wie sie für Kolonisierungsprozesse typisch ist, völlig frei gewesen wäre: An die Stelle eines dominanten, zentralistischen und reichsübergreifenden »Kolonisierungsdiskurses« traten vielfach miteinander verschränkte regionale »Mikrokolonialismen«. ⁷⁷

III. *VorBilder*: Prolegomena to an Austrian Imagology of the Bosnian Other

The remainder of this essay presents the groundwork for a research project ⁷⁸ that focusses on the cultural construction of otherness in Austrian (and German) texts dealing with Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1878 and 1918. The approach is in keeping with the conceptual framework of Edward Said, Maria Todorova, and other postcolonial theorists, along with Robert Musil's famous term for the k. und k. Habsburg Monarchy. ⁷⁹ The aforementioned argument for colonialism can namely be substantiated by examining not only Austro-Hungarian administrative measures or Bosnia-Herzegovina's problematic special legal status, but also by analyzing the narratives and discourses within the hegemonic Austrian culture during the occupation. They projected, insinuated and indeed even imposed their own imagery and conceptual worlds on Bosnia-Herzegovina – symbolic forms, which circulated between occupier and occupied during the forty year span of the Habsburg period, in some cases even much longer.

57 Sethre, Ian: The Emergence and Influence of National Identities in the Era of Modernization. Nation-Building in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1878-1914. In: Kakanien revisited, www.kakanien.ac.at/beitr/fallstudie/ISethre1.pdf [25.01.2004], p. 1.

58 Wessely 1973, p. 566. In comparison, Pinson 1994, p. 118, writes: »Austrian rule left the province with some significant physical assets (mainly railroad lines and roads), little in the way of an industrial base or adequate financial services, and the legacy of a customs duty policy that had been inappropriate for fostering economic growth.« For his part, Lampe suggests that »the Habsburg borderlands, like the Balkan states, thus found themselves on the war's eve with a set of modern financial and industrial sectors. They approached European best practice and had recorded rapid rates of growth since 1900. Despite differences between them, both sets were less dependent on foreign capital and management than colonial counterparts in, say, British India or French Indochina« In: Lampe & Jackson 1982, p. 322.

59 Cf. e.g. Donia 1981, Pinson 1994, p. 91ff. and Vrankić 1995/98.

60 Cf. also Katus, László: Hauptzüge der kapitalistischen Entwicklung der Landwirtschaft in den südslawischen Gebieten der Österreichisch-Ungarischen Monarchie. In: Sándor, Pál/Hanák, Péter (Eds.): Studien zur Geschichte der Österreichisch-Ungarischen Monarchie. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó 1961, pp. 113-163, p. 136ff.

61 Pavlowitch 1999, p. 117.

62 Among others, cf. Dedijer/Božić/Čirković/Ekmečić 1974, p. 449.

63 Cf. *ibid.* and Jelavich 1983, p. 60.

64 McCagg, William O.: The Soviet Union and the Habsburg Empire. Problems of Comparison. In: Rudolph, Richard L./Good, David F. (Eds.): Nationalism and Empire. The Habsburg Empire and the Soviet Union. New York: St. Martin's Pr. 1992, pp. 45-63, here p. 50f.

65 Cf. Hösch 2002, p. 137.

66 Schmid, Ferdinand: Bosnien und die Herzegovina unter der Verwaltung Österreich-Ungarns. Leipzig: von Veit 1914, p. 1 [emphasis i.o.].

As the secondary works on French literature have amply demonstrated through the famous journeys of Napoleon, Chateaubriand, Nerval, Flaubert and Du Camp, etc.,⁸⁰ the ›Orient‹ is a very special space for the projection of European phantasms – to such an extent that it actually exists only as a historical plurality,⁸¹ with a multitude of stock, transnational, controversial, but also ultimately interchangeable, stereotypes. Quite naturally, this poses the question as to which Orient Austria-Hungary thought to find in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As an initial thesis, one could formulate that with the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, former arch-enemy of the Habsburg monarchy, the self-stylized protector of Christianity in Central Europe and the Balkans,⁸² Bosnia became the imagological plaything of the occupying forces – and with this also the site of symbolic occupations (*Besetzungen*).

Thus, the main goal of the research project in question is to investigate the »cultural semantics of the [Bosnian] Orient«⁸³ in Austro-Hungarian texts, which is basically a discourse marked by a certain inventory and tradition(s), as well as disparities, contradictions and aporias. For reasons of limited space, the present contribution has to restrict itself: firstly, to furnishing an approximate sketch based on random sampling and, secondly, to developing a set of theses, which admittedly still require vetting. By the same token, it will preliminarily forego in-depth theoretical and/or methodical discussions, such as those connected with Maria Todorova's Balkanism thesis⁸⁴ and the topic of imagology as a problematic organon.

Aside from the aforementioned memoirs of Austro-Hungarian officers, the corpus of texts on Bosnia⁸⁵ in German contains, above all, travelogues, ethnographic texts, reminiscences of officials and their family members, not to forget political essay writing. In the canonized Austro-German *belles lettres* the Bosnian adventures begun in 1878, which may be said to have paralleled the Oriental creations of Karl May (his novel *In den Schluchten des Balkan* e.g. appeared in 1885-88),⁸⁶ has left behind astonishingly few traces. The Austrian author Robert Michel (1876-1957), on whom important studies⁸⁷ have already been published elsewhere (as well as useful preliminary studies on Bosnian travel literature⁸⁸), is likely of most importance here.

The research project makes a similar claim as Vesna Goldsworthy has already put forward in her own exemplary study of English travel literature dealing with the Balkans. Indeed, it seems as if the Austro-Hungarian occupiers, too, preferred to speak secretly to and of themselves in their texts on the Bosnian foreign land rather than describe the ›external world‹. Or, in Goldsworthy's words:

The concept of imaginative, textual colonisation, as suggested by this examination of literary exploitation of the Balkans, shows the way in which an area can be exploited as an object of the dominant culture's need for a dialogue with itself.⁸⁹

Considering Goldsworthy's concept is a major reason why our research project in question focuses almost exclusively on hegemonic discourses originating with the occupiers, and thus on the construction of an Austrian rather than Bosnian identity.⁹⁰ This has already incited the ire of early (and hasty) readers for, in their eyes, this approach perpetuates the unequal power relationships between Austria and its ›Other‹. Thus, for the sake of completeness, it should be added here that a cooperative partnership has been established with the Gent Slavist Stijn Vervaeet, who has dedicated himself solely to examining the Bosnian and/or Yugoslav perspective of the period of Austro-Hungarian occupation (1878-1918), and with young Bosnian scholars working on similar topics.⁹¹

However, scholarship on Bosnian literary sources is not without problems of its own. If one rephrases Gayatri Spivak's famous question – »Can the Subaltern Speak?«⁹² – in this context, it quickly becomes clear that any research, looking for contemporary native accounts, finds itself confronted with the lack of first-person documents from both the Ottoman and the early Austro-Hungarian era, as the Harvard historian Mark Pinson has pointed out:⁹³

In studying Ottoman attitudes and changes in attitudes, one quickly comes up against the almost total absence of first-person literature – diaries, collected letters, and autobiographies – even from highly placed officials. [...] Not surprisingly, since the Bosnian notables of the Austrian period were largely products of that same culture, there is little such first-person literature from them either.⁹⁴

67 Renner, Heinrich: *Durch Bosnien und die Hercegovina kreuz und quer. Wanderungen von H.R.* Berlin: Reimer 1896, p. V. [spelling as i.o.].

68 *Ibid.*, p. 480. For other German and American examples, cf. Kolm 2001, p. 238.

69 Quoted in: Okuka, Miloš/Rehder, Petra (Eds.): *Das zerrissene Herz. Reisen durch Bosnien-Herzegowina 1530-1993.* Munich: C.H. Beck 1994 (BR 1053), p. 95.

70 As quoted in *ibid.*, p. 94.

71 Tolstoi, Count Leo N.: *Die Annerxion Bosniens und der Herzegowina.* Trans. Edmund Rot. Berlin: Hermann Walther 1909, p. 7.

72 Quoted in: Sugar 1963, p. 46.

73 Quoted in: *ibid.*, p. 30f.

74 Vrankić 1995/98, p. 48.

75 Kann 1977, p. 178.

76 Stachel, Peter: *Der koloniale Blick auf Bosnien-Herzegowina in der ethnographischen Populärliteratur der Habsburger Monarchie.* In: Feichtinger/Prutsch/Csàky 2003, pp. 259-288, here p. 260.

77 *Ibid.*, p. 261.

78 Konstruktionen des Fremden: *Bosnien-Herzegowina in deutschsprachigen Texten 1878-1918*, financed by the Special Research Fund (SFO) of the University of Antwerp, Belgium.

79 »Kakania« (Kakanien) is Musil's nickname for Austria-Hungary derived from the acronym k.u.k. (kaiserlich und königlich, or Imperial and Royal).

80 Cf. Stoll, André: Afterword to: Flaubert, Gustave: *Reise in den Orient.* Ed. and trans. by Reinhold Werner and André Stoll. Frankfurt/M.: Insel 1996, pp. 363-414.

81 Stoll 1996 identifies a number of various discourses on the Orient that were circulating within French culture at the time: There was, for example, the cultured Orient in Montesquieu's socially critical *Persian Letters*, romantic Greece in the struggle for liberation of the 1820's, the India of the German Romantics and their fledgling attempts at Orientalism, the »modern Orient« of Napoleon (Egypt), which became an on-site field of scientific inquiry, the Orient as site of an anachronistic (read »despotic«) society,

The emergence of an extensive body of native literature⁹⁵ is not very likely to have occurred until after the occupation (also on account of the high illiteracy rate), especially in the phase of the »national awakening« of the Serbs, Croats and Muslims.⁹⁶ Here it is necessary to consider the category of ruling authority, or hegemony, respectively, *as the power of definition*: allowing any individuality, regardless of type, to emerge from among the native population, for instance, was certainly not part of the identity policy of the occupying forces. Instead, the aim was to »format« them exogenously,⁹⁷ if not yet as »Bosnians«, then at least as new Austro-Hungarian subjects. The development of the respective political and literary movements of the Bosnian Croats, Serbs and Muslims was a reaction to this process that took manifold forms, ranging from civil protest, resistance and redrafting⁹⁸ to consent to and even collaboration with, or at least adoption of, the symbolic forms of Central and Western European modernity introduced by the invaders.

Thus, it is out of the question to repeat the »silencing« of South Slav voices by Austrian academia; the central problem of all the research projects mentioned is rather to encounter the specific cultural situation of inequality between 1878 and 1918 with means suitable to the task, i.e., with a dialogically functioning, decentralized, comparative network which works transnationally. This approach could effectively realize the desideratum of Larry Wolff, who, at the end of his influential work *Inventing Eastern Europe*, proposes an intellectual history of the reaction of »Eastern Europe« to the imposed images of the »West«:

My book is about the intellectuals of Western Europe, inventing Eastern Europe. As Milosz suggests, the intellectuals of Eastern Europe have had to respond to the imposed images and formulas devised in Western Europe. The intellectual history of that response would be another book, an account of the complex cultural strategies of resistance, appropriation, deference, complicity, and counterattack pursued in the different lands of Eastern Europe.⁹⁹

The imagological problems, however, already inhere in the very designation of the ethnic groups to be found in Bosnia-Herzegovina before and after 1878, and it is a difficulty that does not occur only in texts written in German. The question is therefore not only, whether one really can/should simply label all Catholics as »Croats«, all Orthodox Christian believers as »Serbs«, and all Muslims as »Bosniaks«, as is customarily done to the present day¹⁰⁰ – and indeed they are all Bosnians, too. Equally salient in this respect is the construction of an accentuated Herzegovinian identity, which, wherever it occurs, is frequently situated topographically and also subjected to a process of gendering. As a case in point, Johann (János) von Asbóth (1845-1911), civil servant of the Austro-Hungarian Joint Ministry of the Exterior and elected member of the Hungarian parliament, writes on the Herzegovina:

All das, die schweren, soliden, fast befestigungsartigen Häuser, ebenso wie die Gegend selbst, gibt der ganzen Landschaft einen trotzigen, drohenden Charakter, der sich bis auf die Einwohner selbst erstreckt. Trotzige, stolze, mächtige Männer mit entschieden südlichen Zügen, fast alle brünett, während in Bosnien viel blondes Haar zu sehen ist. Die Volkstracht steht hier schon näher der montenegrinischen, als der türkischen, die in Bosnien die herrschende ist. Auch die Weiber stehen über den Bosniakinnen. Auch diesen Letzteren fehlt es keineswegs an Schönheit, ja man findet in Bosnien auffallend viele edle Gestalten und Physiognomien, die dortigen Frauen aber sind meist flachbrüstig, während die hiesigen mächtig entwickelt sind.¹⁰¹

Then as now, »western« authors in Bosnia-Herzegovina, who come from outside, frequently see themselves confronted by a complexity that refuses to fit into their »modern« category of nation – for which reason the discourse of cultural »lack« is immediately invoked again. In his 1889 volume on Bosnia-Herzegovina in the series *Die Länder Österreich-Ungarns in Wort und Bild*, Moriz Hoernes opines:

Das Band der Nationalität, welches die überwiegende Masse der eingeborenen Einwohner Bosniens und der Herzegowina einigt, [...] wird von den Trägern selbst nicht empfunden. Sie sind culturell noch nicht genügend fortgeschritten, um sich der Sprache wegen [...] als ein besonderes Ganzes, als ein Volk zu fühlen. Die Stelle der Sprache als einigendes Band [...] vertritt die Confession; sie antworten, wenn man sie nach ihrer Abstammung fragt, nicht wie der Westeuropäer, der da sagt: ich bin ein Engländer, ein Franzose, ein Deutscher; sondern bei ihnen heißt es: ich

but also of unsuspected decadent freedom (Flaubert's eroticism) etc.

82 To this motif of the ›protector of Balkan Christians‹, which plays a role in the political discourse of both Austria and Russia and which, together with the ›pacification of the land‹, becomes an important pretext for the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Andrassy's documents, cf. e.g. Haselsteiner 1996, p. 11 and Vrankić 1995/98, p. 17. Cf. also Reber, Ursula: Concerns of the Periphery / Peripheral Concerns. Tempting Territories of the Balkans. In: Spaces of Identity 2.3 (Dec. 2002). www.spacesofidentity.net

83 Formulation by Stoll 1996, p. 375.

84 Cf. Todorova 1997; Sundhussen, Holm: Europa balcanica. Der Balkan als historischer Raum Europas. In: Geschichte und Gesellschaft [Göttingen] 25 (1999), pp. 626-653, here p. 628.

85 For the moment, the investigative corpus consists – pragmatically defined – of the existing materials on Bosnia in German language at the Austrian National Library; this will be supplemented in a later study by the collections of other Central European libraries (Budapest, Munich and Zurich among others). In the process, a contrastive reading of Austro-German and imperial German sources has proven illuminating and not only in regard to the contemporary colonialism discourse. Possible differences between Austrian and Hungarian authors would also have to be examined when the opportunity presents itself, and further, the, in part, very lively and independent contemporary Balkan discourse in Czech – for even the ›established‹ peripheries of the Habsburg monarchy seem to react to the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in specific ways.

86 Cf. Sudhoff, Dieter/Vollmer, Hartmut (Eds.): Karl Mays Orientzyklus. Paderborn: Igel 1991 (Karl-May-Studien 1).

87 Cf. Concetti, Ricardo: Muslimische Landschaften. Hugo von Hofmannsthal's Auseinandersetzung mit der Prosa Robert Michels. In: Kakanien revisited, www.kakanien.ac.at/beitr/fallstudie/RConcetti1.pdf [13.12.2002]. Another article by Anna Babka (Vienna) is under way.

88 Cf. Stachel 2003, who has utilized the travel and ethnographic

bin ein Türke, ein Rechtgläubiger (griechisch-Orthodoxer), ein Lateiner (römischer Katholik).¹⁰²

Judging by the fact that, at the time, even exonymic and endonymic terms were scarcely to be reconciled with one another, the task of determining the ethn(ograph)ic condition in Bosnia-Herzegovina seems to have been even more complex in the 19th century than it is today. In German language texts of the period, for example, the Muslim population is often carelessly generalized as ›Turkish‹,¹⁰³ creating the impression that the converted South Slavs of Bosnia-Herzegovina had actually immigrated to the region, just as the former elite of Ottoman officials and functionaries had done. A similar situation occurs in some older works, which readily labels all orthodox Bosnians/Herzegovinians as ›Greeks‹ or ›Vlachs‹, just as, conversely, the new Austro-German rulers, in the region as elsewhere in South Eastern Europe, are dubbed ›Swabians‹¹⁰⁴ on account of their language. In textual documents of the Serbian (Orthodox) and Croatian (Catholic) populations, there are, in turn, frequently extensive argumentations to convince the Bosnian/Herzegovinan Muslims of the fact that they do not possess their own independent (cultural) identity, but rather are merely Islamized Croats and/or Serbs;¹⁰⁵ this intent is also plainly evident in the following passage from an anonymous German text:

Die ein und eine Dreitmillion Menschen, welche heute die Provinzen Bosnien und die Herzegowina bewohnen, gehören (bis auf ein paar tausend Mohammedaner, deren Vorfahren im Laufen der Jahrhunderte theils aus Asien, theils aus Afrika eingewandert sind, und die 3000 ›spagnolischen‹ Juden) zu einer Rasse und sprechen eine Sprache: die kroatisch-serbische.¹⁰⁶

The complex and disparate set of problems associated with the nomenclature of ›ethnic groups‹ is not the only issue of great interest for discourse analysis. There are, in addition, also those stereotypes, which, from the Austrian and German viewpoint, seek to legitimize the Habsburg monarchy's presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina through narrative and argumentation. As was already pointed out, virtually no German-speaking author refrains from adducing the ›cultural mission‹¹⁰⁷ of Austria-Hungary, which is frequently accompanied by an imagery of fairy tale purity. In the previously cited 1896 work of the Berlin journalist Heinrich Renner, for instance, Bosnia becomes a kind of oriental Sleeping Beauty that must be awakened by the kiss of Europe, or more properly, by the Habsburg prince (the use of gendering¹⁰⁸ in these cases is no more accidental than the ›westernizing‹ figurativeness which, so to speak, relocates Bosnia from *1001 Nights* into a Grimm Brothers' fairy tale).

Bosnia-Herzegovina is constructed in most of the texts analyzed as the extreme case of a periphery, which is in need of a new centre, the more so because the old one was unable to fulfil its ›duties‹. The justifications for this are stereotypical: Ottoman ›decadence‹ (the decline of the ›sick man of the Bosphorus‹) and the ›oriental despotism‹ of the Turks to name only two. The periphery as an area remote from civilization is fixed not only in images of wild landscapes, but also in the catalogue of characteristics attributed to its inhabitants, a catalogue which is virtually rewritten in the cultural memory after the Austro-Hungarian occupation. A *Historisch-Topographische Beschreibung von Bosnien und Serbien*, for instance, which appeared anonymously in Vienna in 1821, states:

Die Bosnier sind ein starker, kühner Menschenschlag, der vorzüglich zum Soldatendienste taugt [...] Wenn der Bosnier in Hinsicht auf Ackerbau, Gewerbe, Handel, kurz in Bezug auf Industrie aller Art, das nicht leistet was er könnte, so ist hiervon einzig die Politik des herrschendem Volkes, nämlich [sic] der Türken, Schuld.¹⁰⁹

That the Bosnian would be strong, brave and industrious were it not for his subjugation and exploitation at the hands of the Ottomans,¹¹⁰ is a form of argumentation that is largely abandoned in the German and Austrian sources after Austria-Hungary assumed the administration of the area. Henceforth, one reads primarily pejorative classifications, which also refuse to conform to the image of the Sleeping Beauty painted by Renner: the Bosnian is supposedly characterized by his ›kindlich naïve Denkungsweise‹, as Count Attems, Kavalleriegeneral der Reserve, writes in 1913.¹¹¹ Moreover, in the native inheres ›etwas von der

literature of Moritz Hoernes, Milena Preindlsberger-Mrazović and Ćiro Truhelka, amongst others, for which reason I will rely upon other textual examples, in order to avoid the risk of repetition.

89 Goldsworthy, Vesna: *Inventing Ruritania. The Imperialism of the Imagination*. New Haven, London: Yale UP 1998, p. 211.

90 In addition to Goldsworthy's study, Hall's exemplary work proceeds from a similar set of problems: Hall, Catherine: *Civilising Subjects. Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination, 1830-1867*. Cambridge: Polity 2002.

91 Cf. his existing preliminary work (Vervaeet 2004) and his contribution to this anthology. Vervaeet's PhD project is being financed by the Flemish Research Fund (FWO).

92 Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty: *Can the Subaltern Speak?* In: Nelson, Cary/Grossberg, Lawrence (Eds.): *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*. Urbana: U of Illinois Prs. Reprint in: Chrisman, Laura/Williams, Patrick (Eds.) *Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory*. New York: Columbia UP 1994.

93 Correspondingly, it is incumbent upon Stijn Vervaeet not only to evaluate those few early first-person accounts but also to consider, for example, the journalism of the individual population groups in the later period of the occupation, the migrations of Bosnian-Herzegovinian intellectuals to Vienna (for the purpose of study etc.), as well as other indicators.

94 Pinson 1994, p. 122.

95 The antecedent oral literary tradition, which was still alive at the time of the occupation, holds its own problems. For example, who are the authors that record the songs and epic poems and who canonizes them (and to what purpose)? Frequently, they come from outside, from Austria, Serbia, Croatia. Sometimes it is Franciscan monks. These are questions that Stijn Vervaeet will also pursue.

96 Cf. Džambo, Jožo: *Buchwesen in Bosnien und der Herzegowina (1800-1878)*. Zum Problem der Lesersozio-logie. Frankfurt/M.: Peter Lang 1985 (Arbeiten und Bibliographien zum Buch- und Bibliothekswesen 22).

südslawischen Indolenz, gemischt mit mohammedanischem Fatalismus«, a point at which the category of power and coercion comes into play:

Dem Bosnier imponieren nur zwei Sachen: die Macht im Form von Bajonetten und das Geld in Gestalt eines Automobils. Gegen alles andere ist er von einer imponierenden Gleichgültigkeit. Der Bosnier sagt: ›Unser Kaiser‹, ›Der Landes-chef‹, ›Der Herr Gendarm‹.¹¹²

In a chapter portentously entitled *Ethnic Types and Ethnic Character*, the aforementioned Moriz Hoernes pronounces a similar judgement on the attitude of the »Slavic Mohammedan«, whom he describes as follows:

[Das] ewige Zuwarten und Herbeisehnen unter lange dauernder Bedrückung hat ihn ängstlich, energielos gemacht: es hat ihn auch gelehrt, sich brünstig an seinen Glauben anzuschließen [...].¹¹³

For his part, the previously cited anonymous author, who in 1886 expresses concern for »Bosnia's Present and Near Future«, assesses the Bosnian Muslim as follows: »selbst den Boden zu bearbeiten, dazu hat der echte Türke weder Lust noch Verständniß; er weiß zu genießen, aber nicht zu schaffen.«¹¹⁴ After its political decline, the Ottoman Empire, the once mighty adversary, resides, so to speak, only in its ethnic remains, which are disparagingly looked down on; the »lethargy« of the locals does not require merely the intercession of a fairy tale prince, but rather »encouragement« by a stronger hand.¹¹⁵

In this regard, only the so-called *Kronprinzenwerk* represents an exception. In the »political correctness« of its propagandistically patriotic, »holistic« approach to the Habsburg monarchy, this anthology of edited ethnographic essays, like the aforementioned anonymous text of 1821, also acquires a taste for the locals, and not surprisingly so, given the background of some of the authors. Here, as for example the Osijek-born Croatian archeologist Ćiro Truhelka writes in his contribution, the Bosnian is endowed with »eine bewundernswerte Auffassungsgabe«, »eine präzise, logische Ausdrucksweise«, »eine natürliche Einfachheit« and »ein ausgeprägtes Wahrheits-, Rechts- und Ehrgefühl.«¹¹⁶ The Bosnian's checked »energy« or, »creative enthusiasm«, however, comes at the expense of the Turkish oppression. Consequently, the claim, »[den] Arbeitstrieb erweckt zu haben«, is here as well »ein nicht genug hoch zu schätzendes Verdienst der [k.u.k.] Occupation«.¹¹⁷

At any rate, the predominantly negative characteristics, which have been taken up again from the old European stereotypes of the so-called »Table of Peoples« (*Völkertafeln*)¹¹⁸ and other reservoirs (e.g. the cliché of the »effeminate« Oriental), are meant to justify that civilizing mission which a previously cited anonymous¹¹⁹ text from the year 1886 formulates in a particularly crass fashion:

Denn hier stellt sich uns zum ersten mal ein Beispiel vor Augen, wie eine ›europäische Macht‹ das Werk der Reorganisierung eines ›asiatischen‹ Landes in Angriff nimmt, in welcher Weise sie mit den Mitteln unsers modernen Staates eine rohe, beinahe noch urwüchsige, jedenfalls ›von der Cultur noch unbeleckte‹ Masse von 1 1/3 Millionen Menschenmaterials bearbeitet, um daraus ein europäisches Staatswesen, ein Culturvolk herauszubilden, mit einem Worte: um aus Asiaten Europäer herauszuformen.¹²⁰

This Europeanisation is also seen as the task of German-speaking colonists, who are to serve the native population as role models of rural modernity, as is extolled in the text of a church newspaper penned by a certain Trappist Father named Franz as well as in other contributions; it is after all a question of providing the desirable settlers from Austria and Germany with a clarion call to immigrate.¹²¹

Frequently the contrast between ›Orient‹ and ›Occident‹, which is here intensified into the polarity between ›Europe‹ and ›Asia‹, is shown in the texts by using examples from architecture; the splendid new Austro-Hungarian buildings of the narrated present stand in contrast to the quaint but ›primitive‹ and ›dirty‹ oriental house of the Ottoman past. The following is a quote from an automobile travel guide of 1908, which praises how »safe« the Balkans have become under the governing hand of Austria-Hungary:

97 The failed venture of the Joint Finance Minister Benjamin von Kállay, administrator of Bosnia from 1882-1903, is briefly worth mentioning here. Through the banning of national designations and/or organizations, and the imposition of a Bosnian identity (*bošnjaštvo*), he sought to conduct a ›homogenization‹ of the populace that went beyond religious creed. The anticipated land reform, which never occurred, also strengthened the ethnic difference, which was at the same time a social one. Burian was the first to allow the existence of political and religious organizations for the Serbs, Croats and Muslims. Cf. for e.g. Pinson 1994 and others.

98 The situation of the Bosnian Muslims and Serbs in this regard is well documented, as is the emancipation movement of the individual national churches. Cf. further Šehić, Nusret: *Autonomni pokret Muslimana za vrijeme austrougarske uprave u Bosni i Hercegovini*. Sarajevo: Svjetlost 1980; Madžar, Božo: *Pokret Srba za vjersku-prosvjetnu samoupravu*. Sarajevo: Svjetlost 1982.

99 Wolff, Larry: *Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment*. Stanford: Stanford UP 1994, p. 373.

100 On this cf. also Malcolm 2002, p. 148f.

101 Asbóth, Johann v.: *Bosnien und die Herzegowina. Reisebilder und Skizzen*. Vienna: Hölder 1888, p. 242. Other authors such as Moriz Hoernes und Robert Michel emphasize the ›melancholy‹ of the Herzegovinians, cf. Okuka/Rehder 1994, p. 45 and p. 72.

102 Hoernes, Moriz: *Bosnien und die Herzegowina*. Vienna: K. Graeser 1889, p. 106f. On Hoernes cf. Stachel 2003.

103 A century later the renowned historian Robert A. Kann 1977, p. 177 still stumbles into this conceptual trap when he categorizes Bosnian Muslims in general as ›Turkish speaking‹.

104 E.g. Schmid 1914, p. 247f., also makes reference to this.

105 Cf. Malcolm 1996/2002, p. 152.

106 [anonymous]: *Bosniens Gegenwart und nächste Zukunft*. Leipzig: Brockhaus 1886, p. 1 [emphasis i.o.].

Wir fuhren durch zahlreiche verträumte türkische Dörfer. Meist waren sie schmutzig und bestanden hauptsächlich aus Lehmhütten. Obgleich ein gewöhnlicher Wochentag, saßen die Türken in süßem Nichtstun unter den Türen ›ihrer Häuser‹. Der Ausdruck ihrer Gesichter verriet beim Anblick des Automobils nicht die geringste Bewegung. Auch wenn wir anhielten und nach der Straße fragten, kamen sie nicht näher.¹²²

Another stock motif that circulates in the travelogues and other textual documents of the time centres on the ›mystery‹ of the oriental woman in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which seems again and again to incite the fantasy of the Western male from Austria, Germany or Switzerland,¹²³ and to release a syntax fashioned from gendering. On the other hand, ›Filius‹ [!], the pseudonymous author of the aforementioned automobile travel guide, conducts himself in his account with an amazing serenity that verges on self-reflexivity when he writes:

Anders die Türkinnen. Die Harems sind leicht kenntlich an den vergitterten oder mit einem Vorhang versehenen Fenstern. Ich glaube, der Grad der Schüchternheit der Türkinnen steht in umgekehrtem Verhältnis zu ihrer Schönheit, denn diejenigen, die sich für mehr als Augenblick unverhüllt zeigten, waren zumeist hübsch. Wie merkwürdig es doch mit der Neugierde der Menschen bestellt ist! Läge nicht der Zauber des Geheimnisvollen über dem Haremsleben und seinen Bewohnern, die Türkinnen würden gewiß nicht mehr Interesse erregen als die Frauen irgend eines anderen Landes.¹²⁴

Yet it is precisely the veiled, forbidden and invisible nature of the ›Turkish‹ (read: Muslim) woman that is capable of sending some of the authors into veritable raptures. The description, though, does not offer up that which is seemingly obvious about the ›Oriental‹, but rather, on the contrary, that which no one may see, perhaps not even the author himself. It is here that the phantasma manifests itself.

It is striking, for instance, how Western texts often describe the fascinating and eroticizing ›primitiveness‹ of the foreigner through the use of a bathing scene as a thematic connection between race, gender and water, while the country itself appears ›dirty‹ on its surface. This applies to fin de siècle African ethnography as it does to the North German Bernard Wieman, who at the time traveled to Bosnia-Herzegovina at the invitation of an Austrian friend. Analyzing Wieman's text, it is possible to demonstrate its ›scopic regime‹ (Martin Jay), i.e. the principle by which the narrative directs the reader's gaze – a process that involves the transfer of the (erotic) curiosity of the beholder onto his sexual object:

Es naht die Zeit der Abendwaschung; die türkischen Mädchen kommen mit den schlanken Kannen an den Fluß, und wenn wir nahen, fliehen sie in holdem Schrecken und in Schamhaftigkeit; mir, dem Fremden, der ich alles mit staunenden Augen und empfänglich sehe, kommt es so vor; es mag Gewohnheit sein und Sitte, mich kümmert das nicht; es hat einen zauberhaften Reiz, diese schlanken Gestalten [...] flüchten zu sehen, zu sehen, wie sie sich hinter den Pflaumenbäumen und den Zäunen verbergen und doch staunend aus ihrem Versteck heimlich mit den Blicken uns verfolgen. Und wenn dann keine Giaren mehr auf der Veranda sitzen, dann werden die türkischen Mädchen [...] an das dunkle Ufer auf jener Seite zum Baden kommen, und die jungen Burschen werden sich an jenes Ufer schleichen und lockende Liebeslieder singen.¹²⁵

However, no travel account of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be complete without a description of the bazaar, especially of the Baščaršija in Sarajevo. Here, the Bosnian merchant, in his narratively emphasized indolence, can more often reckon with a higher popularity rating by the narrator than the overzealous Sephardic Jew. Renner raves:

Die Mohammedaner hegen noch immer keinen Konkurrenzneid und wenn die verlangte Ware nicht vorhanden ist, wird der Käufer freundlichst an den Nachbar verwiesen. [...] ¹²⁶

[...] erst nach und nach breitet der Mohammedaner seine Schätze aus, ein Stück nach dem andern holt er aus irgend einem Versteck. Er ist auch nicht unwillig, wenn kein Kaufabschluss erfolgt. Er wartet ruhig weiter, während die Spaniolen mit lautem Geschrei Kunden anzulocken versuchen.¹²⁷

107 On this topic cf. also Stachel 2003, p. 265.

108 On national gendering cf. also the forthcoming publication by American historian Diana Reynolds (San Diego): *Manufacturing Mother Austria: Arts and Crafts Reform and Austrian Identity in the Age of Imperialism* (1878-1918).

109 [anonymous]: *Historisch-Topographische Beschreibung von Bosnien und Serbien*. Vienna: Schrömbel 1821, pp. 8 and 12.

110 Cf. also Reber 2002.

111 Attems, Moriz Count: *Bosnien einst und jetzt*. Vienna: L.W. Seidel 1913, p. 27f.

112 *Ibid.*, p. 30.

113 Hoernes 1889, p. 108.

114 Anonymous 1886, p. 13.

115 Cf. the examples in Stachel 2003, p. 270.

116 Truhelka, Ćiro: *Volksleben*. In: *Die österr.-ungar. Monarchie in Wort und Bild*, vol. 12: *Bosnien und Hercegovina*. Vienna: Hof- u. Staatsdruckerei 1901, pp. 290-371, here p. 290.

117 *Ibid.*, p. 291.

118 Cf. Stanzel, Franz: *Europäer*. Ein imagologischer Essay. Heidelberg: C. Winter 21998.

119 The number of anonymously published textual documents one encounters in connection with Bosnia-Herzegovina is striking.

120 Anonymous 1886, p. IV.

121 Frater Franz: *Bosnien, ein Land für Ansiedlung*. In: *Weckstimmen für das katholische Volk* 9/11 (1878), p. 4. On the subject of the colonists cf. also Schmid 1914, p. 247f.; Renner 1896, p. 441ff.; Malcolm 2002, p. 142f.

122 Filius [pseud.]: *Eine Automobilreise durch Bosnien, die Herzegovina und Dalmatien*. Reiseschilderung für Automobilisten. Vienna: F. Beck s.a. [1908], p. 26.

123 Even the young Swiss writer Max Frisch muses in his 1933 Brief aus Sarajewo (in: Okukua/Rehder 1994, p. 102-106): »Wenn aber alles

What lies concealed behind this German critique of Capitalism is closet anti-Semitism. Also Wieman openly voices his preferences when he describes the inhabitants of Banjaluka: »[...] zur Hälfte sind es Mohammedaner; aber das sind sehr gute, brave Leute, die keinem ein Unrecht tun, sie haben hier 40 Moscheen; sind sehr fromm, glaube ich, und sie gefallen mir besser als die Serben und die Spaniolen.«¹²⁸ Approbation and disapprobation are thus expressed from the perspective of the ›superiorly civilized‹ German observer, who is bolstered by the knowledge that the cultural hegemony of the Austro-Hungarian occupation force is behind him. The point of view ossifies into a scopic regime that is supposed to work as ›reading glasses‹ that try to direct the recipient's opinion.

Narrative contact with the Other in Bosnia represents a type of exoticism¹²⁹ that is typical at the turn-of-the-century; here, however, it serves not only the colorful import of foreign images, but also the justification of Austro-Hungarian rule and political disenfranchisement. But still, the very periphery that is to be civilized is also worth protecting. As is frequently the case in the European imagination since the 18th century, the foreigner becomes something of an ambiguous amalgam. At times s/he is the poor barbarian, whom it is necessary to ›civilize‹, at others, the noble savage, who lives in a lost paradise.¹³⁰ Sometimes, though, s/he even appears eerily similar to oneself, a kind of mirror image without the ›degeneration‹ of the West.¹³¹ Heinrich Renner comments along these lines »dass auch die Moslims trotz der Polygamie und der Abgeschlossenheit der Frauen Fleisch von unserem Fleisch sind, dass sich bei ihnen alles findet, was wir in unserem Volksleben beobachten. Nur ein grosser Teil der Laster mangelt und das ist entschieden kein Fehler.«¹³²

The inscrutable ethnic complexity of Bosnia propels one either to the maintenance of the official Austro-Hungarian equipoise towards all cultural groups or to partisanship. Where the Berliner Renner can feel enthusiastic about the Muslims in a style which reminds one of the descriptions of North American natives, Austrian texts, particularly those of anonymous origin, would rather demand the removal of the potential danger. In the process, arguments such as »the Turkish resentment« and a reticent attitude towards the modern age are brought into play when it comes to denouncing the Muslims.¹³³ As one source text quite openly opines: »[E]s lässt sich ja doch die orientalische Frage in populärer Weise nicht anders ausdrücken als ›hinaus mit den Türken‹. Nirgends wird man daraus Oesterreich einen Vorwurf machen.«¹³² The author of this self-published text is a certain Dr. Josef Neupauer, who, incidentally, not only suggests the expulsion of the Muslims but also the conversion of whole Bosnia-Herzegovina into a kind of corporation (»*Aktiengesellschaft*«) in the interests of better economy.

Admittedly, the Bosnian Serbs make out even worse. With their alleged national pride actually attributed not only to their women,¹³⁵ they generally find even less approval in the texts than the Muslims, who are ambivalently coded all the same. For instance, it is said that

Allein bei dem Serbenthum bestehen manche andere Hemmnisse, welche es bedenklich erscheinen lassen dürften, dasselbe zum herrschenden Staatselement zu erheben. Da ist vor allem die verhältnismäßig niedere Kulturstufe, auf welcher das bosnische Serbenthum bis zur Stunde steht, namentlich in den höhern Volksschichten, dem handeltreibenden und besonders dem geistlichen Stande.¹³⁶

The Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the other hand, are backed by a strong lobby. This can be seen not only in the case of Milena Preindlsberger-Mrazović, a Viennese of Croatian descent and editor of the *Bosnian Post*, who writes in her *Bosnisches Skizzenbuch* (1909) of Kreševo and its Franciscan monastery:

In den schmalen Tälern dieser Berggebilde lebt ein scheues, dunkelgekleidetes, ungeheuer gutartiges Volk, die Katholiken, gleichsam in Verstecken.[...] Diese Streiter für ihren Gott und ihr Volk nötigten selbst ihren Verfolgern, den Muhamedanern, Ehrerbietung ab. Nicht selten suchen Muhamedaner bei den Fratres Rat und Hilfe in Unglücks- und Krankheitsfällen.¹³⁷

An examination of the texts of the Austro-Hungarian administration reveals that they suggest, time and again, the strengthening of the Croatian element of the population on account of its ›occidental‹ transparency and, more importantly, its religious and political loyal to the Empire. Then there are also Croatian politicians like Ferdinand von Šišić, a university

vermummt ist, so gibt sich der Mann
mit dem Wenigsten zufrieden«
(p. 105).

124 Filius [1908], p. 26f.

125 Wieman, Bernard: *Bosnisches
Tagebuch*. Kempten, Munich: Kösel
1908, p. 44.

126 Renner 1896, p. 50f.

127 Ibid., p. 55.

128 Wieman 1908, p. 19.

129 Cf. for e.g. Jacobs, Angelika:
›Wildnis‹ als Wunschraum westlicher
Zivilisation. Zur Kritik des Exotismus
in Peter Altenbergs *Ashantee* und Ro-
bert Müllers *Tropen*. In: *Kakanien re-
visited*, www.kakanien.ac.at/beitr/
fallstudie/AJacobs1.pdf [30.03.2002].

130 Stachel 2003, p. 263, outlines
the imagery applied to the ›Balkans‹
with the attributes ›oriental‹, ›foreign‹,
›backward‹, ›effeminate‹, ›infantile‹,
›immature‹ – these can, however,
also be understood as ›naturalness‹,
as exotically delightful; in any event,
these stereotypes signal a ›Hand-
lungsbedarf von außen‹.

131 The discourse of degeneration
booms around 1900 and, looked
at in this way, may certainly also be
considered as a further formative
stamp on European popular Orien-
talism.

132 Renner 1896, p. 75.

133 Cf. anonymous 1886.

134 Neupauer, Josef: *Wie könnte
die europäische Cultur nach Bosnien
verpflanzt werden?* *Viribus Unitis*.
Vienna: publ. by the author 1884,
p. 21.

135 So, for e.g., Wieman 1908, p.
119: ›Schöne Frauen gehen neben
ihm [= a cart, CR] her; sie tragen
weite schwarze Hosen und auf dem
Kopfe die rote Serbenmütze mit dem
leuchtend roten, hinten geknoteten
und herabfallenden Tuch. Sie schrei-
ten sehr stolz und königlich, und
über ihren Stirnen glänzt ein reicher
goldener Schmuck. Es kommt mir
ungewohnt vor, wieder ungeniert in
das Gesicht eines Weibes schauen
zu können nach meiner Wanderung
durch die Türkendörfer.‹

136 Anonymous 1886, p. 16.

137 Quidt. in Okuka/Rehder 1994,
p. 65f.

professor and member of the regional parliament in Zagreb, who, after the annexation in 1908, attempts to demonstrate with much historical misrepresentation that Bosnia had always been Croatian;¹³⁸ his argument is directed principally against the hegemonic power ruling the Croats, i.e., the Kingdom of Hungary, which thinks itself capable of asserting its historical rights on the basis of Bosnia's belonging to its domain of state in the Late Middle Ages. According to Šišić, however, the Croatian on Bosnian soil ought to win his independence as well as a new position of supremacy.

IV. *NachBildungen*: Appropriations and Incorporations of the Other

All narratives that have been sketched here,¹³⁹ as disparate as they may seem in places, are overarched by the discourse of civilization and culture, which is supposed to be implanted, as it were, in the Balkans. The symbolic incorporation of Bosnia-Herzegovina follows in the wake of its military occupation and administrative affiliation. In this context might be considered (*mutatis mutandis*) what Catherine Hall writes in her exemplary study on the relationship between ›white‹ homeland (England) and ›black‹ colony (Jamaica):

Marking differences was a way of classifying, of categorising, of making hierarchies, of constructing boundaries for the body politic and the body social. Processes of differentiation, positioning men and women, colonisers and colonised, as if these divisions were natural, were constantly in the making, in conflicts of power. The most basic tension of empire was that ›the otherness of colonised persons was neither inherent nor stable: his or her difference had to be defined and maintained‹. This meant that ›a grammar of difference was continuously and vigilantly crafted as people in colonies refashioned and contested European claims to superiority‹. The construction of this ›grammar of difference‹ was the cultural work of both colonisers and colonised.¹⁴⁰

This brings us to the problem of representation at a meta-level as well. If it is supposed to be more than simply a ledger list of the textual constructs of a ›grammar of difference‹, a serious imagological analysis like the presented research project cannot but pay heed to the methodological crisis it encounters when dealing with the (stereotypical) images. By the same token, however, it ought also to resist the temptation of wanting to ›correct‹ these images in reference to a ›reality‹: After all, there is no ›real‹ escape from the maelstrom of the images. For the researcher, there remains only the reference to their projected phantasmatic nature, which is immanent in all these images and formations, and to the political instrumentalization of the discourses, which they take up – without being able to dismiss the affective power of the images completely. In his latest book, the Anglicist Graham Huggan has pointed to a further ›dilemma‹ by asking:

[...] is it possible to account for cultural difference without at the same time mystifying it? To locate and praise the other without also privileging the self? To promote the cultural margins without ministering the needs of the mainstream? To construct an object of study that resists, and possibly forestalls, its own commodification? The postcolonial exotic is the name that one might give to this dilemma, a name that accompanies the emergence of postcolonial studies as an institutional field.¹⁴¹

Huggan's reproach would thus be that Postcolonial Studies, with its self-ascribed political mission of changing perspectives and/or properly adjusting viewpoints, does not really undermine exoticism as such, but rather re-inscribes it in a politically correct format and, in doing so, makes it socially palatable. Nevertheless, a ›postcolonial‹ critical imagology seems sensible where an egregious political imbalance of the images is notable. The stereotypes may in fact reflect nothing ›real‹, but they do achieve something in the *Lebenswelt* of social realities.

In symbolic practice, however, Austrian exoticism vis-à-vis Bosnia-Herzegovina, i.e., the fiction of otherness and of a periphery in dire need of civilization, always turns out to be inherently threatened by the potential heterogeneity and presumed decadence of its own culture, i.e. the Habsburg Monarchy. As a foreigner in the oriental Balkans, fixed as they are by inscrutable inner differences between Serbs, Croats and Turks, on the one hand, and Muslims, Christians and Jews, on the other, the Austrian intruder encounters, in this opaque

138 Šišić, Ferdinand v.: Nach der Annexion. Erörterungen geographischer, ethnographischer, historischer u. staatsrechtlicher Fragen Herzeg-Bosnien betreffend. Ein Vortrag gehalten zu Laibach am 14. November 1908. Zagreb: Kroatische Rechtspartei 1909.

139 Further analysis will have to reveal, to what extent these ›long wave‹ conceptual worlds, which are provisionally presented here as synchronic, change or do not change along the path of their historical development

140 Hall 2002, p. 17f. In the quote reproduced above, Hall, for her part, quotes from Cooper, Frederick/Stoler, Ann Laura: *Tensions of Empire. Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*. Berkeley: Univ. of California Pr. 1997, p. 3f. and p. 7.

141 Huggan, Graham: *The postcolonial Exotic. Marketing the Margins*. London, New York: Routledge 2001, p. 31f.

142 Cf. Wieman 1908, p. 94ff.

143 Renner 1896, p. 230.

144 Andrić, Ivo: *The Bridge over the Drina*. Trans. by Lovett F. Edwards. London: Harvill 1994., p. 177ff. Cf. also Antić, Marina: *Living in the Shadow of the Bridge*. Ivo Andrić's *The Bridge over the Drina* and Western Imaginings of Bosnia. In: *Spaces of Identity 3.3* (2003), www.spacesofidentity.net.

145 The threshold between Orient and Occident is a frequent motif and metaphor in texts on Bosnia.

146 Andrić 1945/94, p. 141.

147 *Ibid.*, p. 135, p. 139.

148 It would be incorrect to assume that the Habsburg myth had only been an instrument of Austro-Hungarian rule and that the Bosnian intelligentsia rejected it; this would mean misjudging the logic of rule, which exists precisely in the assertion and internalization of the hegemonic symbolism of culture. A rather crass example of this is a book from the respected Bosnian social scientist Smail Balić, who, against the background of the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, naively views the Austrians as historic ›Ordnungs- und Kulturträger‹ in Bosnia-Herzegovina: »Die bosnischen Muslime verdanken

alterity, his own unfathomable heterogeneity and hybridity; themes that are constantly revisited in literary texts, as for example in the form of the Czech gendarmes on border patrol in Herbert Wieman's *Bosnisches Tagebuch*.¹⁴² The journalist Renner furnishes an even more curious example when he describes the inns of Konjic in Herzegovina from the outside perspective of an imperial German:

Es haben sich in diesem einst durch den Fanatismus seiner Bevölkerung berüchtigten Orte eine Menge Fremde niedergelassen und mehrere Gasthäuser (›Elephant‹, ›König von Ungarn‹, ›Kaiser von Oesterreich‹ und besonders die Bahnhofsrestauration) bieten eine ganz gute Verpflegung. Als ich im Jahre 1885 einmal in Konjica übernachtete, genoss das Gasthaus ›zum Kaiser von Oesterreich‹ durch seine dicke Wirtin, die ›Schmauswaberl‹, in der ganzen Herzegovina einen wohlverdienten Ruf. Nicht etwa durch die Schönheit der Wirtin, denn diese war sehr negativer Natur, sondern durch die vorzügliche Küche.¹⁴³

The gastronomy seems positively predestined for cultural *hybridity*. The example of an East Galician Jew who operates a (Viennese) hotel café amidst Serbs and Muslims even found its way into the work of the Croatian-Bosnian author Ivo Andrić (1892-1975).¹⁴⁴

With his famous, oft-quoted and oft-misused 1945 novel *Na Drini ćuprija* (*The Bridge over the Drina*), the Yugoslav Nobel Prize laureate certainly provides more than just standard reading fare for the knapsacks of later crisis tourists, where several centuries of Bosnian history parade by in compact episodes. In his depiction of the period of Austro-Hungarian occupation, Andrić nurtures a point of view that casts an eye at both shores of the river Drina, a fitting complement to the central cultural symbol of the bridge with which the text posits Bosnia as the link between East and West, Occident and Orient.¹⁴⁵ In a narrative construction typical of the novel, the narrator, who stands above time, and the bridge over the waters practically merge into one, as if to suggest that the edifice itself reports the story. The result is the emergence of a stereoscopic, hybrid optic, which criticizes the Austrian invaders' obsession with civilization and ›cleanliness‹¹⁴⁶, without, however, falling prey to a nationalistic counter-discourse of naïve ›nativeness‹, which would view an insistence on ›tradition‹ as truly desirable. In the swaying bridge arch of his irony, so to speak, the narrator dismisses both extremes. He wonders, amongst other things, what restlessness drives the Austro-Hungarian occupiers:

The newcomers were never at peace; and they allowed no one else to live in peace. It seemed that they were resolved with their impalpable yet ever more noticeable web of laws, regulations and orders to embrace all forms of life, men, beasts and things, and to change and alter everything, both the outward appearance of the town and the custom and habits of men from the cradle to the grave. All they did quietly without many words, without force or provocation, so that a man had nothing to protest about. [...]

This continual need of the newcomers to build and rebuild, to dig and to put back again, to put up and to modify, this eternal desire of theirs to foresee the action of natural forces, to avoid or surmount them, no one either understood or appreciated.¹⁴⁷

It is as if the arches of the bridge also connect the national stereotypes and with that the ambivalence invested in them. The disapproval of the hectic bustle of the Austro-Hungarian invaders contains at once a hint of praise for their civilization as well as an admonishment of the ›lazy‹ ›Oriental‹. The desire to attach a general message to the construct of the text, however, represents an impracticable task, for the perspective of the story frequently remains uncertain; it is not clear who speaks here, the figures or the omniscient bridge-narrator who strategically constructs this intermediate position. At the same time, the narrator develops a very odd, self-reflexive variant of the Habsburg myth,¹⁴⁸ one which remains cognizant of the principle of foreign rule and which places the narrative of k.u.k. Civilisation and Pax Austriaca squarely in the dubious light of irony and illusion, thereby tracing the myth of civilization back to its own phantasmatic structure:

Such were those three decades of relative prosperity and apparent peace in the Franz-Josef manner, when many Europeans thought that there was an infallible formula for the realization of a centuries-old dream of full and happy development

Österreich ihre weitgehende Europäisierung, durch die sie ihren Anschluß an die moderne Welt gefunden haben.« (Balić, Smail: Das unbekannte Bosnien. Europas Brücke zur islamischen Welt. Cologne et al.: Böhlau 1992 [Kölner Veröff. zur Religionsgesch. 23]).

149 Andrić 1945/94, p. 173.

150 Ibid., p. 173f.

151 Ibid., p. 136.

152 Ibid., p. 174.

153 Cf. Bhabha, Homi: *The Location of Culture*. London, New York: Routledge 1994.

of individuality in freedom and progress [...]. But to this remote Bosnian township only broken echoes penetrated of all this life of the nineteenth century, and those only to the extent and in the form in which this backward oriental society could receive them and in its own manner understand and accept them.¹⁴⁹

The people found order, work and security. That was enough to ensure that here too life, outward life at least, set out ›on the road of perfection and progress‹. Everything else was flushed away into that dark background of consciousness where live and ferment the basic beliefs of individual races, faiths and castes, which, to all appearances dead and buried, are preparing for later far-off unsuspected changes and catastrophes, without which, it seems, peoples cannot exist and above all the peoples of this land. The new authorities, after the first misunderstandings and clashes, left among the townspeople a definite impression of firmness and of permanence (they were themselves impregnated with this belief without which there can be no strong and permanent authority). They were impersonal and indirect and for that reason more easily bearable than the former Turkish rulers.¹⁵⁰

In this ›illusionistic‹ process of narrative irony certain ethnic stereotypes nevertheless remain in place as does the myth of the ›just‹ Austro-Hungarian rule; they are, however, in quotation marks, as it were, and are deferred, so to speak, in light of the utopia of a metamorphosis, which Andrić develops. Nothing and no one keeps its form – not even the rule of Austria-Hungary. Against the problematic civilizing task of the Austrian texts, which fantasize about education and development, Andrić sets the hybridity of a conglomerate as both a combination and, in a further step, a transformation of the heterogeneous:

Old ideas and old values clashed with the new ones, merged with them or existed side by side, as if waiting to see which would outlive which.¹⁵¹

On the other hand, after a certain time, even these newcomers were unable to avoid completely the influence of the unusual oriental milieu in which they had to live. [...] It is true that the local people, especially the Christians and Jews, began to look more and more like the newcomers in dress and behaviour, but the newcomers themselves did not remain unchanged and untouched [...].¹⁵²

Andrić shows here the beginning undecidedness of an intermediary state of colonial existence, a state of ›de-automatizing‹, as to which image of the Orient is meant and precisely what cultural position Austrians and Bosnians occupy within it. This could be more than just the loss of one's ›roots‹ and, on the other hand, even transcend Bhabha's concepts of *mimikry* and hybridity.¹⁵³ Perhaps, in the hope for a future ›uncommon‹ Oriental or Westerner (who thus resists stereotyping), and in the idea of the transitory nature of every rule and the permanent metamorphosis of culture/s, there also exists that small residual utopia. Those who research stereotypes might accept it as a possible solution to their aforementioned dilemmas, at least on a (retrospective and individualistic) literary level. It remains uncertain, however, if this is of any general comfort for those who were actually – as social groups – exposed to the ambivalent political and economic practices of a patronizing k.u.k. colonialism, and its aftermath.

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